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Abstract 
The ability to perceive emotion in others has been proposed as an 
important component of emotional intelligence (EI). Indeed, perhaps the only 
independent aspect of EI which is not simply a manifestation of personality or 
cognitive ability. 
This thesis investigates the status of emotional perception (EP) within the 
EI framework. Chapter 1 discusses a number of controversies within the EI 
literature and identifies EP as the most important aspect of EI. Chapter 2 
describes the difficulties with the measurement of EP and evaluates its 
potential theoretical contributions. It then reports the development and 
validation of a scale designed to measure EP. 
Successive Chapters investigate the influence of EP in three main 
theoretical areas. First, the role of EP in academic performance and its 
potential longitudinal effects are evaluated in two longitudinal studies. EP is 
compared with scales measuring other aspects of EI, a personality inventory, a 
measure of cognitive ability, a well-being scale and a coping scale in order to 
assess the reliability and validity of the measures, and to evaluate their inter-
correlations. Additionally, the relationship between EP and various types of 
academic achievement is explored in order to assess the predictive validity of 
EP. Second, a quasi-experimental design is employed in order to investigate 
the role of EP in social interaction. The experience of embarrassment when 
delivering class presentations is used to investigate these effects. Third, a 
series of experimental studies, using the attentional bias framework, consider 
the effects of EP on the focus of attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. 
The thesis presents evidence to suggest that EP is a semi-independent 
construct within EI. It can be assessed reliably, demonstrates validity, is a 
practically useful construct, and influences moment-by-moment regulation of 
behaviour. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently 
opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident. /I 
(Schopenhauer, German philosopher) 
There has been an explosion of interest in the topic of Emotional Intelligence 
(EI) during the past decade. The term EI was first coined by Salovey & Mayer (1990) 
who defined it as: 
"the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to 
discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking and 
actions" (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p.189). 
The telID EI was popularised in Daniel Goleman's influential book: 
"Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ" (Goleman, 1995) 
and its surrounding pUblicity. Since then, a wide range of, predominantly popular, 
books and articles have examined the nature and development of EI at both the 
individual and occupational level and both have received intense media attention. 
There are several reasons for the rise of interest in EI. One explanation is that 
EI fits in well with today's contemporary society which is concerned with caring 
attitudes and environmental responsibility. Second, the topic is appealing as it implies 
that people with high EI, even if lacking in cognitive intelligence may still be highly 
successful in life. Third, the failure of intellectual intelligence (IQ) to account for a 
large proportion of variance in peliormance has resulted in the search for other 
characteristics, such as EI, that may also influence perfOlIDance (discussed later in the 
Chapter). Finally, EI may have become popular due to the claims that it can make us 
happy, rich, healthy and successful. Such claims need to be reviewed and investigated 
scientificall y. 
This Chapter examines the role of emotion and cognition within traditional 
views of intelligence which lead to the development of the EI concept. It presents a 
critical analysis of current theories of EI, discusses measures purporting to assess the 
1. General Introduction 
whole concept of EI, examines whether EI may represent a construct which is 
independent from cognitive and personality factors and discusses the role of EI in 
performance. 
The Age of Reason 
"The more bureaucracy is dehumanised, the more completely it succeeds in 
eliminating from official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational and 
emotional elements which escape calculation." Weber (1948) 
For many years the study of intelligence primarily focused on the rational, 
objective function of cognition (e.g., Piaget, 1972). In conjunction with this, 
traditional views have classified emotions as being disorganised, irrational 
disturbances of the mind which should be controlled. Somewhat ironically, as 
illustrated in the quote above, this actually makes emotion the centre of the theory of 
bureaucracy rather than its periphery. It is because emotion is so important in human 
activity that organisations must impose rules and regulations upon it. Rationality is 
the artificial construction which human beings have developed in order to pursue their 
ends most effectively. This way of thinking lead to the development of the harsh 
business ethos and "tough love" so common during the 1980's. 
The Age of Passion 
"The balance of our lives has one scale of reason, another of sensuality, blood and 
raging motions." Othello, Act 1 Scene 3 
More recently, there has been a realisation that emotion and cognition are 
inextricably linked and that we cannot afford to choose between the head and heart, 
anymore than we would choose to walk on one leg or see with one eye. Researchers 
such as Gardner (1983) and Sternberg (1988; 1999) have suggested taking a wider 
approach to understanding intelligence, and emotions have emerged as having 
organisational and adaptive properties which may be crucial in the management of 
actions (Damasio, 1994). These two developing lines of thought have brought the 
concepts of emotion and intelligence closer together, and researchers have attempted 
to incorporate EI within the traditional intelligence framework (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan, 
& Caputi, 2000; Dawda & Hart, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
Evidence from neuroscience adds further weight to the argument that cognition and 
2 
1. General Introduction 
emotion are inextricably linked, with neither being able to function fully without some 
input from the other (e.g., Damasio, 1994). 
Different approaches to emotional intelligence 
Research evidence suggests that EI consists of a set of related adaptive abilities: 
verbal and nonverbal appraisal and expression of emotion in the self and others, 
regulation of emotion in the self and others and use of emotion to guide thinking and 
facilitate peliormance (e.g., Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Martinez-Pons, 1997; 
Mayer & Geher, 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Within this framework of adaptive 
abilities it has been proposed that EI consists of a number of underlying components, 
often referred to as factors. There is some debate over the nature of these components 
and no agreed consensus as to how many there are. A number of the different 
approaches to EI are summarised in Table 1.1. 
Salovey & Mayer (1990) for instance, suggested that EI consists of three 
categories of adaptive abilities relating to self and others: appraisal and expression of 
emotion, regulation of emotion and utilisation of emotion in solving problems. Mayer 
& Salovey (1997) revised this original model of EI to place more emphasis on the 
cognitive components of EI and conceptualise EI in terms of potential for intellectual 
and emotional growth. The revised model consists of four branches of EI: perception, 
appraisal and expression of emotion, emotional facilitation of thinking, understanding, 
analysing and employing emotional knowledge and reflective regulation of emotions. 
The perception, appraisal and expression of emotion are viewed as the most basic 
processes, while the reflective regulation of emotions requires the most complex 
cognitive processing. The Four Cornerstone Model of EI (Cooper, 1997), suggests 
that it consists of four components: emotional literacy, emotional fitness, emotional 
depth and emotional alchemy, which represent the driving force behind competitive 
advantage in the workplace. Goleman (1998) analysed job competencies in 121 
organisations, and proposed that EI consists of self-awareness, self-management, 
social awareness and social skills. Dulewicz & Higgs (1999) suggest EI is linked to 
competencies and developed a conceptualisation of EI based on a 7-year follow-up 
study with general managers. They postulate that EI consists of seven competencies: 
self-awareness, conscientiousness and integrity, motivation, emotional resilience, 
decisiveness, influence and interpersonal sensitivity. 
3 
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Table 1.1 Different approaches to emotional intelligence. 
Components of EI Researchers 
Self-awareness (Dulewicz & Higgs, 1999; Goleman, 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; 
Salov~ & Mayer, 1990) 
Appraisal and Expression (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) 
Perception (Davies et ai., 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) 
Understanding/Clarity (Goleman, 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) 
ReKulation (May~r & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) 
ManagementiUtilisation (Cooper, 1997; Goleman, 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990) 
Motivation (Cooper, 1997; Dulewicz & Higgs, 1999) 
Social/Interpersonal skills (Dulewicz & Higgs, 1999; Goleman, 1998) 
Criticisms of these approaches include the fact that much of the evidence 
proposed has been anecdotal and many studies have not measured related constructs 
such as cognitive, social and intellectual processes. As a result, it is unclear whether 
EI is simply a loosely connected set of abilities measuring aspects of personality and 
cognition and we are left wondering whether EI is unitary, factorial, or if it even exists 
at all. 
More recent research has shown that the concept of EI may be far narrower than 
proposed by many current theoretical models. For example, Davies et al. (1998) used 
a relatively large sample (total N = 530) to explore the concept of EI in a series of 
three studies. Participants were presented with self-report measures of EI, "objective" 
measures of EI (such as facial expressions and excerpts of music), personality 
questionnaires, fluid and crystallised intelligence tests and social intelligence 
measures. The results of these studies suggest that the concept of EI is limited by the 
tests used to measure it and it was concluded: 
"as presently postulated, little remains of emotional intelligence that is unique 
and psychometrically sound." (Davies et aI., 1998, p.1013) 
However, their data provided some evidence for the existence of an 
independent emotional perception (EP) factor representing the ability to monitor 
another individual's emotions. Indeed, they argue that EP is perhaps the only aspect 
of EI which is independent from personality and cognitive ability. Investigating the 
status of EP is the focus of the thesis. 
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Applications of emotional intelligence 
EI has been proposed to have applications in a number of important areas in 
everyday life, including well-being and health, happiness, work, education, 
interpersonal relationships, psychiatry and financial decisions (Ciarrochi, Forgas, & 
Mayer,2001). A selection of these potential applications are outlined in this section. 
In terms of well-being, health and happiness, people who can understand, 
regulate and manage their emotions should be able to maintain a better outlook on life 
and experience better emotional health. Research has shown that poor management of 
emotions can lead to health problems such as heart disease and makes individuals 
vulnerable to stress (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). EI abilities have also been associated 
with positive mood and higher self-esteem (Schutte, Malouff, Simunck, McKenley, & 
Hollander, 2002), less depression (Martinez-Pons, 1997; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, 
Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998), and greater optimism (Schutte et aI., 
1998). 
EI has been shown to be highly correlated with self-actualisation (e.g Bar-On, 
2001; Goleman, 1998). Self-actualisation consists of a number of aspects. These 
include the ability to actualise potential, enrich life, to set and achieve goals and 
commitment to interests. EI has been shown to be a more important predictor of self-
actualisation than IQ. This suggests that emotionally intelligent individuals are able to 
actualise their potential in life even if their cognitive intelligence is relatively low. 
Just as EI components such as self-awareness, effective problem solving and 
motivation influence the ability to actualise our potential, self-actualisation influences 
general well-being and health as well as effectiveness at work (Bar-On, 2001). 
EI abilities appear to be involved in maintaining happy 10ng-telID relationships. 
Mmital researchers have demonstrated that the better spouses are at perceiving, 
accurately identifying, expressing and regulating emotions, the happier and more 
stable their relationships are (Fitness, 2001). 
EI has an important role to play in education. In order for individuals to succeed 
in life, it seems that EI skills are just as important as traditional cognitive abilities 
(Goleman, 1995). Indeed, recognition of this has lead to the implementation of a wide 
range of social and emotional learning programs in schools, resulting in positive 
outcomes (e.g., better teaching, less aggression and drug usage). It is emphasised that 
both teachers and parents must be trained in the implementation of EI skills in order 
for such programs to be most effective (Elias, Hunter, & Kress, 2001). 
The potential role of EI in petiormance, both in terms of occupational success 
and academic achievement, is discussed in a separate section later in the Chapter as 
this area is of more relevance to the thesis. 
5 
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To summarise, it appears that EI abilities are essential to maintaining happy, 
healthy and successful lives. Many bold claims have been made regarding the 
potential applications of EI, but thorough, scientific investigation of these claims is 
still in its infancy. 
Measuring emotional intelligence 
There are a number of measures claiming to assess various components of EI, 
which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but there are a limited number of measures 
that purport to assess the whole concept of EI. Four of the more widely known are 
reviewed in the following section and a summary is presented in Table 1.2 below. 
Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I, Bar-On, 1997) 
In contrast with researchers such as Mayer & Salovey (1997) who believe in the 
importance of connecting: 
"emotions with intelligence (in order to ensure) the meanings of the two terms 
are preserved" (p.3) 
Bar-On (1997), defined EI as: 
"an array of non-cognitive capabilities, competencies and skills that influence 
one's ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures" (p.14). 
Using this definition Bar-On developed the EQ-i, a 133-item self-report 
inventory to assess EI. Items are summed to yield a total score, which reflects overall 
EI, scores on 5 higher order composite factors (Intra-Personal, Inter-Personal, 
Adaptability, Stress Management, and General Mood) and 15 lower-order component 
scales (Emotional Self-Awareness, Assertiveness, Self-Regard, Self-Actualisation, 
Independence, Empathy, Interpersonal Relationships, Social Responsibility, Problem 
Solving, Reality Testing, Flexibility, Stress Tolerance, Impulse Control, Happiness 
and Optimism). A substantial body of research, summarised in the EQ-i manual, 
indicates that the scales generally have good internal consistency (alpha coefficients 
range from 0.69 to 0.86 across 10 studies) and test-retest reliability. Factor analysis 
also provides some support for the hypothesised structure of the EQ-i. Further 
unpublished reports cited in the EQ-i manual suggest that scores on various sub-scales 
have been used to discriminate between academically successful and unsuccessful 
students and successful and unsuccessful US Air Force recruiters (Bar-On, 1997). 
More recent research also provides evidence for the EQ-i identifying differences 
6 
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between police officers and care workers in relation to occupational stress (Bar-On, 
Brown, Kirkcaldy, & Thome, 2000). 
Although heralded as being a comprehensive account of EI, there are a number 
of limitations with the EQ-i. First, the measure shows considerable overlap with 
traditional measures of personality (detailed in the later section looking at the 
relationship between EI and personality). 
Second, the EQ-i does not appear to be related to cognitive ability, but the EQ-i 
manual claims that it is related to successful academic outcomes (Bar-On, 1997). As 
part of their study, Newsome, Day, & Catano (2000) examined whether the EQ-i 
would account for vmiance in academic achievement scores after controlling for 
cognitive ability scores. Individual scores on personality were also controlled to 
assess whether the EQ-i was measuring aspects of personality (not measured by more 
traditional personality measures) that are related to academic achievement. Results 
showed no support for the predictive validity of the EQ-i. While both cognitive 
ability (assessed by the Wonderlic) and personality were significantly associated with 
academic achievement (Grade-point averages), neither the total EQ-i score nor the 15 
sub-scales were significantly correlated with Grade-point average. Correlation 
coefficients ranged from -0.13 to 0.10 (see later section on EI and academic 
achievement). Consequently, even if we accept Bar-On's view that EI is embedded 
within the personality framework, the 16PF still does a better job of predicting 
academic achievement. 
Third, even though the EQ-i consists of 133 items and 15 sub-scales, a, further 
criticism is that it fails to address the component of EP. Considering EP has been 
argued as potentially being a semi-independent construct within the EI framework 
(Davies et aI., 1998), a measure purporting to assess all aspects of EI is hardly 
complete without this component. 
33-item measure of emotional intelligence (Schutte et aI., 1998) 
Schutte et aI. (1998), developed a 33-item measure of EI based on the original 
model of EI developed by Salovey & Mayer (1990). The scale purportedly measures: 
"a homogeneous construct of emotional intelligence" (p.175). 
The scale was found to be reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90. It showed good 
test-retest reliability over a two-week period (0.78), proved to be different from 
cognitive ability as measured by the SAT, [r(41) = -0.06, n.s.], showed discriminant 
validity over and above personality measures (scores were significantly related to 
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Openness but not to any of the other big five dimensions, detailed in the section below 
on the relationship between EI and personality) and showed evidence of predictive 
validity as scores on the EI scale significantly predicted grade point average at the end 
of the year, [r(63) = 0.32, P < 0.01], Factor analysis showed the 33-item measure had 
a one factor solution allegedly assessing a general EI factor. However, as pointed out 
by Petrides & Fumham (2000) this factor solution leaves 82.6% of the total variance 
still unexplained and uses only 33 of the original 62-items. A unifactorial solution 
suggests that the scale has not been successfully mapped onto Salovey & Mayer's 
(1990) model of EI as it would be expected to have three factors corresponding to the 
three subdomains of Salovey & Mayer's original EI model. Following a re-analysis of 
the scale, Petrides & Fumham (2000) found it did not have a unitary solution but 
consisted of four factors. These factors accounted for 40.4% of the total variance and 
were labelled: 'optimism/mood regulation', 'appraisal of emotions', 'social skills' and 
'utilisation of emotions'. This solution fits better with Salovey & Mayer's original 
model, but still does not map on exactly as 'social skills' represents an additional 
factor. This suggests that the scale does not successfully sample the three sub-
domains of EI proposed in the original model. A further criticism pertains to the scale 
not containing items relating to important aspects of EI such as EP and emotional 
clarity. The scale constructed by Schutte et al. (1998) has not been widely applied and 
the only supporting evidence appears to be from the authors themselves. 
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS, Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
1999) 
In an attempt to improve on the weaknesses of self-report measures of EI, Mayer 
et al. (1999) have developed an "objective" measure of EI called the Multifactor 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). The test is objective in that there are correct 
answers based on pre-determined scoring criteria. The MEIS consists of 12 scales 
divided into four hierarchical branches of EI. The perception and appraisal of 
emotion is the most basic branch of EI and is measured by having people identify 
emotion in faces, stories, designs and music. The second branch involves the ability 
to assimilate emotions into perceptual and cognitive processes, including weighting 
emotions against one another and against other sensations and thoughts, and allowing 
emotions to direct attention. The third branch of EI involves reasoning about and 
understanding emotions. High EI people know, for example, that anger often changes 
to sadness and that emotions can combine together to result in certain feelings. The 
forth and highest branch of EI involves the management and regulation of emotions in 
oneself and others, such as knowing how to remain calm when provoked or being able 
to alleviate the anxiety of another person. Factor analysis of the MEIS suggests that 
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the four branches can be reduced to three factors, namely perception and appraisal of 
emotion (branch 1), understanding emotions (combining branches 2 and 3), and 
managing emotions (branch 4). 
The MEIS sub-tests can be scored in one of three different ways. The first, 
favoured by the authors, involves determining how closely a participant's answer 
matches a consensus answer. For example, if most people think a particular face is 
expressing a great deal of happiness, then it is assumed that it does indeed express a 
great deal of happiness. People who do not judge the face to express happiness are 
'less correct' than others. A second way is based on judgements made by a panel of 
experts. Participants who agree with the expert judgements tend to get higher scores 
than those who do not agree. The third scoring criterion is based on the extent to 
which the participant guesses how a target (e.g. musician) was feeling at the time they 
were engaged in an activity (e.g., playing music). 
The MEIS has two main strengths over previous tests of EI. First it is based on 
actual performance as opposed to self-reported performance, thus may be less subject 
to social desirability and does not require people to have insight into their own EI. 
Second, the measure samples a wide range of behaviours, from perceiving emotions in 
faces to identifying the best course of action to manage someone else's emotions. The 
sub-scales have generally been shown to be reliable, with most alpha coefficients 
exceeding 0.70, although two of the understanding emotions sub-scales, namely the 
blends and progressions tests, were found to have alpha reliabilities of 0.49 and 0.51 
respectively. Finally, the MEIS has been shown to correlate with a number of 
theoretically related constructs, including cognitive ability (verbal IQ), empathy, life 
satisfaction, and parental warmth (Mayer et aI., 1999). On the basis of this evidence, 
it would appear that the MEIS is a potentially useful instrument for measuring EI. 
However, most of the supporting evidence has been generated from the authors 
themselves and it is only more recently that the MEIS has been evaluated by other 
researchers. 
Ciarrochi et aI. (2000) critically evaluated the EI construct as operationalised by 
the MEIS. They examined the reliability and factor structure of the scale, investigated 
whether it relates to theoretically relevant variables, and examined whether the MEIS 
relates to important criteria and to mood biases even after controlling for existing 
well-established measures. In general, Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found support for the 
reliability and validity of the MEIS, although there were some limitations. Reliability 
coefficients for the sub-scales ranged from 0.35 to 0.88, but three of the sub-scales, 
namely the blends, progressions and managing self had reliabilities of 0.35, 0.46 and 
0.43 respectively, which is somewhat lower than desirable, and is in support of Davies 
et aI's (1998) claim that many objective measures of EI fail to reach acceptable levels 
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of reliability. However, the emotional factors (Overall EI, Perception, and 
Understanding and Management) that were derived from these sub-scales did reach 
satisfactory reliability with alpha coefficients of 0.90, 0.88 and 0.70 respectively. In 
support of Mayer et aI's findings, factor analysis showed that all the MEIS sub-scales 
loaded on the first principle component (a sort of 'emotional g') although there was a 
slight difference in terms of the factor structure of the MEIS. Mayer et al. (1999) 
suggest a three factor solution for the MEIS, which they labelled emotional 
perception, emotional understanding, and emotion management; whereas Ciarrochi et 
al. (2000) identified two factors labelled as emotional perception, and emotional 
understanding and management (combining Mayer et aI's second and third factors). 
This result could be a consequence of the lower reliabilities of the sub-scales or 
because only 10 of the 12 MEIS sub-tests were used (making up 90% of the total 
MEIS test). Nevertheless, in both studies the factors clearly overlap conceptually. In 
terms of construct validity, the MEIS was related to theoretically relevant variables, 
including empathy, self-esteem, life satisfaction and relationship quality. Importantly, 
the MEIS factors were still correlated with life satisfaction and relationship quality 
even after controlling for IQ and personality traits. In terms of discriminant validity, 
the MEIS showed low to moderate correlations with personality factors (assessed by 
the big five, detailed in the later section on the relationship between EI and 
personality). The MEIS was not related to cognitive ability, which was unexpected as 
the measure was developed from the framework of EI being a type of information-
processing ability expected to share a moderate correlation with other cognitive ability 
factors. This result is most likely due to the fact that Ciarrochi et al. (2000) assessed 
performance IQ (Raven's Matrices), whereas Mayer et al. (1999) assessed verbal IQ 
and found a significant relationship with EI. Indeed, research (discussed in the later 
section on EI and cognitive ability) suggests that verbal IQ may be the only form of 
cognitive ability related to EI. Finally, the MEIS was related to people's ability to 
manage their moods, but not to their ability to prevent moods biasing their 
judgements. IQ was also related to both these mood processes, supporting Goleman's 
(1995) view that a combination of EI and IQ are important in understanding emotional 
processes. 
In contrast to the positive findings regarding the MEIS, Zeidner, Matthews, & 
Roberts (2001) criticised the sCOling protocols of the measure. They found a series of 
conflicting results depending on how the test was scored. For example, using expert 
sCOling, males were shown to have higher EI than females, with the effect reversed for 
consensus scoring. Different findings between expert and consensus scoring were 
also found for intelligence, personality, ethnicity and the structure of the MEIS itself. 
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To summarise, although the MEIS shows promise as a measure of EI, it does 
have some limitations: some sub-scales have low reliabilities, the scoring methods are 
questionable and the whole test takes a long time to administer. Furthermore, at the 
time of developing studies for the thesis, the MEIS was not commercially available. 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, MSCEIT V.1.1 and V.2.0 
(Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, cited in Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). 
The MSCEIT was designed to resolve some of the problems associated with the 
MEIS. As with its predecessor, it has the advantage of measuring actual performance 
not simply relying on self-reported performance. The MSCEIT V.2.0 is a shorter 
version of the MSCEIT V.1.1. 
The MSCEIT has one overall pelformance score which can be divided into sub-
areas of experiential and strategic EI. The experience EI score assesses a person's 
ability to perceive, respond to and manipulate emotional information, without 
necessarily understanding it. It indexes how accurately a person can read and express 
emotion and how they can compare that emotion with other sorts of sensory 
experiences (e.g., sounds or colours). It may also indicate how a person reacts to 
different emotions. 
The strategies EI score assesses a person's ability to understand and manage 
emotions, without necessarily perceiving them well or fully experiencing feelings. It 
indexes how accurately a person can understand what emotions signify and how 
emotions in oneself and others can be managed. 
These two general areas can be further divided into four branches (specific 
skills) of EI designed to measure (a) perceiving emotions, measured with the faces and 
pictures tasks, (b) using emotions to facilitate thought, with the sensations and 
facilitation tasks, (c) understanding emotions, with blends and changes tasks, and (d) 
managing emotions, with emotion management and emotional relationships tasks. 
The MSCEIT yields a total score, two area scores (experiential and strategic), four 
branch scores and eight task scores. Each score can be calculated using either a 
consensus or expert method (as described in the MEIS section). 
The MSCEIT appears to be an improvement on its predecessor the MEIS. It is 
more reliable than the MEIS with most of the reliabilities for the sub-scales exceeding 
0.75. One sub-scale (the sensations test) had a lower reliability of 0.55. It also 
demonstrated two-week test-retest reliability of 0.86 (Mayer et at, 2003). The scale 
has the advantage of being shorter and quicker to administer than the MEIS and there 
are extensive norms available. Despite being shorter, it appears to measure more 
dimensions of EI than the MEIS (Ciarrochi et at, 2001). Finally, in response to 
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earlier criticisms of scoring methods (discussed in the previous section), Mayer et al. 
(2003) reported a correlation of 0.98 between MSCEIT consensus and expert scores. 
To summarise, although the MSCEIT (particularly V.2.0) shows substantial 
promise as a measure of EI, because of its recent development, it suffers from a lack 
of scientific support. It is not yet clear whether it demonstrates validity and has utility 
in predicting outcomes over and above related constructs such as intelligence. These 
issues are acknowledged by Mayer et al. (2003) who claim that studies relating the 
MSCEIT to pro-social behaviour, deviancy and academic performance are in progress. 
Like the MEIS, the MSCEIT was not available when developing studies for the thesis. 
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Table 1.2 Measures purporting to assess all aspects of emotional intelligence. 
Test Alpha reliability Strengths Weaknesses 
Emotional Quotient Ranging between 0.69 to 0.86 for Good internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities. Considerable overlap with traditional personality traits. 
Inventory (EQ-I, Bar- the 15-subscales (Bar-On, 1997), Discriminant validity over cognitive ability. Does not appear to offer predictive validity. 
On, 1997) and between 0.69 and 0.96 Does not assess EP. 
(Dawda & Hart, 2000). 
The 33-item Emotional 0.90 (Schutte et aI., 1998). Good test-retest reliability. Unitary factor solution does not assess all components 
Intelligence Scale Discriminant validity over personality and cognitive ofEl. 
(Schutte et aI., 1998) ability. Only supporting evidence is from the authors 
Evidence of predictive validity (Schutte et aI., 1998). themselves. 
Multifactor Emotional Ranging between 0.49 to 0.94 for Measures actual performance as opposed to self-reported Certain sub-scales fail to reach acceptable reliability. 
Intelligence Scale 12 sub-scales (Mayer et aI., performance, sampling a range of behaviours. Questionable scoring methods 
(MEIS, Mayer et aI., 1999). Construct and discriminant validity (Ciarrochi et aI., 2000; Takes a long time to administer 
1999) Ranging between 0.35 and 0.88 Mayer et aI., 1999). More extensive evaluation needed. 
(Ciarrochi et aI., 2000). 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Ranging between 0.55 to 0.93 for Measures actual performance like the MEIS. Lack of research. 
Emotional Intelligence 8 sub-scales (Mayer et aI., 2003). More reliable than its predecessor the MEIS. No validity or utility evidence established yet. 
Test (MSCEIT, Mayer Measures more dimensions of EI than the MEIS but is still Not widely available. 
et aI., 2003) quicker to administer. 
Extensive norms available. 
Improved scoring methods. 
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A number of researchers (e.g., Goleman, 1995; Martinez-Pons, 1997; Mayer & 
Geher, 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) have attempted to classify EI as an independent 
type of human ability involving the processing of affective information. To determine 
whether this is the case, the concept needs to be measured effectively and it needs to 
be demonstrated that EI has at least some independent status over and above other 
established concepts such as cognitive ability and personality, which represent the 
main potential confounds of EI. The following section considers the relationship 
between EI and these potential confounds. 
The relationship between emotional intelligence and traditional 
measures of cognitive ability 
For many years, researchers have been reluctant to integrate emotion within 
traditional conceptions of intelligence. However, more recent evidence suggests that 
emotion is not something opposed to reason and indeed, it can bridge the gap between 
rational and non-rational processes. For instance, Damasio (1994) studied patients 
who had received damage to the amygdala and found they had a deterioration in their 
decision-making capabilities. However, IQ tests conducted on these patients showed 
no deterioration in their IQ scores. Damasio therefore concluded that the patients had 
lost access to the emotional learning which is necessary for effective decision making 
and that the traditional cognition-emotion divide is fundamentally wrong. 
EI has been defined as being a type of information-processing ability within the 
traditional intelligence framework (e.g., Mayer et aI., 1999), and might therefore be 
expected to share a moderate correlation with other cognitive ability factors. 
Nevertheless, measures of EI should also retain some unique variance (either partial or 
complete) from traditional measures of cognitive ability. 
Goleman (1995) reviewed the research examining the relationship between 
cognitive intelligence and EI and concluded: 
" ... there is a slight correlation between IQ and some aspects of Emotional 
Intelligence, but small enough to make clear that they are largely independent 
entities. " (p.44). 
Schutte et ai. (1998) concluded that their measure of EI was not significantly 
related to cognitive ability as measured by scores on the SAT combined mathematics 
and verbal sections [r(41} = -0.06, n.s.]. However, their 33-item scale appeared to be 
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more about emotional awareness than other purported components of EI, so it could 
be argued that discussion of these results needs to be limited to an emotional 
awareness factor, not the whole concept in the wider sense. Similarly, the EQ-i (Bar-
On, 1997), does not appear to be related to cognitive ability (assessed by the 
Wonderlic), but it failed to assess the component ofEP. 
Davies et al. (1998) found a weak link between cognitive abilities and emotional 
intelligence, and concluded that the only form of cognitive ability which may be 
related to components of EI is verbal ability. As discussed earlier, this is supported by 
Mayer et al. (1999), whose measure of EI (the MEIS) was related to verbal IQ. 
Ciarrochi et al. (2000) did not find a significant correlation between the MEIS and 
cognitive ability. However, they suggest that this was most likely due to the fact that 
they assessed performance IQ (Raven's matrices), whereas EI may be: 
"more closely related to verbal than perfonnance abilities" (p.556). 
The relationship between EI and verbal IQ has not yet been clearly defined. As 
EI appears to be about understanding emotions in self and others, verbal IQ may 
represent an essential part of this process. We need to be able to provide labels for EI 
abilities before we can begin to understand them, so verbal fluency needs to be 
assessed alongside EI, more so than spatial IQ for example. 
To summarise, research to date suggests that at least certain aspects of EI have 
unique variance over and above cognitive ability. However, future research should 
concentrate on determining the relationship between EI and verbal ability as a 
component of EI reduced to verbal IQ would offer no predictive power in terms of a 
person's actual behaviour. 
The relationship between emotional intelligence and personality 
Researchers who classify EI as a type of mental ability would expect only small 
to moderate correlations with various personality dimensions. There is some debate 
over the nature of the relationship between EI and personality. The research conducted 
so far is often contradictory and there are limitations to some of the methods 
employed. This section outlines a selection of studies which have considered the 
relationship between EI and personality. 
The EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997) appears to overlap significantly with personality. As 
outlined above, there were significant correlations between many sub-scales of the 
EQ-i and the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), ranging between 0.51 
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to 0.72 in several studies. Newsome et ai. (2000) found that correlations between the 
five 16PF factors and the five EQ-i composite factors ranged from 0.01 to -0.77. Of 
the 25 possible correlations between the global factors of the 16PF and the five 
composite scales of the EQ-i, 20 were significant. Moreover, of all the 16PF factors, 
the EQ-i was most highly correlated with the Anxiety factor. Dawda & Hart (2000) 
also found considerable overlap between the EQ-i sub-scales and personality, as 
assessed by the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Correlations between the five 
NEO-FFI factors and the five composite scales of the EQ-i ranged from -0.11 to -
0.77. In support of Newsome et aI's findings, of all the NEO-FFI factors, the EQ-i 
was most highly correlated with Neuroticism. 
Part of the study conducted by Schutte et ai. (1998) involved 23 college students 
completing a 33-item measure of EI and the revised NEO Personality Inventory. It 
was found that EI correlated significantly with Openness to experience (1' = 0.54), but 
was not significantly correlated with any of the other big five factors. The magnitude 
of these non-significant but still moderate, correlations were as follows: Neuroticism (1' 
= -0.28), Extroversion (1' = 0.28); Agreeableness (1' = 0.26) and Conscientiousness (1' = 
0.21). However, this study appears to be underpowered and it would be beneficial to 
consider correlations with a much larger sample. 
Dulewicz & Higgs (1998a) found that their competency based measure of EI 
correlated significantly with the OPQ personality questionnaire (1' = 0.35), but did not 
cOITelate significantly with 16PF (1' = 0.15). One explanation may be that OPQ factors 
are linked more closely to competencies in respect of their work-related behavioural 
definitions than the 16PF factors. It was concluded that EI did not cOITelate so highly 
with the OPQ as to be redundant. 
The MEIS (Mayer et aI., 1999) appears to show discriminant validity in relation 
to personality. The measure, assessed by CiaITochi et ai. (2000), showed low to 
moderate cOITelations (ranging from -0.03 to 0.26) with personality factors (assessesed 
by the big five). Furthermore, the MEIS was unrelated to Neuroticism and of the 
factors, objective EP showed the lowest cOITelations with personality variables. 
One of the aims of the study conducted by Davies et ai. (1998) was to examine 
the relationship between various measures of EI and personality variables. They 
assessed six different personality types using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-
Revised (Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism), the NEO Personality 
Inventory and Trait-Self Description Inventory (Extraversion, Neuroticism, 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Openness). In contrast to much of the previous 
research, they conclude that self-report measures of EI have salient loadings on well-
established personality measures (namely, Neuroticism, Extraversion and 
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Agreeableness), indicating a lack of divergent validity. Only objective measures of 
EP did not overlap to any great extent with personality variables. 
To summarise, it is apparent that the relationship between EI and personality has 
not yet been clearly defined. The associations are difficult to assess with the vast 
number of EI scales, with various sub-scales being correlated with many different 
personality scales, each with their own sub-scales. Nevertheless, there appears to be a 
general pattern of relationships between EI and personality. Any scale developed to 
measure EI should be correlated with established personality measures in order to 
determine the relative independence of the concept. 
Summary 
In order to evaluate whether EI represents a type of ability with at least some 
independent status, in addition to its successful measurement, its relationship with 
established concepts such as personality and cognitive ability needs to be assessed. 
The majority of the research to date suggests that EI may be more closely related to 
personality factors than cognitive ability. The only form of cognitive ability which 
represents a potential confound of EI appears to be verbal IQ. This could be due to 
the fact that the EI construct is indeed closely related to personality variables or more 
likely due to the lack of well-validated self-report measures and objective measures of 
EI. 
The predictive validity of emotional intelligence 
EI has been heralded as a predictor of successful performance, both in terms of 
occupational effectiveness and academic achievement. It has been suggested that 
success in life is more a function of EI than traditional cognitive intelligence 
(Goleman, 1995). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, one of the major driving forces 
behind the development of the EI concept has been the failure of cognitive ability to 
account for sufficient variance in performance. It has been claimed that IQ at best 
contributes about 20% of the factors that determine successful life outcomes 
(Goleman, 1995). This is in line with findings from other researchers who have 
investigated the predictive power of IQ. For example, Hernstein & Murray, cited in 
Dulewicz & Higgs (1998a) in a study of the relationship between IQ and "broad 
measures of life success" conclude: 
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" ... The link between test scores and those (broad) achievements is dwarfed by 
the totality of other characteristics which are brought to life. " (p.66) 
In an organisational setting, Bahn (1979) reported a study which was designed 
to assess the validity of IQ tests in predicting executive or management competency. 
He concluded that leaders tended to be more intelligent than the average group 
members, but not the most intelligent. Overall, his review of studies in this field 
indicated a certain minimum baseline IQ as being necessary for effective performance. 
However, he concludes that intelligence test scores should simply be used as one of 
several predictors of performance. IQ scores do not constitute comprehensive 
judgements about a person's capacity, as an outstanding executive is far more than a 
highly intelligent person. 
The search for characteristics, other than IQ, which adequately explain 
variations in success is by no means new. Thorndike (1920), in reviewing the 
predictive power of IQ, developed the concept of social intelligence as a means of 
explaining variations in outcome measures not accounted for by IQ. However, this 
approach was somewhat stifled by the predominance of the behaviourists in the 
1920's and 30's and the subsequent focus on cognitive psychology. The interest in a 
broader view of intelligence was once again brought to attention by researchers such 
as Gardner & Hatch (1989) who developed and explored the concept of Multiple 
Intelligences. The spectrum of intelligences proposed was examined in conjunction 
with measures of IQ (using the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale) and no significant 
relationships were found (Gardner & Hatch, 1989). This led to a conclusion that the 
'other' intelligences proposed were a distinctively different construct to IQ. 
In a different type of study, Sternberg (1985) asked people to describe an 
"intelligent person". The descriptions provided included "practical people skills" 
among the main attributed traits. Studies such as these re-awakened interest in 
Thorndike's Social Intelligence construct, which he identified as being distinct from 
academic abilities (Thorndike, 1920). 
In developing explanations of the 'interpersonal intelligences', the major 
paradigm has been that of meta-cognition (i.e., awareness of one's mental processes) 
rather than exploration of the full range of emotional abilities (Goleman, 1995). In 
identifying a range of emotional abilities Goleman highlights a need to go beyond 
meta-cognition and explore the concept of "metamood" (which he defines as 
awareness of one's own emotions). He further expands on this to highlight the 
importance of self-awareness which he describes as being: 
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" ... aware of both our mood and our thoughts about that mood ... non-reactive, 
non-judgemental attention to inner states. " (pA3) 
In reviewing the development of the concept of EI it is evident from the 
foregoing summary that one of the major driving forces has been the failure of IQ to 
account for sufficient variance in success both in an educational and occupational 
context. This interest is by no means new (e.g., Thorndike, 1920), however the 
construct has evolved from a meta-cognition paradigm to a broader view of the nature 
and range of abilities which are labelled as EI. Unfortunately, as yet there have been 
few empirical studies conducted to investigate the predictive validity of EI, and many 
of the claims have been anecdotal. 
Emotional intelligence and Occupational Success 
In recent years organisations have focused on rationality and the development of 
technical skills in order to enhance competitiveness. This is reflected in higher levels 
of skills training and in the implementation of forms of work organisation designed to 
promote knowledge and expertise. Concentrating on the realm of facts and intellect 
has meant emotions have been undervalued in organisations, as noted by Hopfl & 
Linstead (1997): 
"It is almost certainly a commonplace to observe that organisational emphases 
on rationality have lead to the relative neglect of emotional issues in organisational 
life. " (p.S) 
Although 'emotional' factors such as stress and job satisfaction have been 
extensively studied in the workplace, these remain fairly general in their application 
rather than focusing on specific aspects of EI (Briner, 1998). However, work values 
are shifting. Not only are employees judged on their 'hard skills' of intellect, training 
and expertise; but also on their 'soft skills' of perceiving and expressing emotions. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that EI plays a vital role in determining occupational 
success: 
"Emotions, properly managed, can drive trust, loyalty, and commitment - and 
many of the greatest productivity gains, innovations, and accomplishments of 
individuals, teams, and organisations." (Cooper, 1997, p.31) 
It has been estimated that EI abilities are about twice as important as cognitive 
abilities for producing effective peiformance at work; and that 80% of the factors 
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distinguishing superior from average performers at work depend on EI abilities 
(Goleman, 1998). EI has been reported to facilitate learning, improve leadership, lead 
to radical change, increase motivation and build competitive advantage in the 
workplace (e.g., Fineman, 1997; Hopfl & Linstead, 1997; Huy, 1999; Ostell, 
Baverstock, & Wright, 1998). 
Unfortunately, many of these claims have been anecdotal and there is a need for 
more systematic, empirical studies to be carried out. Dulewicz & Higgs (1998a) 
evaluated a competency-based EI measure on data gathered from 100 general 
managers over a seven-year period. Level of advancement by individuals within the 
organisation was used as the measure of success. The EI scale accounted for 36% of 
the total variance in level advancement, whereas intellectual and managerial 
intelligence accounted for 27% and 16% respectively. These findings support 
Goleman's (1995) view that a combination of EI and IQ is a more powerful predictor 
of success than either measure alone. 
EI measures have also been found to predict stress levels and general well-being 
in the workplace. Bar-On et al. (2000), used the EQ-i (described earlier) in police 
officers and care workers to investigate occupational stress. Police officers scored 
higher on the EQ-i than care workers, especially in terms of positive affect and 
emotional stability, implying that they were more adaptable in general, coped better 
with stress and enjoyed their work. However, this may be due to differences in the 
occupational culture rather than differences in EI scores. For instance, police officers 
may enjoy their work more than care workers due to a greater variability of work 
tasks. Also, although many stressors may be similar between the groups (such as lack 
of resources, poor communication, job overload), many stressors are likely to be 
occupation specific which may account for the different levels of coping between the 
groups. More interesting are the comparisons within various occupational groups. As 
mentioned earlier, unpublished reports cited in the EQ-i Technical Manual (Bar-On, 
1997) suggest that scores on various sub-scales have been used to discriminate 
between successful employees both in terms of affective well-being and productivity, 
and that EQ-i scores accounted for 27% of the variance in job performance, whereas 
cognitive ability accounted for less than 1 %. These statements should however be 
treated with caution given the lack of published research on the EQ-i. 
In summary, it appears that organisations stand to gain significant advantages by 
paying attention to the EI abilities of their workforce. However, research is still in its 
infancy and there is a need for a more systematic, rigorous evaluation of the influence 
of EI in the workplace. It is not sufficient to look only at the contribution of EI to 
overall job performance. Individual aspects of EI may effect various workplace 
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behaviours in different ways and also may vary across occupations. Such questions 
can be addressed by conducting longitudinal and comparative studies. 
Emotional intelligence and academic achievement 
Similar to research on the effect of EI in organisations, there have been few 
empirical studies which have assessed the contribution of EI to academic 
performance. Again, many of the proposed claims for the predictive validity of EI 
abilities have been anecdotal and results have been rather mixed. 
As discussed earlier, Schutte et al. (1998) found evidence for the predictive 
validity of EI in that college students' EI scores significantly predicted their end-of-
year grade point average. However, this study did not take account of other possible 
confounding variables such as cognitive ability and personality. 
In contrast, a more recent study conducted with 180 students demonstrated that 
EI was not related to academic achievement, whereas both cognitive ability and 
personality were significantly associated with academic performance (Newsome et aI., 
2000). EI was assessed using the EQ-i, (Bar-On, 1997), which was described earlier 
in the section on measuring EI. General cognitive ability was assessed using the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test, and personality was measured by the 16PF. Academic 
achievement was assessed using student's end-of-year grade point averages collected 
four months after the administration of the other measures. Academic achievement 
was found to correlate significantly with the Wonderlic and with the Extraversion and 
Self-control factors of the 16PF. Specifically, individuals who had higher cognitive 
ability, who were more introverted, and who had higher self-control, tended to have 
higher grade point averages. The total EQ-i score and the five EQ-i factors were not 
associated with grade point average. Although EI did not predict academic 
achievement in this particular study, it may be due to the limitations of the measure 
used to assess it. The EQ-i was found to overlap considerably with the 16 PF, 
especially Neuroticism. Given that there is a wealth of research suggesting no 
relationship between Neuroticism and academic achievement, it is hardly surprising 
that the EQ-i does not correlate with cognitive ability either. Researchers should be 
careful of using measures such as the EQ-i for selection purposes before they have 
been rigorously tested. 
Summary 
In summary, the lack of conclusive research regarding the relationship between 
EI and performance is due in part to a lack of agreement among EI researchers over 
what constitutes EI and how it should be measured. Researchers need to specify not 
only which particular aspect of EI is being measured, but also which aspect of 
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performance is being assessed. Individual components of EI may predict different 
aspects of academic achievement. 
The relationship between EI and performance is a complex one and until further 
systematic research is conducted, results must be treated with caution. Researchers 
need to adopt a componential approach considering various aspects of EI in turn· and 
assessing their predictive validity over certain performance skills. Research to date 
holds great promise for the predictive validity of EI, but successful future research 
largely depends on the skills of researchers in accurately identifying what they mean 
by performance. 
(;eneralsuununary 
This Chapter has outlined a number of complexities surrounding the 
investigation of EI, which will be controlled for throughout the thesis. Also, it has 
identified EP as the most important part of EI, arguably the only independent aspect 
once personality and cognitive ability have been assessed. The status and 
measurement of the EP concept within the EI framework is addressed in Chapter 2. 
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The status and measurement of an emotional perception 
component within emotional intelligence 
Chapter 1 discussed the integration of emotion within the traditional intelligence 
framework, which lead to the development of the EI concept. It described the rise and 
popularisation of the topic and evaluated various theoretical accounts of EI. A number of 
controversies were identified within the research, and it was suggested that the concept of 
EI may not be as broad as originally claimed by many theorists. 
This Chapter further investigates this suggestion by evaluating the status of EP, 
which has been purported to be the most important aspect of EI once other potential 
confounds have been assessed (Davies et aI., 1998). Additionally, the theoretical areas in 
which EP may influence are identified, and the development and validation of a scale 
designed to measure EP is described. Finally, an outline for the rest of the thesis is 
provided. 
Emotional perception as an independent factor of emotional intelligence 
The ability to perceive emotion in others has been proposed as an important 
component of EI (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998; Martinez-Pons, 1997; Mayer & Geher, 1996; 
Salovey & Mayer, 1990), indeed perhaps the only aspect of EI which is truly emotional, 
in that it is not simply a manifestation of personality or cognitive ability. 
Although speculative at this stage, there are a number of theoretical areas in 
which EP may have an important contribution to make. First, as part of the EI 
framework, EP may influence performance and have longitudinal effects. EI has been 
heralded as a predictor of successful pelformance both in terms of academic and 
occupational success (discussed in Chapter 1), so it seems reasonable to hypothesise that 
EP will demonstrate predictive validity over performance. 
The second area which EP may have theoretical influence is in social settings. EP 
involves the ability to perceive emotion in others which clearly has implications in the 
social environment. Presumably, people who are good at perceiving emotions in others 
will know how to react appropriately in social settings and may consequently develop 
more successful personal interactions. Assessing emotions in other people is linked to 
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self-perception of how we portray our own feelings, thus EP is likely to be related to a 
range of social emotions, particularly self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, 
shame, gUilt and pride. 
The third area in which EP may have theoretical influence is actual moment-by-
moment regulation of behaviour. In general, EI research has been criticised for relying 
purely on self-report measures, and it has been suggested (Petrides & Furnham, 2000) 
that more objective methods and experimental methodologies should be used to 
investigate the construct. Most emotion research has used attention to look at the detailed 
effects of behaviour (see Chapter 7 for a discussion). As EP involves scanning the 
emotional landscape, it is possible that attention towards emotionally meaningful stimuli 
may be mediated by EP. 
Although potentially important, EP has proved very difficult to measure. Self-
report measures relying on people's self-descriptions may be inaccurate, whereas 
responses to tests directly measuring the ability have resulted in weak internal 
consistency coefficients. For instance, Davies et al. (1998) employed a number of direct, 
objective measures of EP. In these measures, originating in the work of Mayer, DiPaulo, 
& Salovey (1990), participants were presented with 12 facial images, 12 colours, 12 
excerpts of music, and 12 voice intervals. For each stimulus, participants were provided 
with a list of six different emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust; 
and were asked to judge which of the six was present in a given stimulus. The tests were 
scored using both target scoring methods (the person experiencing the emotion, as given 
by Ekman & Friesen (1975), and consensual scoring methods (the participant responded 
within one point of the sample's modal response). The only test which had satisfactory 
internal reliability was the Faces Test, in particular when scored using the target method. 
Scores for the Colours, Music and Voices tests, when based on consensual scoring, were 
low on internal reliability. Relying purely on "objective" measures does not therefore 
pelmit EP to be assessed in a dependable way. 
This thesis focuses on EP as a potentially independent factor, arguably the most 
important aspect, of EI. The first problem to overcome (assessed in Study 1 of this 
Chapter) was whether EP could be measured effectively. Subsequent chapters look 
specifically at what EP is and how useful it may be. For example, is EP independent 
from cognitive ability and personality variables? Is it related to other theoretically 
relevant variables, such as other components of EI? Does EP evidence predictive 
validity? Given the problems associated with relying purely on self-report data, does EP 
have actual behavioural effects? 
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Study 1 
Development of the Questionnaire 
A self-repOlt measure of EP was chosen for a number of reasons. First, as noted 
above, typical internal consistency coefficients for objective measures of EP are lower 
than those produced by self-report instruments. Second, self-report measures are easier 
to administer, particularly in applied settings where measures of EP may be included 
among other measures of both emotional and cognitive ability. Although self-report 
measures can be inaccurate, the scale will be correlated with objective measures and 
actual behaviour in order to address this problem. 
Items for the scale were adapted from the Affective Communication Test (ACT, 
Friedman, Prince, Riggio, & DiMatteo, 1980), a validated 13-item instrument measuring 
nonverbal emotional expressiveness in a variety of situations (see Table 2.1). Emotional 
expression involves the signalling of emotion through various different channels (facial 
expression, body posture and the form and content of the voice). Similarly, we perceive 
the emotions of others by paying attention to cues from these same channels, and 
emotional communication and perception are conceptually if not behaviourally related. It 
was therefore decided that the ACT offered a sound basis for the development of a 
measure of EP. Items for the scale were created by changing the focus of ACT items 
from expression of emotion to EP. For example, the ACT item "I can easily express 
emotion over the telephone" became "I am good at recognising emotions when they are 
expressed over the telephone" in the EP scale. In addition, new items were created for 
the scale in order to cover other aspects of EP. For instance, expression through vocal 
channels was not incorporated within the ACT to any great extent so new items designed 
to tap this aspect were created for the EP scale. 
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Table 2.1 The 13-item Affective Communication Test. 
1. When I hear good dance music, I can hardly keep still 
2. My laugh is soft and subdued 
3. I can easily express emotion over the telephone 
4. I often touch friends during conversations 
5. I dislike being watched by a large group of people 
6. I usually have a neutral facial expression 
7. People tell me that I would make a good actor or actress 
8. I like to remain unnoticed in a crowd 
9. I am shy among strangers 
10. I am able to give a seductive glance if I want to 
11. I am terrible at pantomime as in games like charades 
12. At small parties I am the centre of attention 
13. I show that I like someone by hugging or touching that person 
Initially, 17 items were selected for the questionnaire (see Table 2.2). Respondents 
used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). A 7-
point scale was chosen as it has been suggested (e.g., Kline, 1993), that individuals are 
less likely to respond at the extremes than with a 5-point scale. 
Table 2.2 The 17-item emotional perception scale. 
1. I can tell when other people are affected by emotionally charged music 
2. I can see when a friend is angry with me just by looking at them 
3. I recognise enthusiastic laughter in other people, regardless of whether I respond to it or 
not 
4. I am good at recognising emotions when they are expressed over the telephone 
5. I know which of my friends are more or less likely than me to initiate physical contact 
during conversations 
6. I am very aware of when other people are feeling nervous or embarrassed in public 
7. I can tell a lot about what a person is experiencing by looking at their facial 
expression 
8. I know which of my friends would make good actors or actresses 
9. I am able to tell whether someone is anxious or not just by observing their body 
language 
10. I can recognise people who are shy amongst strangers 
11. I know when someone is trying to seduce me 
12. I find it easy to recognise what feelings people are portraying in games like charades 
13. In any social situation, I know who wants to be the centre of attention 
14. Just by listening to someone's voice on a radio talk show, I can tell whether they are 
angry or not 
15. I recognise immediately when someone wants to express intimacy to a greater or 
lesser degree than I am comfortable with 
16. When someone smiles at me, I can tell whether it is false or if it is really meant 
17. I find it difficult to tell how someone is feeling just by looking at them 
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It is hypothesised that the short self-report scale designed to assess EP would result 
in an acceptable degree of score reliability, internal consistency and test-retest reliability, 
and would not correlate with the ACT from which it was developed (evidencing 
discriminant validity). Furthermore, it was predicted that women would report superior 
levels of EP (higher scores) on the scale, in line with previous research on sex differences 
in the perception and expression of emotion (e.g., Ciarrochi et aI., 2000; Mayer & Geher, 
1996). Finally, it was predicted that scores on the scale would correlate with an objective 
measure similar to ones traditionally used to assess EP. 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 100 first-year undergraduate Psychology students (59 female and 41 
male) participated in the study. The sample ranged from 18 to 43 years of age (M = 
23.70, SD = 5.44). Participation in the study was voluntary. 
Materials 
Participants completed the EP scale, the ACT and one "objective" measure of EP: 
A Facial and Posture Perception Test. In order to help establish the validity of the EP 
scale, it was considered necessary to examine its relationship with existing nonverbal 
measures of EP. 
The Facial and Posture Perception Test consisted of two similar sub-tests. The first 
was based on stimuli reproduced from the Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman & Friesen, 
1975). 12 pictures were chosen from the original set of 110 (six male and six female), to 
represent the six emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise). 
References to exact images were as follows: happiness (NRl-6 & WF2-11), sadness 
(EM4-24 & MOl-30), anger (WF3-1 & C2-12), surprise (NRl-14 & GSl-16), fear (PF2-
30 & JJ5-13), and disgust (JBl-16 & Cl-4). 
The second aspect measuring EP concerned recognition of five of the six basic 
emotions from body postures. In a similar format to the Pictures of Facial Affect, ten 
images, showing the postures for anger, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise from the 
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front and side were presented to participants in a forced-choice response format'. A full 
list of materials can be found in Appendix B.1. 
Procedure 
The measures were administered to groups of between 20-25 participants over a 10-
15 minute session. 
Results 
Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and alpha reliabilities calculated for the EP scale, ACT and 
Facial and Posture Perception Test are presented in Table 2.3. The summary statistics 
calculated for the ACT were similar to those obtained in the past (e.g., Davies et aI., 
1998; Friedman et aI., 1980). The summary statistics calculated for the EP scale showed a 
normal distribution with a variance approximately equal to that of the ACT. The two 
aspects of nonverbal EP (recognition from facial expressions and body postures) were 
combined as a single measure in order to increase the alpha reliability of the Facial and 
Posture Perception Test to 0.75. 
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics for the emotional perception scale, the Affective 
COl1ununication Test, and the Facial and Posture Perception Test. 
Measure 
EP scale 
ACT 
Facial & Posture Test 
M (SD) 
88.71 (13.82) 
47.92 (9.10) 
17.34 (2.85) 
Range 
69.00 
43.00 
11.00 
Cronbach's alpha 
0.82 
0.80 
0.75 
Reliability and Factor analysis of the emotional perception scale 
Factor analysis using the method of principal components (peA) was conducted on 
the responses of the 100 participants to the 17-item EP scale. The clitelion of salient 
loading was 0.30. The first five factors extracted in the initial solution had eigenvalues of 
5.55, 1.83, 1.25, 1.20 and 1.01, together accounting for 63% of the valiance. 
I Although a posture for disgust has been developed and tested, and is discussed elsewhere (Coulson, in press), 
recognition rates for the disgust posture are barely above chance, and this emotion was not included in the test. 
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Examination of the scree plot (see Appendix A.I) derived from the peA showed a 
pronounced dip between the first and second components, indicating that a single 
component provided an appropriate solution for the scale. The component pattern matrix 
corresponding to this solution is presented in Table 2.4. This component, labelled EP, 
accounted for 33% of the variance and had loadings from 0.48 to 0.69. 
Table 2.4 Loadings for One-Component Solution for the emotional perception scale. 
Item 
03. I recognise enthusiastic laughter in other people, regardless of 
whether I respond to it or not 
06. I am very aware of when other people are feeling nervous or 
embarrassed in public 
16. When someone smiles at me, I can tell whether it is false or if it is 
really meant 
11. I know when someone is trying to seduce me 
15. I recognise immediately when someone wants to express intimacy 
to a greater or lesser degree than I am comfortable with 
13. In any social situation, I know who wants to be the centre of 
attention 
09. I am able to tell whether someone is anxious or not just by 
observing their body language 
14. Just by listening to someone's voice on a radio talk show, I can tell 
whether they are angry or not 
05. I know which of my friends are more or less likely than me to 
initiate physical contact during conversations 
04. I am good at recognising emotions when they are expressed over 
the telephone 
02. I can see when a friend is angry with me just by looking at them 
10. I can recognise people who are shy amongst strangers 
08. I know which of my friends would make good actors or actresses 
12. I find it easy to recognise what feelings people are portraying in 
games like charades 
17. I find it difficult to tell how someone is feeling just by looking at 
them (-) 
Ol. I can tell when other people are affected by emotionally charged 
music 
07. I can tell a lot about what a person is experiencing by looking at 
their facial expression 
Component 
emotional perception 
.69 
.68 
.68 
.67 
.67 
.63 
.61 
.57 
.57 
.57 
.56 
.54 
.49 
.58 
.48 
The internal consistency reliability of the scores for the I7-item scale was 0.81. 
Following two cycles, two items were excluded resulting in a final alpha level of 0.82. 
The IS-item EP scale is presented in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 The final 15-item emotional perception scale. 
1. I can see when a friend is angry with me just by looking at them 
2. I recognise enthusiastic laughter in other people, regardless of whether I respond to it or 
not 
3. I am good at recognising emotions when they are expressed over the telephone 
4. I know which of my friends are more or less likely than me to initiate physical contact 
during conversations 
5. I am very aware of when other people are feeling nervous or embarrassed in public 
6. I can tell a lot about what a person is experiencing by looking at their facial 
expression 
7. I know which of my friends would make good actors or actresses 
8. I am able to tell whether someone is anxious or not just by observing their body 
language 
9. I can recognise people who are shy amongst strangers 
10. I know when someone is trying to seduce me 
11. I find it easy to recognise what feelings people are portraying in games like charades 
12. In any social situation, I know who wants to be the centre of attention 
13. Just by listening to someone's voice on a radio talk show, I can tell whether they are 
angry or not 
14. I recognise immediately when someone wants to express intimacy to a greater or 
lesser degree than I am comfortable with 
15. When someone smiles at me, I can tell whether it is false or if it is really meant 
Correlation with the Affective Communication Test 
As predicted, scores on the scale were not significantly correlated with scores on 
the ACT (r = 0.17, n.s). 
Correlation with an objective measure of emotional perception 
As predicted, scores on the scale were significantly correlated with scores on a 
Facial and Posture Perception Test (r = 0.57, p < 0.05). Scores on the ACT were not 
correlated with this test (r = 0.15, n.s). 
Sex Differences 
Women scored significantly higher on the scale than men, t(98) = 3.90, p < 0.05 
(M=92.85; SD=11.92 and M= 82.61; SD=14.15, respectively), represented in Fig 2.1. 
There was no sex difference for the ACT, t(98) = 1.0, n.s. 
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Fig 2.1 Sex differences for scores on the emotional perception scale. 
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In order to assess the test-retest reliabilities, 19 of the respondents who originally 
completed the measures were contacted eight weeks later to complete the EP scale and 
the ACT again. Eight-week test-retest reliabilities, calculated using Pearson's product 
moment con'elation, were 0.76 (p < 0.05) for the EP scale, and 0.81 (p < 0.05) for the 
ACT. Guttman split-half reliabilities for the EP scale and ACT were 0.86 and 0.89 
respectively. 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to develop and assess a short self-report measure of EP. 
Reliability coefficients estimated from this sample indicate that the IS-item scale may 
reliably assess EP. 
In terms of construct validity, results of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
suggest that the scale has a one-component structure accounting for 33% of the total 
variance. The items of the scale reflect two main aspects of EP: The ability to perceive 
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intentions in others (e.g., "When someone smiles at me, I can tell whether it is false or if 
it is really meant") and the ability to understand emotions in others (e.g., "I am very 
aware of when other people are feeling nervous or embarrassed in public.") It was 
decided that the EP scale would be called the Affective Perception Test (APT) to mirror 
the ACT from which it was developed. 
Further evidence of construct validity was demonstrated by the correlation between 
the APT and an objective measure of EP: A Facial and Posture Perception Test. Even 
though alpha reliabilities are often lower than those produced by self-report instruments, 
objective measures (particularly facial expressions), have been traditionally used to 
assess EP (e.g., Baum & Nowicki, 1998; Ekman, 1993; Hall, Gaul, & Kent, 1999; Mayer 
et aI., 1990). The fact that the APT is related to such a test indicates that it has a sound 
theoretical basis, accurately assessing what it purports to measure, not purely relying on 
correlations with other self-report measures. 
The measure showed evidence of discriminant validity as scores on the APT were 
not significantly related to scores on the ACT. Further validity evidence was 
demonstrated by the fact that women scored significantly higher than men on the APT, a 
finding to be expected in light of previous research on sex differences in the perception 
and expression of emotion (e.g., Ciarrochi et aI., 2000; Mayer & Geher, 1996). The fact 
that women did not score any higher than men on the ACT is in contrast with research 
showing greater expressiveness for females (e.g., Friedman et aI., 1980). 
It is noted that of the initial 17 items selected for the APT, only one was negatively 
worded. However, the potential for an acquiescence bias of scores is not likely to occur 
in this case. Such bias is more likely to influence dichotomous judgements than rating 
scales and fUlthelIDore, negative items have been reported to impair response accuracy 
and reliability (Schriesheim & Hill, 1981, cited in King & Emmons, 1990). 
Outline of the thesis 
Prior to investigating the potential contributions of EP, it was first necessary to 
develop and validate a measure of the construct. The results of Study 1 suggest that the 
APT may reliably assess the component of EP. 
Three main theoretical areas where EP may have an influence were outlined at the 
start of the Chapter. Each of these are considered in the thesis, which is constructed of 
three parts. The first part concerns the role of EP in performance and considers whether 
it has longitudinal effects. In order to examine these issues, first it has to be established 
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that the construct is independent from potential confounds (such as personality and 
cognitive ability). Chapter 3 describes the construction of a test battery for two 
longitudinal studies. Chapter 4 compares the APT with scales measuring other 
components of EI, a personality inventory, a measure of verbal IQ, a well-being scale and 
a coping scale in order to assess the reliability and validity of the measures, and to 
examine the correlations between them. Chapter 5 considers the relationship between the 
APT and various different aspects of academic achievement in order to assess the 
predictive validity of EP. It also considers changes over time in EP which may occur. 
Part two of this thesis concerns the role of EP in social settings. The self-conscious 
emotion of embarrassment is used as a tool for investigating these effects. Chapter 6 
considers the influence of EP in the social environment when delivering class 
presentations. 
Part three uses the attentional bias framework in order to consider the behavioural 
effects of EP. Chapter 7 reviews the research on attentional biases for threat, which is 
used as a framework in order to investigate the effects of EP on behaviour. Chapters 8 
and 9 describe a series of four studies which consider the role of EP in actual moment-by-
moment regulation of behaviour. 
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Construction of a test battery for two longitudinal 
studies 
To determine whether EP represents an independent ability, the concept needs to 
be measured effectively and it needs to be demonstrated that it has at least some 
independent status over and above cognitive ability and personality. Its relationship 
with other theoretically relevant variables, and whether it evidences predictive validity 
also need to be explored in order to generate further validity evidence. 
This part of the thesis considers whether EP influences performance and has 
longitudinal effects. In order to do this, we first need to construct a reliable set of 
measures to administer. This Chapter describes a selection of measures to be 
employed in two longitudinal studies (described in Chapters 4 and 5). It is 
acknowledged that this analysis draws heavily upon the Davies et aI. (1998) article, 
where much of the groundwork has been covered, and the Trait Meta Mood Scale 
(Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), one of the more established 
measures of EI. 
A useful theoretical classification taking account of the different measurement 
approaches and operational definitions adopted by researchers is that between trait EI 
and infonnation processing EI (Petrides & Furnham, 2000). Trait EI is embedded 
within the personality framework and is assessed via self-report instruments that 
purport to measure typical behaviour (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Salovey et aI., 1995; 
Schutte et aI., 1998). This approach to EI draws heavily on personality variables such 
as extraversion, agreeableness and optimism, but often includes many, somewhat 
vaguer, constructs that seem to be potential correlates (e.g., motivation, resilience, 
happiness and decisiveness) rather than essential components of EI. By contrast, the 
information processing approach is more closely related to traditional measures of 
cognitive ability and is more explicit to the underlying components of EI (e.g., Mayer 
et aI., 1999). This approach is generally more "objective" concerned with identifying 
actual performance abilities (e.g., ability to perceive, express and label emotions). 
Lost in the explosion of interest in the EI topic is the fact that many of the measures 
may not be reliable or valid (Davies et aI., 1998). 
Although primatily interested in EP, at this stage an inclusive approach is 
adopted so other aspects of EI are included in the test battery. From conducting a 
review of the available literature and paying particular reference to the article by 
Davies et aI. (1998), the components of EI assessed by the longitudinal studies were: 
EP, emotional awareness, emotional clarity, and emotional expression (see Fig 3.1). It 
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is acknowledged that Davies et al. (1998) classify emotional expression under the 
component of emotional awareness (i.e. the degree to which people think about and 
express their feelings), but other researchers (e.g., Ekman, 1993; Friedman et aI., 
1980; King, 1998; King & Emmons, 1990; Mayer & Geher, 1996) have demonstrated 
that emotional expression is significant in the communication and socialisation of 
emotion. From a theoretical perspective, it therefore appears that this aspect could be 
considered as a separate component of EI. 
Chapter 3 considers each of these four components in tum and provides a 
justification for the particular measures proposed. Chosen measures for cognitive 
ability, personality, well-being and coping are also justified. A summary of all the 
potential EI tests examined are presented in Table 3.1. 
Fig 3.1 The theoretical model of emotional intelligence for the longitudinal studies. 
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EP is an important component of EI which has proved difficult to measure (as 
discussed in Chapter 2). From the results of Study 1, it appears that the APT offers 
the potential to measure this challenging component. The APT will be employed as 
the measure of EP in the longitudinal studies in order to obtain further reliability and 
validity evidence for the scale. 
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Emotional awareness 
This refers to the degree to which individuals are aware of and think about their 
feelings (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The Attention sub-scale 
of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS, Salovey et aI, 1995) purportedly measures the 
degree to which individuals notice and are aware of their feelings. There are 13 items, 
e.g., "I pay a lot of attention to how I feel" and "The best way for me to handle my 
feelings is to experience them to the fullest" rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). It was originally found to offer an internal 
consistency reliability of 0.86 (Salovey et aI., 1995) and subsequent studies using the 
Clarity sub-scale have reported score reliabilities of internal consistency of 0.65 
(Martinez-Pons, 1997) and 0.82 (Davies et aI., 1998). It also it had the highest 
loading (0.71) on the emotional awareness factor (Davies et aI., 1998). 
The construct validity of the sub-scale, established by Salovey et aI. (1995) was 
supported by Martinez-Pons (1997; 1998) who conducted path analysis on the 
TMMS. A significant correlation was found between attention and clarity (0.26) and 
between clarity and repair (0.47), but a non-significant correlation emerged between 
attention and repair (0.12) when the mediating effect of clarity was statistically 
controlled. These findings are in line with the requirements for assessing construct 
validity which state that there should be statistically significant correlations between 
adjacent components of a model, and lower or non-significant correlations between 
non-adjacent components (Guttman, 1953, cited in Martinez-Pons, 1997; 1998). 
In reference to the relationship of this sub-scale with other concepts, Davies et 
aI. (1998) found that the Attention sub-scale loaded highly (0.65) on Agreeableness of 
the NEO Personality Inventory, but was not significantly related to most cognitive 
ability measures. It had a weak link with verbal ability (0.27 loading on this factor). 
Martinez-Pons (1997; 1998) found that the TMMS showed predictive validity in 
relation to other key aspects of personal functioning. It had a positive relationship 
with goal orientation and life satisfaction and a negative relationship with symptoms 
of depression. 
Another scale purporting to measure emotional awareness was the Externally 
Oriented Thinking sub-scale of the Toronto Alexthimia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994a; 1994b). This measures the ability to pay attention to one's own 
emotions and therefore had a negative loading (-0.54) on the emotional awareness 
factor (Davies et aI., 1998). However, a reliability analysis showed that the scale was 
unreliable with an internal consistency of only 0.07 (Davies et aI., 1998). Reliability 
was one important criteria taken into account when assessing measurement scales, and 
this sub-scale was therefore excluded from further consideration. 
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Taking into account the relative advantages and disadvantages of each possible 
measure for this component of EI, it was concluded that the Attention sub-scale of the 
TMMS was the most suitable measure for emotional awareness. 
Emotional clarity 
This refers to the extent to which individuals understand and identify their own 
emotional state (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The Clarity sub-
scale of the TMMS (Salovey et aI., 1995) purportedly measures the ability to 
understand and discriminate among one's own emotions. There are 11 items, e.g., "I 
almost always know exactly how I am feeling" and "I am usually very clear about my 
feelings" rated on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(5). It was Oliginally found to offer an internal consistency reliability of 0.88 (Salovey 
et aI., 1995), and subsequent studies using the Clarity sub-scale have reported score 
reliabilities of internal consistency of 0.73 (Martinez-Pons, 1997) and 0.83 (Davies et 
aI., 1998). It also had the highest loading (0.82) on the factor which (Davies et aI., 
1998) labelled as Emotional Clarity. 
As with the Attention sub-scale of the TMMS, the construct validity was once 
again supported by path analysis (Martinez-Pons, 1997; 1998). 
With reference to the relationship of the Clarity sub-scale with other concepts, 
Davies et ai. (1998) found that it had a reasonably high negative loading (-0.55) on 
Neuroticism of the NEO Personality Inventory, and also loaded reasonably highly on a 
measure of verbal ability (0.45 loading on this factor). As noted above, Martinez-
Pons (1997; 1998) found that the TMMS demonstrated predictive validity in relation 
to other key aspects of personal functioning. 
Another scale purportedly measuring emotional clarity was the Difficulty 
Describing Feelings sub-scale (Bagby et aI., 1994a; 1994b). It claims to measure the 
ability to understand one's emotions, and therefore had a negative loading (-0.41) on 
the emotional clarity factor (Davies et aI., 1998). However, a reliability analysis 
found this scale to offer an internal consistency of merely 0.36, and it was 
consequently deemed as being unreliable. 
To summarise, following an evaluation of the various different scales, it was 
decided that the Clarity sub-scale of the TMMS represented the best measure for 
emotional clarity. 
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Emotional expression 
As discussed earlier, although this component has sometimes been classified 
under emotional awareness, from a theoretical viewpoint, it appears that emotional 
expression should be treated as an individual component of EI. 
The Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire (EEQ, King & Emmons, 1990) 
purports to focus on actual expressive behaviours with items tapping the expression of 
both positive and negative emotions. There are 16 items, e.g., "Watching television or 
reading a book can make me laugh out loud", "If a friend surprised me with a gift, I 
wouldn't know how to react" rated on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7). High scores on the scale indicate a tendency to express 
emotion. Initially, the EEQ was constructed from 50 items, but items were deleted as 
they were judged to tap positive self-assertion rather than emotional expression. It 
was found to have an alpha reliability of 0.78 and Principle Components factor 
analysis conducted on the scale extracted three factors: expression of positive emotion 
(7 items accounting for 14% of the variance), expression of intimacy (5 items 
accounting for 12% of the variance) and expression of negative emotion (4 items 
accounting for 10% of the variance). A subsequent reliability analysis showed that 
these factors have alpha reliabilities of 0.74, 0.67 and 0.63 respectively. Women 
scored significantly higher on emotional expressiveness than men, a finding to be 
expected in light of previous research on sex differences in the expression of emotion. 
Also, the EEQ negatively correlated with ambivalence (r = -0.24, P < 0.01) suggesting 
that individuals who are ambivalent about expression tend to be less expressive (King 
& Emmons, 1990). 
The Affective Communication Test (ACT, Friedman et aI., 1980), has 
traditionally been the most widely used measure of expressiveness, but has been 
criticised for its tendency to tap charisma more than general expressiveness (King & 
Emmons, 1990). Also Friedman et al. (1980) found an overlap (0.52 correlation) 
between the ACT and the personality component of Extraversion. Davies et ai. (1998) 
also found the ACT to have a high loading (0.71) on Extraversion. Given these 
weaknesses, it was decided that the EEQ should be used as an alternative measure of 
emotional expressiveness, even though it has not yet been widely applied in research. 
Personality 
Important personality factors that components of EI may overlap with appear to 
be Neuroticism, Extraversion and Agreeableness (Davies et aI., 1998), all of which are 
38 
3. Construction of a test battery for two longitudinal studies 
assessed by the NEO-FFI. This 60-item scale was developed as a short version of the 
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and is useful where global 
information on personality is sufficient. Score reliabilities for Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, were 0.86, 0.77, 0.73, 
0.68 and 0.81 respectively (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Respondents were required to 
answer each statement using a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree). Considering the number of measures to be employed in the 
longitudinal studies, the shortened version of the personality inventory would appear 
to be the most suitable to reduce participant fatigue. Although considered, the 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire does not measure Agreeableness and was therefore 
not used in the longitudinal studies. It was decided that it would be more consistent 
to use one personality questionnaire (the NEO-PI-R) rather than sections of various 
questionnaires for each different personality component. 
Cognitive ability 
EI has been defined as being a type of ability within the information-processing 
approach (e.g., Mayer et aI., 1999) and might therefore be expected to share a 
moderate cOlTelation with other cognitive ability factors. However, measures of EI 
should also retain some independence over traditional measures of cognitive ability. 
The linkage between cognitive abilities and EI is weak and verbal IQ represents 
the only form of cognitive ability which is potentially overlapping with EI (e.g., 
CialTochi et aI., 2000; Davies et aI., 1998). As EI appears to be about understanding 
emotions in self and others, verbal IQ may represent an essential part of this process 
(as discussed in Chapter 1). 
Verbal IQ is assessed using the AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence (Heim, 
1970), which is primarily a test of deductive reasoning. The first section deals with an 
individual's ability to solve verbal and numerical problems and the second section 
with diagrammatic problems. The test offers an overall score reliability of 0.81 and a 
test-retest consistency of 0.92. For the longitudinal studies, only questions from the 
first section involving verbal problems will be employed. Items were selected in order 
to produce equivalent versions of the test for phases 1 and 2 of the studies. The test 
was chosen as it is robust and has been widely applied in research, has sufficient items 
to create equivalent versions and is relatively quick to administer. 
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Well-being 
Both theory and previous research suggests a link between EI and emotional 
well-being (as discussed in Chapter 1), so its inclusion in the longitudinal studies is of 
theoretical relevance. 
Warr (1990) developed a 12-item measure of well-being covering two axes of 
anxiety-contentment and depression-enthusiasm. This measure has the advantage of 
being widely used and well validated, plus it has been shown to be related to aspects 
of EI (specifically attention and clarity of the TMMS, Salovey et aI., 1995). A large 
number of measures of job-related affective well-being have been developed. These 
cover specific areas of satisfaction, job attachment, depression, burnout and job 
morale. There are also a number of context-free measures available to tap life 
satisfaction, happiness, positive affect, negative affect, anxiety, self-esteem and other 
types of feeling. 
Although research into these aspects of well-being has been valuable and 
productive, the advantage of Warr's measure is that it also draws upon research from 
the structure of emotions and moods, which fits well with the overall test battery. The 
measure is therefore based upon dimensions of pleasure and arousal in addition to 
competence, aspiration and negative job carry-over. 
The scale was validated on a large sample of 1686 job-holders and it seems to 
be psychometrically acceptable, and associated with demographic and occupational 
features in expected ways. 
The first axis, anxiety-contentment, is measured through the adjectives tense, 
uneasy, worried, calm, contented and relaxed. Responses to the first three items are 
reverse-scored, so that high scores indicate positive well-being. The reported alpha 
reliability score for the scale was 0.76 (Warr, 1990). 
The second axis, depression-enthusiasm, is tapped by depressed, gloomy, 
miserable, cheerful, enthusiastic, optimistic. The first three items are again reverse-
scored and the alpha reliability score was reported to be 0.80 (Warr, 1990). 
In the longitudinal studies, items were responded to on a 6-point scale where 
responses were: never, occasionally, some of the time, much of the time, most of the 
time, all of the time: and answers were scored from 1 to 6 respectively. Items 
covering the two axes were intermingled in the questionnaire. 
To summarise, of all the measures proposed to assess well-being, Warr's 
measure seems to be the most suitable in relation to the other measures employed and 
has been used previously within the EI framework. 
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Coping 
In recent years, research into coping with stress has gained considerable 
momentum. However, although numerous measures have been proposed, methods 
used to evaluate the validity of these measures have often been incomplete. Many 
studies have failed to directly verify the presumed underlying measurement model 
resulting in ambiguous data regarding construct validity. 
The inclusion of a coping scale in the longitudinal studies is of theoretical 
relevance. Coping variables have been proposed to relate to aspects of EI, particularly 
emotional expression (e.g., Ciarrochi, Deane, & Anderson, 2002; Stanton, Kirk, 
Cameron, & Danoff-Burg, 2000) 
The 20-item Cybernetic Coping Scale (CSS, Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) has 
been used extensively to measure coping and was derived from Edwards' cybernetic 
theory of stress, coping, and well-being. Coping is conceptualised as attempts to 
reduce or eliminate the negative effects of stress on well-being. Five forms of coping 
are identified, including attempts to bring the situation into conjunction with desires 
(i.e., changing the situation), adjust desires to meet the situation (i.e., 
accommodation), reduce the importance associated with the discrepancy (i.e., 
devaluation), improve well-being directly (i.e., symptom reduction) and direct 
attention away from the situation (i.e., avoidance). Hence stress and coping are 
viewed as critical components of a negative feedback loop, in which stress damages 
well-being and activates coping, which may improve well-being directly and 
indirectly. 
The first version of the CCS was based on items drawn from existing coping 
measures, which were substantially revised and supplemented in accordance with the 
five dimensions indicated by the cybernetic theory. The scale was administered to 
samples of MBA students, executives, and psychiatric inpatients. The eight items that 
best reflected each dimension, based on both statistical and conceptual criteria, were 
retained. Subsequent research, however, showed high overlap between certain items 
and redundancy in items comprising two of the scales. By dropping the flawed items 
and retaining the four best items from the scale, a 20-item CCS was formed, which 
seems to provide a parsimonious representation of the coping dimensions with little 
loss of information over the full 40-item CCS. 
Alpha reliabilities for all scales were 0.79 or higher and confirmatory factor 
analysis of the associated measurement model indicated a better fit than for the full 
40-item CCS (values for fit indices ranged from 0.796 for the AGFI to 0.957 for the 
NFI2). 
The 20-item version of the CCS was measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 = "do 
not use at all", 2 = " use seldomly", 3 = "use sometimes", 4 = "use frequently" and 5 = 
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"use very much". Items covering all five scales were intermingled in the 
questionnaire. Higher scores indicate more evidence of coping strategies being 
employed. 
Another scale considered was the Ways of Coping Checklist (WCCL, Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984, cited in Edwards & Baglioni, 1993), which is based on Lazarus' 
transactional model of stress and coping. Coping is defined as the: 
"constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific 
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taking or exceeding the 
resources of the person" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p.141). 
The 67 -item WCCL consists of two basic categories of coping, including 
efforts to alter the troubled person-environment relationship (i.e., problem-focused 
coping) and efforts to regulate emotional distress (i.e., emotion-focused coping). 
These two broad scales were collapsed into eight smaller scales with reliabilities 
ranging from 0.50 to 0.89, with approximately half exceeding 0.70. Subsequent 
research has shown the WCCL to have reliability scores between 0.53 and 0.68 with 
one scale less than 0.40 (Edwards & Baglioni, 1993). The factor structure of the 
WCCL is also unstable, yielding anywhere from three to eight factors and loadings 
vary considerably, such that items are assigned to different factors or dropped entirely 
from one analysis to another. 
Taking account of the criticisms of the WCCL and coping scales in general, it 
was decided that the CCS was the best measure for the longitudinal studies. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of all the emotional intelligence tests examined with their corresponding score reliabilities from various different studies, 
their major strengths and weaknesses. 
Test component of EI alpha reliability strengths weaknesses 
Affective Perception Test EP (self-report) 0.82 (Study 1). A decent self report measure of EP does not Further research needs to be conducted. 
yet exist. 
Developed from reliable evidence on the 
research of emotional expression. 
Initial work demonstrates reliability and 
validity evidence. 
Faces, Colours, Music and EP (objective) Faces, Colours, Music and Directly measure the construct. Suffers from poor reliability. 
Sounds (Davies et aI., 1998) Sounds 0.71, 0.28, 0.37, Faces test good reliability. 
0.31 respectively. 
Attention sub-scale (Salovey Emotional awareness 0.86 (Salovey et aI., 1995). Highest loading (0.71) on the emotional May be related to Agreeableness (Davies 
et aI., 1995) 0.82 (Davies et aI., 1998). awareness factor (Davies et aI., 1998). et aI., 1998). 
0.65 (Martinez-Pons, 1997). Evidence of construct validity (Martinez-
Pons, 1997; Salovey et aI., 1995). 
Not significantly related to most cognitive 
ability measures (Davies et aI., 1998). 
Predictive validity (Martinez-Pons, 1997; 
1998). 
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Externally Oriented Thinking Emotional awareness 0.07 (Davies et ai., 1998). Negative loading (-0.54) on the emotional Significantly umeliable. 
sub-scale (Bagby et ai., awareness factor (Davies et ai., 1998) = 
1994a; 1994b) validity evidence. 
Clarity sub-scale (Salovey et Emotional clarity 0.88 (Salovey et ai., 1995). High loading (0.82) on clarity factor (Davies May be related to Neuroticism and verbal 
ai., 1995) 0.83 (Davies et aL, 1998). et al., 1998). ability (Davies et ai., 1998). 
0.73 (Martinez-Pons, 1997). Construct validity (Martinez-Pons, 1997; 
Salovey et ai., 1995). 
Predictive validity (Martinez-Pons, 1997; 
1998). 
Difficulty Describing Feelings Emotional clarity 0.36 (Davies et ai., 1998). Negative loading (-0.41) on the emotional Significantly umeliable. 
sub-scale (Bagby et ai., clarity factor (Davies et ai., 1998) = validity 
1994a; 1994b) evidence. 
Emotional Expressiveness Emotional expression 0.78 (King & Emmons, Focuses on actual expressive behaviours. Not widely applied in the research. 
Questionnaire (King & 1990). Taps the expression of both positive and 
Emmons, 1990) negative emotions. 
Predictive validity (King & Emmons, 1990). 
Affective Communication Test Emotional expression 0.77 (Friedman et ai., 1980). Convergent and discriminant validity. Tends to tap charisma more than general 
(Friedman et ai., 1980) Predictive validity (Friedman et ai., 1980). expressi veness. 
High loading (0.71) on Extraversion 
(Davies et ai., 1998). 
0.52 correlation with Extraversion 
(Friedman et aL, 1980). 
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Piloting the test battery 
Plior to administeling the test battery to participants for the longitudinal 
studies, a pilot study was conducted with 25 Psychology undergraduates. The aim 
was simply to determine the reliability of the measures, not to consider the 
relationships between them given the relatively small sample size. Additionally, it 
was intended to make sure the test battery wasn't labolious or incomprehensible. 
Descriptive statistics and alpha reliabilities calculated for each measure are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics and alpha reliabilities for the test battery. 
Measure M (SD) Cronbach's 
alrha 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 84.23 (13.52) 0.86 
2. Emotional awareness 56.66 (6.16) 0.70 
3. Emotional clarity 45.75 (5.32) 0.71 
4. Emotional expression 82.43 (12.23) 0.75 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 27.83 (7.33) 0.78 
6. . Extraversion 34.25 (5.52) 0.70 
7. Openness 36.45 (6.01) 0.71 
8. Agreableness 34.12 (4.25) 0.70 
9. Conscientiousness 37.22 (6.12) 0.77 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ 15.02 (4.22) 0.75 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 4.88 (1.20) 0.82 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 5.23 (1.11) 0.80 
Coping 
13. Coping total 68.25 (12.45) 0.79 
In general, the summary statistics and reliabilities for the self-report measures 
were comparable to those obtained with the same measures in the past (e.g., Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Davies et aI., 1998; Heim, 1970; King & Emmons, 1990; Martinez-
Pons, 1997), although differences due to the small sample size were expected. The 
measures were consequently deemed suitable for administration in the longitudinal 
studies. No changes were made to the test battery as a result of the pilot study. 
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Summary 
This Chapter has identified a set of measures for EI, personality, cognitive 
ability, well-being and coping and justified the inclusion of each of these measures in 
two longitudinal studies (reported in Chapters 4 and 5). The entire test battery is 
presented in Table 3.3 below. The data collected from the longitudinal studies will be 
used to consider whether EP has performance and longitudinal effects. Chapter 4 
assesses the reliability and validity of the measures, and examines the correlations 
between them. Chapter 5 considers the relationship between the APT and various 
different aspects of academic achievement in order to assess the predictive validity of 
EP. It also considers change across time in EP scores which may occur. 
Table 3.3 Summary of the entire test battery of measures to be administered in the 
longitudinal studies. 
Test Component Number of items 
assessed 
Affective Perception Test (APT, described Emotional 15 
in Study 1) perception 
Attention sub-scale of the Trait Meta Emotional awareness 13 
Mood Scale (Salovey et aI., 1995) 
Clarity sub-scale of the Trait Meta Mood Emotional clarity· 11 
Scale (Salovey et aI., 1995) 
Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire Emotional 16 
(EEQ, King & Emmons, 1990) expression 
NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) Personality 60 
AH4 (Heim, 1970) Verbal ability 20 
Depression-Enthusiam Well-being 12 
Anxiety-Contentment (Warr, 1990) 
Cybernetic Coping Scale (CCS, Edwards Coping 20 
& Baglioni, 1993) 
Total = 167 
46 
Chapter 4 
Reliability, validity and correlations of emotional 
perception with other variables 
Chapter 3 described a reliable set of measures for a test battery to be 
administered in two longitudinal studies. This Chapter describes the two studies, 
using two different samples, which aim to assess the reliability and validity of the 
measures and examine the relationship between EP, personality, cognitive ability, 
well-being and coping. Chapter 5 investigates the role of EP in performance, and 
presents further analyses from the two longitudinal studies in order to assess whether 
scores on all measures change over time. In order to adopt an inclusive approach, 
other aspects of EI are considered, but the studies focus on exploring the component 
of EP and examining its status within the EI construct. 
A longitudinal design was employed as this was particularly suitable to assess 
the test-retest reliability and the predictive validity of the measures. It was also 
necessary to monitor changes over time as EI has been proposed as being an adaptive 
ability that may change with age and experience (e.g., Goleman, 1995). Participants 
supplied data at two measurement points in time with a six-month interval between the 
two measurements. This time appears to be long enough for possible changes in 
individual scores, but not too long for a high drop-out rate or for falsely inflating 
statistics such as test-retest reliability (Kline, 1993; Zapf, Dormann, & Frese, 1996). 
The target samples were trainee nurses and trainee managers as EP potentially has 
important consequences in occupational settings. An example of such an occupation is 
that of nursing, where self-awareness and awareness of the feelings of other people is 
central to work performance, as suggested by Bellack (1999): 
"Emotional intelligence is both desirable and necessary in such a relationship-
intense and service-based profession as nursing" (p.3). 
Also, nurses have both an academic (Le. degree based) component as well as a 
practical component which involves relating to other people at various levels (Le. 
patients, staff and so on). Consequently, when assessing the predictive validity of EP, 
the effects on both academic grades and practical performance can be explored. 
Similarly, EI skills have proved to be useful for managers in the workplace where 
developing leadership skills, communication and identifying emotions of the 
workforce are essential for successful pelformance. Furthermore, management is 
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largely male dominated which is in contrast to nursing which is largely female 
dominated. There are interesting comparisons to be explored between the two groups, 
such as whether they both employ the same skills in similar or different ways, and 
whether various different aspects of EI have important roles to play in the different 
occupational groups. It is noted, however, that the main focus is to look for replication 
across the two groups, particularly in terms of the pattern of results for EP. Although 
differences between the samples will be considered, this is not the main concern. 
In line with Study 1, it is hypothesised that the new measure of EP (the APT), 
will demonstrate good internal reliability scores and test-retest coefficients, will show 
a unitary factor solution, and that women will score higher on the scale than men. In 
line with research suggesting that EI consists of a set of related abilities (e.g., Dawda & 
Hart, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Mayer et al., 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), it is 
predicted that EP will be related to other aspects of EI. Research has shown an overlap 
between EI and personality factors (e.g., Davies et al., 1998), as well as a link between 
EI and verbal IQ (e.g., Davies et al., 1998; Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), 
so it is predicted that EP will be correlated with both personality and verbal IQ, but 
will retain some independence. Finally, both theory and previous research has 
demonstrated a link between EI and emotional well-being (e.g., Warr, 1990), as well as 
EI and coping (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Stanton et al., 2000), so it is predicted that 
EP will be correlated with these theoretically-relevant constructs. 
The results for both phases of Study 2 are presented first, followed by the results 
for Study 3 across both phases. Similarities and differences between the samples are 
then considered followed by a general discussion. 
Study 2 (phase 1) 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 178 first-year undergraduate nursing students (131 female and 47 
male) participated in phase 1 of the study. The sample ranged from 18 to 50 years of 
age (M = 28.1, SD = 7.6). Pmticipation in the study was voluntary. 
Materials 
In total participants completed four EI measures (EP, emotional awareness, 
emotional clarity, emotional expression), one personality inventory, measures of 
verbal IQ, well-being and coping. The full test battery is described in Chapter 3, with 
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additional information regarding the cognitive ability measure detailed below. A full 
list of materials can be found in Appendix B.2-3. 
Cognitive ability 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that two equivalent versions of the verbal IQ test were 
constructed. References to exact questions used in phase 1 were as follows: Q2, Q4, 
Q6, QlO, Q12, Q18, Q20, Q22, Q30, Q34, Q40, Q42, Q46, Q50, Q52, Q54, Q58, 
Q60, Q62, Q64. 
Ethics 
The cover sheet of each questionnaire pack contained details about the study 
including ethical practices. Informed consent was obtained by signature before 
participants completed the test battery. As part of the consent form, participants were 
asked to give permission to cross-reference data with academic records for the 
purposes of the longitudinal studies only, and were reminded that they would be 
unidentifiable from any records held on a computer or otherwise. The researcher was 
present throughout administration of the questionnaire packs to answer any further 
questions. 
The data collected were confidential and anonymous, and participants were not 
identifiable except through use of a key which only the researcher had access to. The 
cover sheet of the questionnaire packs containing names and student numbers were 
discarded before data were entered into a computer. Participants were provided with 
detailed individual feedback on each of the questionnaires within three weeks of 
completing the test battery. The cover sheet for studies 2 and 3 can be found in 
Appendix B.2-3. 
Procedure 
The measures were administered to groups of between 20-25 participants over a 
30 - 40 minute session. 
Results 
Summary Statistics and reliabilities 
Descriptive statistics and alpha reliabilities calculated for each measure are 
presented in Table 4.1. In general, the summary statistics and reliabilities for the self-
report measures were comparable to those obtained with the same measures in the past 
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(e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Davies et al., 1998; Heim, 1970; King & Emmons, 
1990; Martinez-Pons, 1997). Reliability scores were lower than desirable for some of 
the coping sub-scales (particularly Symptom reduction, Changing the situation and 
Accomodation which all had reliabilities of less than 0.60). 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and alpha reliabilitiesfor measures employed in 
Study 2 (phase 1). 
Measure M (SD) Cronbach's alDha 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 79.44 (11.68) 0.84 
2. Emotional awareness 52.83 (5.16) 0.67 
3. Emotional clarity 41.33 (4.82) 0.69 
4. Emotional expression 76.96 (10.28) 0.70 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 26.84 (6.35) 0.77 
6. Extraversion 31.54 (4.42) 0.68 
7. Openness 33.22 (4.45) 0.62 
8. Agreableness 35.72 (3.95) 0.64 
9. Conscientiousness 34.83 (5.25) 0.75 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ 13.66 (2.59) 0.63 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 4.06 (0.81) 0.80 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 4.36 (0.79) 0.78 
Coping 
13. Changing the situation 13.52 (2.70) 0.54 
14. Accomodation 12.96 (2.71) 0.56 
15. Devaluation 12.24 (3.33) 0.69 
16. Avoidance 11.62 (3.47) 0.72 
17. symptom reduction 13.60 (2.71) 0.52 
18. Coping total 63.93 (10.98) 0.85 
Reliability and Factor analysis of the emotional perception scale 
Factor analysis using the method of plincipal components (PCA) was conducted 
on the responses of the 178 participants to the 15-item APT. The clitelion of salient 
loading was 0.30. The first four factors extracted in the initial solution had 
eigenvalues of 4.69, 1.27, 1.12 and 1.06, together accounting for 54% of the valiance. 
Examination of the scree plot (see Appendix A.2-3) delived from the PCA showed a 
pronounced dip between the first and second components, indicating that one 
component would provide an appropliate solution for the APT. This component 
accounted for 31 % of the variance and had loadings between 0.42 to 0.69. These 
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results confirm the factor structure for the APT obtained with Psychology students in 
Study l. 
The internal consistency reliability of the scores for the 15-item APT = 0.83. 
Following one cycle, item 11 was excluded resulting in an alpha level of 0.84. Item 
11 referred to the game of "charades" with which a number of respondents were 
unfamiliar. 
Sex differences 
Women scored significantly higher on the APT than men, t(176) = 2.63, P < 
0.05 (M=83.28; SD=12.95 and M= 75.31; SD=Il.24, respectively). 
Correlations with other variables 
Intercorrelations among the 18 variables are presented in Table 4.2. With 
respect to the EI measures, correlations were in the expected direction and generally 
significant. EP scores were positively correlated with emotional awareness and 
emotional clarity, and to a greater extent with emotional expression. The TMMS sub-
scales of awareness and clarity were not significantly correlated which is consistent 
with previous findings (Davies et al., 1998; Salovey et al., 1995). 
In relation to personality, there was a considerable overlap between the EI 
variables of awareness and clarity with personality, and a moderate overlap between 
EP and expression with personality. Emotional awareness correlated with all of the 
big five personality dimensions, and was particularly related (0.38) to Agreeableness. 
This finding is in line with Davies et al. (1998) who found emotional awareness to 
load highly (0.68) on a factor which they labelled Agreeableness. Emotional clarity 
was also related to all five of the personality dimensions and was especially related 
(0.44) to Conscientiousness. In line with Salovey et al. (1995) there was a positive 
correlation with awareness and Neuroticism and a negative correlation with clarity and 
Neuroticism. In contrast, EP and emotional expression were only related to four of 
the big five personality dimensions, with neither being related to Neuroticism. 
Overall, EP and expression have lower correlations with personality than awareness 
and clatity. 
In terms of cognitive ability, the only EI aspect related to verbal IQ was EP. The 
correlation was small (0.16) but significant. Consistent with previous research, 
verbal IQ was not related to the big five (Heim, 1970; Sternberg, 1999). 
In reference to well-being, EP was positively related to anxiety-contentment, 
whereas none of the other EI variables were related to well-being. Both anxiety-
contentment and depression-enthusiam were negatively related to Neuroticism, which 
is consistent with previous findings (Warr, 1990). 
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In terms of coping, the emotional awareness and EP aspects of EI were 
positively related to certain coping subscales and the overall coping score, whereas 
emotional clarity and expression were not correlated with any of the scales or total 
score. Coping was also positively related to the anxiety-contentment aspect of well-
being. However, these results (particularly for the sub-scales of Symptom reduction, 
Changing the situation and Accomodation) are treated with caution due to the low 
reliabilities obtained for these scales. Further analyses only consider the total coping 
score which demonstrated good internal reliability. 
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Table 4.2 Correlations among all emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being, and coping variables employed in Study 2 
(phase 1). 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
l. Aware 
2. Clarity .10 
3. Express .25 ** .27 ** 
4. EP .16 * .34 ** .33 ** 
5. Verbal .01 .05 .08 .16 * 
6. Neuro .25 ** -.31 ** .13 -.01 -.02 
7. Extra .15 * .35 ** .32 ** .23 ** .02 -.10 
8. Open .20 ** .29 ** .29 ** .33 ** .14 -.08 .42 ** 
9. Agree .38 ** .33 ** .32 ** .33 ** .02 .05 .35 ** .23 ** 
10. Cons .15 * .44 ** .18 * .22 ** -.01 -.28 ** .40 ** .31 ** .42 ** 
11. A-C -.08 .11 -.03 .17 ** -.01 -.28 ** -.01 -.04 .07 .07 
12. D-E -.04 .04 -.01 .06 .15 * -.29 ** .09 .01 .06 .04 .62 ** 
13. Situation .10 .03 .07 .16 * -.04 .05 -.01 .12 .08 -.00 .15 * .10 
14. Accom .15 * .11 -.06 .06 -.11 .04 -.05 .10 .07 .02 .19 * .12 .43 ** 
15. Deval .03 .06 -.05 .10 -.06 .05 -.04 .03 .07 .03 .08 -.04 .18 * .52 ** 
16. Avoid .07 -.01 -.04 .07 -.19 * .15 -.07 -.03 .05 -.02 .10 -.03 .25 ** .44 ** .72 ** 
17. Reduc .23 ** .05 .10 .25 ** -.02 .07 -.01 .15 * .16 * .00 .22 ** .22 ** .46 ** .28 ** .36 ** .51 ** 
18. Cope tot .16 * .06 .00 .17* -.12 .10 -.05 .09 .11 .01 .19 ** .09 .60 ** .72 ** .79 ** .83 ** .70 ** 
**p<O.Ol 
* p< 0.05 
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Study 2 (phase 2) 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 108 first-year undergraduate nursing students from phase 1 (82 female 
and 26 male) participated in phase 2 of the study. The drop-out rate was 39% which 
does not seem to be unusual according to the literature about participant drop-out 
(e.g., Hagenaars, 1990). Reasons for drop-out may be withdrawal from the course, 
change of module and so on. The sample ranged from 18 to 49 years of age (M = 
28.2, SD = 7.4). Participation in the study was voluntary. 
Materials 
Participants completed the same test battery as in phase 1, with the exception 
of changes to the EP scale, verbal IQ and personality measure, which are detailed 
below. A full list of materials can be found in Appendix B.2-3. 
EP 
Following the removal of one unreliable item in phase 1, a 14-item APT was 
used in phase 2. 
VerbalIQ 
The questions selected from the AH4 were different from those used in phase 1 
in order to create an equivalent version of the test. References to exact questions were 
as follows: Q2, Q4, Q8, Q12, Q16, Q18, Q20, Q24, Q28, Q32, Q34, Q36, Q40, Q44, 
Q48, Q50, Q52, Q56, Q60, Q62. 
Personality 
A shortened 3o-item version of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, 
Costa & McCrae, 1992) was used to measure personality. Feedback from participants 
in phase 1 suggested the personality scale was laborious to complete, given all the 
other measures in the test battery, so the slight loss in percentage variance accounted 
for using the shortened scale was deemed to be worthwhile. Also, personality appears 
to be a stable trait which does not change much. 
This scale was shortened by conducting linear regression in order to preserve the 
overall structure of the scale, but to reduce the number of items. The top 6-items for 
each aspect of personality which accounted for the greatest amount of variance were 
selected. Score reliabilities were then conducted for the new scales using the 
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responses from phase 1. Percentage variance (and score reliabilities) for Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, were 95% (0.80), 91 % 
(0.75),91 % (0.70),91 % (0.67) and 94% (0.80) respectively. 
Procedure 
The measures were administered to groups of between 20-25 participants over a 
20 -30 minute session. 
Results 
Summary Statistics and reliabilities 
Descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities and test-restest reliabilities calculated 
for each measure are presented in Table 4.3. In general, the summary statistics and 
reliabilities for the self-report measures were comparable to those obtained with the 
same measures in the past (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Davies et aI., 1998; Heim, 
1970; King & Emmons, 1990; Martinez-Pons, 1997). Cronbachs alpha scores were 
lower than desirable for some of the coping sub-scales (particularly Symptom 
reduction, Changing the situation and Accomodation which all had reliabilities of less 
than 0.60). Generally, test-retest reliabilities were satisfactory to good, but coping 
scales were rather low (all were less than 0.50). 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics, alpha reliabilities and test-retest reliabilities 
(Pearson's r)for measures employed in Study 2 (phase 2). 
Measure M (SD) Cronbach's . Test-retest 
aloha reliabilit 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 74.23 (11.08) 0.88 0.75* 
2. Emotional awareness 47.76 (6.57) 0.73 0.62* 
3. Emotional clarity 37.67 (4.63) 0.69 0.65* 
4. Emotional expression 71.45 (8.90) 0.71 0.70* 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 17.04 (4.39) 0.74 0.69* 
6. Extraversion 21.96 (3 .17) 0.67 0.70* 
7. Openness 21.07 (3.05) 0.60 0.75* 
8. Agreableness 21.78 (3.02) 0.62 0.74* 
9. Conscientiousness 22.87 (3.25) 0.76 0.72* 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ 15.05 (2.27) 0.61 0.72* 
Well-being 
11 . Anxiety-contentment 3.99 (0.81) 0.83 0.80* 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 4.32 (0.76) 0.81 0.75* 
Coping 
13. Changing the situation 12.72 (0.79) 0.57 0.30* 
14. Accomodation 12.51 (2.60) 0.59 0.48* 
15. Devaluation 11.55 (3.30) 0.74 0.39* 
16. Avoidance 10.80 (3.33) 0.74 0.49* 
17. symptom reduction 13.32 (2.74) 0.55 0.45* 
18. COEins; total 60.90 (10.60) 0.85 0.48* 
* p<O.Ol 
Reliability and Factor analysis of the emotional perception scale 
Factor analysis using the method of principal components (PCA) was conducted 
on the responses of the 102 participants to the 14-item APT. The criterion of salient 
loading was 0.30. The first four factors extracted in the initial solution had 
eigenvalues of 5.60, 1.29, 1.09 and 1.05, together accounting for 64% of the variance. 
Examination of the scree plot (see Appendix A.2-3) derived from the PCA showed a 
pronounced dip between the first and second components, indicating that one 
component would provide an appropriate solution for the APT. This component 
accounted for 40% of the variance and had loadings between 0.47 to 0.82. These 
results confiIm the factor structure for the APT obtained in Study 1 and in phase 1 of 
this study. 
The internal consistency reliability of the scores for the 14-item APT was 0.84. 
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Sex differences 
Women scored significantly higher on the APT than men, t(106) = 2.90, P < 
0.05 (M=80.24; SD=1O.87 and M= 71.77; SD=11.19, respectively). 
Correlations with other variables 
Intercorrelations among the 18 variables are presented in Table 4.4. Overall, the 
pattern of correlations are very similar to those in phase 1 of the study. EP scores 
were again positively correlated with the other EI measures, to the greatest extent 
with emotional expression. The magnitude of these correlations were small to 
moderate. As in phase 1, the TMMS sub-scales of awareness and clarity were not 
significantly correlated which was expected. 
In relation to personality, the pattern was similar to phase 1, with any differences 
outlined below. The correlations between emotional awareness and clarity followed 
the same pattern as in phase 1, with both being related to all five personality 
dimensions. In contrast, EP was only realted to two, and emotional expression was 
only related to three of the big five personality dimensions. Neither were related to 
Neuroticism. As in phase 1, EP and expression shared lower correlations with 
personality than the other aspects of EI. 
With respect to cognitive ability, the pattern of correlations were the same as 
phase 1. EP was the only EI variable to significantly correlate (0.18) with verbal IQ. 
In contrast to phase 1, EP was not related to well-being, whereas emotional 
awareness and clarity were. Once again, both anxiety-contentment and depression-
enthusiam were negatively related to Neuroticism. 
In terms of coping, EP was the only EI variable positively related the overall 
coping score. Emotional clarity and expression were correlated with A voidance and 
Symptom reduction respectively. Coping was also negatively related to verbal IQ. 
However, the accuracy of these results are questionable (particularly for the sub-scales 
of Symptom reduction, Changing the situation and Accomodation) due once again to 
the low reliabilities obtained for these scales. Further analyses only consider the total 
coping score which demonstrated good internal reliability. Change across time 
between phase 1 and 2 for scores on all measures are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.4 Correlations among all emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being, and coping variables employed in Study 2 
(phase 2). 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Aware 
2. Clarity -.02 
3. Express .05 .20 * 
4. EP .06 * .14 * .36 ** 
5. Verbal .01 .09 .03 .18 * 
6. Neuro .23 ** -.32 ** -.04 -.06 -.09 
7. Extra .23 * .33 ** .28 ** .22 ** .04 -.17 
8. Open .22 ** .28 ** .26 ** .29 ** .16 -.08 .31 ** 
9. Agree .31 ** .31 ** .17 .15 .16 -.11 .28 ** .22 ** 
10. Cons .28 ** .34 ** .21* .09 -.09 -.31 ** .39 ** .28 ** .24 ** 
11. A-C -.26 ** .21 * .06 .02 -.04 -.42 ** .29 ** -.09 .08 .35 ** 
12. D-E -.29 ** .15 .03 -.01 .26 ** -.43 ** .32 ** .08 .21 .22 * .68 ** 
13. Situation -.04 .15 .09 .13 -.14 -.04 .23 * .12 .17 .11 .04 .05 
14. Accom .00 -.00 .01 .22 * -.19 * .09 .22 * .01 .18 .20 * .15 .03 .42 ** 
15. Deval .06 .03 .09 .14 -.20 * .03 .01 -.12 .10 .04 .02 -.10 .14 .51 ** 
16. Avoid -.01 -.19 * .00 .10 -.25* * .11 .00 -.18 -.00 -.01 .00 -.13 .24 * .48 ** .65 ** 
17. Reduc .15 .05 .21 * .22 * -.11 -.04 .30 .10 .20 * .07 .17 .16 .45 ** .32 ** .39 ** .47 ** 
18. Cope tot .05 -.00 .12 .23 * -.21* .05 .20 * -.03 .17 .10 .10 -.01 .56 ** .73 ** .77 ** .81 ** .71 ** 
**p<O.Ol 
* p < 0.05 
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Discussion 
The results of the longitudinal study with nursing students support the 
contention that EP is a semi-independent ability within the EI construct. Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) of the APT suggested a unitary component solution, and 
that 14 of the 15 items selected in phase 1 should be retained in the final version of the 
scale. The final scale showed good internal reliablity coefficients and test-retest 
reliability. 
In terms of construct validity, women scored significantly higher than men on 
the APT, in line with Study 1. EP correlated with the EI scales of emotional clarity, 
emotional expression and emotional awareness. The magnitude of these correlations 
were small to moderate, which was to be expected in light of previous research which 
has conceptualised EI as being a set of related abilities (e.g. Davies et aI., 1998; 
Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). EP was also related to theoretically 
relevant variables of well-being and coping, although due to a number of the coping 
sub-scales having unsatisfactory reliability scores, these results should be treated with 
caution. 
The scale also showed evidence of discriminant validity in that it did not 
correlate highly with personality factors and verbal IQ. Although EP was related to 
four personality dimensions (Extraversion, Openness, Agreableness and 
Conscientiousness) in phase 1 and two (Extraversion and Openness) in the second 
phase, the magnitude of these correlations were small enough for the scale not to 
merely be an aspect of personality. Notably, Neuroticism does not correlate with EP 
and expression, yet does correlate with emotional awareness and clarity. In line with 
Salovey et aI. (1995), there was a positive correlation between Neuroticism and 
emotional awareness, and a negative correlation between Neuroticism and emotional 
clatity. Importantly, in comparison with the other EI scales, the APT showed the 
lowest correlations with the five personality dimensions. 
The APT was related to verbal IQ, as expected, but the correlation was small 
enough to suggest that the self report measure of EP is not overlapping highly with 
verbal IQ. 
EP shared a small correlation with the anxiety-contentment aspect of well-being 
in phase 1, but was not related to well-being in phase 2, where it was more closely 
related to emotional awareness and claity. It has been shown that well-being changes 
greatly over time, but notably well-being shared a negative relationship with 
Neuroticism in both phases (WatT, 1990). 
All components of EI were related to aspects of coping. The pattern of these 
relationships were quite different across the two phases. Coping scores were positively 
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related to well-being in phase 1 and negatively related to verbal IQ in phase 2. 
However, the results are treated with caution due to the unreliable nature of a number 
of the coping sub-scales. 
Study 3 (phase 1) 
This study was conducted in the same way as Study 2, with nursing students, but 
used a different sample. In particular, Study 3 focuses on generating further reliability 
and validity evidence for the APT. It is important to replicate the results of Study 2 in 
another sample, and it also permits the investigation of the different ways in which 
EPIEI and performance may relate (refer to Chapter 5). 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 145 first-year undergraduate management students (76 female and 69 
male) participated in phase 1 of the study. The sample ranged from 18 to 47 years of 
age (M = 24.2, SD = 7.8). Participation in the study was voluntary. 
Materials 
The test battery was identical to that used in Study 2 (phase 2) with the 
exception of the verbal IQ measure which was the same as in Study 2 (phase 1). A full 
list of materials can be found in Appendix B.2-3. 
Ethics 
The protocols adopted were identical to those employed in Study 2. 
Procedure 
The measures were administered to groups of between 20-25 participants over a 
20 -30 minute session. 
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Results 
Summary Statistics and reliabilities 
Descriptive statistics and alpha reliabilities calculated for each measure are 
presented in Table 4.5. In general, the summary statistics and reliabilities for the self-
report measures were comparable to those obtained with the same measures in the past 
(e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Davies et al., 1998; Heim, 1970; King & Emmons, 
1990; Martinez-Pons, 1997) and in Study 2. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics and alpha reliabilities for measures employed in 
Study 3 (phase1). 
Measure M (SD) Cronbach's al~ha 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 74.25 (10.16) 0.87 
2. Emotional awareness 48.45 (5.29) 0.70 
3. Emotional clarity 37.63 (4.64) 0.68 
4. Emotional expression 73.68 (11.64) 0.71 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 17.65 (3.95) 0.70 
6. Extraversion 22.57 (3.35) 0.71 
7. Openness 19.94 (3.02) 0.60 
8. Agreableness 21.52 (2.81) 0.62 
9. Conscientiousness 22.12 (3.48) 0.73 
Cognitive ability 
10. VerbalIQ 13.52 (3.27) 0.75 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 3.79 (0.85) 0.80 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 4.37 (0.79) 0.77 
Coping 
13. Changing the situation 13.00 (3.00) 0.76 
14. Accomodation 11.99 (2.49) 0.65 
15. Devaluation 11.19 (2.99) 0.80 
16. A voidance 10.54 (3.15) 0.78 
17. Symptom reduction 12.95 (2.79) 0.67 
18. Coping total 59.67 (9.49) 0.84 
Reliability and Factor analysis of the emotional perception scale 
Factor analysis using the method of principal components (PCA) was conducted 
on the responses of the 145 patticipants to the 14-item APT. The criterion of salient 
loading was 0.30. The first three factors extracted in the initial solution had 
eigenvalues of 5.37, 1.44, and 1.12, together accounting for 57% of the variance. 
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Examination of the scree plot (see Appendix A.2-3) derived from the PCA showed a 
pronounced dip between the first and second components, indicating that one 
component would provide an appropriate solution for the APT. This component 
accounted for 38% of the variance and had loadings between 0.52 to 0.71. These 
results confirm the factor structure for the APT obtained in studies 1 and 2. 
The internal consistency reliability of the scores for the 14-item APT was 0.87. 
Sex differences 
Women scored significantly higher on the APT than men, t(143) = 2.48, P < 
0.05 (M=78.43; SD=1O.23 and M= 72.94; SD=9.98, respectively). 
Correlations with other variables 
Intercorrelations among the 18 variables are presented in Table 4.6. In general, 
the pattern of correlations were very similar to phases 1 and 2 of Study 2. The pattern 
of correlations between EP and other EI measures followed that of Study 2. 
In relation to personality, the pattern was again consistent with Study 2. 
Emotional awareness and clarity correlated with all of the big five personality 
dimensions. Awareness was particularly related (0.30) to Agreeableness, and clarity 
was especially related (0.28) to Extraversion. In line with Study 2, EP and emotional 
expression had lower correlations with personality than the other EI components, and 
were only related to four of the big five personality dimensions, with neither being 
related to Neuroticism. Expression was especially related to Extraversion (0.42). 
As in Study 2, EP was the only EI component to share a small (0.18) but 
significant correlation with verbal IQ. 
In contrast to Study 2, there was a small positive correlation with EP and the 
depression-enthusiam aspect of well-being (0.17). Emotional clarity was positively 
related related to both anxiety-contentment (0.27) and depression-enthusiasm (0.31). 
Both aspects of well-being were negatively related to Neuroticism. 
In terms of coping, in contrast to Study 2, emotional expression was the only 
aspect of EI to be positively related to certain coping subscales and the overall coping 
score. Coping was also positively related to the personality aspects of Extraversion 
and Conscientiousness. 
62 
4. Reliability, validity and correlations of emotional perception with other variables 
Table 4.6 Correlations among all emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being, and coping variables employed in Study 3 
(phasel). 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
l. Aware 
2. Clarity .16 
3. Express .30 ** .22 ** 
4. EP .18 * .29 ** .35 ** 
5. Verbal .15 .07 .16 .18 * 
6. Neuro .27 ** -.23 ** .06 .01 -.10 
7. Extra .26 ** .28 ** .42 ** .24** .03 -.03 
8. Open .23 ** .25 ** .31 ** .30 ** .13 -.12 .30 ** 
9. Agree .30 ** .18 * .32 ** .27 ** .15 -.15 .18 * .23 ** 
10. Cons .27 ** .22 ** .16 * .22 ** .04 -.30 ** .29 ** .31 ** .21 * 
1l. A-C -.01 .27 ** .02 .04 .09 -.30 ** .19 * .09 .14 .10 
12. D-E .03 .31 ** .12 .17 * .25 ** -.34 ** .43 ** .19 * .23 ** .23 ** .60 ** 
13. Situation .15 .12 .24** .14 -26 ** -.22 ** .32 ** .20 * -.04 .24 ** .14 .35 ** 
14. Accom -.02 -.08 .05 .09 -.23 ** .14 .11 -.07 .07 .14 -.15 06 .27 ** 
15. Deval -.02 .02 .00 .02 -.11 .10 .02 -.03 .09 .11 .07 .00 .05 .53 ** 
16. Avoid -.06 -.13 .03 -.02 -.10 .28 ** .09 .01 .06 .07 .08 -.07 -.05 .29 ** .66 ** 
17. Reduc .15 -.02 .24 ** .15 -.21 * .07 .27 ** .20 * .22 ** .23 ** .14 .20 * .16 .13 .38 ** .50 ** 
18. Cope tot .07 -.03 .17 * .13 .01 .12 .24 ** .09 .12 .24 ** .09 .16 .43 ** .65 ** .79 ** .75 ** .66 ** 
**p<O.Ol 
* p < 0.05 
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Study 3 (phase 2) 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 74 first-year undergraduate management students from phase 1 (39 
female and 35 male) participated in phase 2 of the study. The drop-out rate was 49% 
which is 10% more than in Study 2, although still not unusual according to the 
literature. The sample ranged from 18 to 47 years of age (M = 24.1, SD = 7.2). 
Participation in the study was voluntary. 
Materials 
The test battery was identical to that used in phase 1 of the study with the 
exception that an equivalent version of verbal IQ was used, which was the same as in 
Study 2 (phase 2). A full list of mateIials can be found in Appendix B.2-3. 
Procedure 
Identical to phasel. 
Results 
Summary Statistics and reliabilities 
DescIiptive statistics, alpha reliabilities and test-retest reliabilities calculated for 
each measure are presented in Table 4.7. In general, the summary statistics and 
reliabilities for the self-report measures were comparable to those obtained with the 
same measures in the past (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Davies et al., 1998; Heim, 
1970; King & Emmons, 1990; Martinez-Pons, 1997) and Study 2. Reliability scores 
were lower than desirable for som~ of the coping sub-scales (particularly Symptom 
reduction and Accomodation) with reliabilities of less than 0.60. Test-retest 
reliabilities were generally good, but as with the nurses, coping sub-scales were rather 
low (all less than 0.60). 
64 
4. Reliability, validity and correlations of emotional perception with other variables 
Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics, alpha reliabilities and test-retest reliabilities 
(Pearson's r)for measures employed in Study 3 (phase 2). 
Measure M (SD) Cronbach's Test-retest 
al~ha reliabilit~ 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 70.01 (11.26) 0.84 0.78* 
2. Emotional awareness 47.47 (6.19) 0.72 0.60* 
3. Emotional clarity 36.05 (4.57) 0.60 0.65* 
4. Emotional expression 69.39 (9.49) 0.65 0.69* 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 17.65 (3.83) 0.66 0.66* 
6. Extraversion 20.56 (3.13) 0.70 0.71* 
7. Openness 19.36 (2.94) 0.60 0.72* 
8. Agreableness 20.14 (2.83) 0.63 0.73* 
9. Conscientiousness 21.24 (3.08) 0.70 0.70* 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ 13.47 (2.65) 0.70 0.70* 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 3.67 (0.78) 0.71 0.76* 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 4.08 (0.70) 0.72 0.72* 
Coping 
13. Changing the situation 12.91 (2.22) 0.60 0.50* 
14. Accomodation 12.49 (1.84) 0.59 0.45* 
15. Devaluation 11.47 (2.79) 0.60 0.59* 
16. Avoidance 11.23 (2.84) 0.60 0.50* 
17. Symptom reduction 12.24 (2.18) 0.58 0.54* 
18. Coping total 60.34 (8.07) 0.73 0.59* 
* p < 0.01 
Reliability and Factor analysis of the emotional perception scale 
Factor analysis using the method of principal components (PCA) was conducted 
on the responses of the 74 participants to the 14-item APT. The criterion of salient 
loading was 0.30. The first five factors extracted in the initial solution had 
eigenvalues of 4.34, 1.50, 1.37, 1.23, and 1.11 together accounting for 68% of the 
variance. Examination of the scree plot (see Appendix A.2-3) derived from the PCA 
showed a pronounced dip between the first and second components, indicating that 
one component would provide an appropriate solution for the APT. This component 
accounted for 31 % of the variance and had loadings between 0.35 to 0.68. These 
results confirm the factor structure for the APT obtained in studies 1 and 2 and phase 
1 of this study. 
The internal consistency reliability of the scores for the 14-item APT was 0.84. 
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Sex differences 
Women scored significantly higher on the APT than men, t(72) = 2.62, p < 0.05 
(M=76.41; SD=11.23 and M= 69.57; SD=11.44, respectively). 
Correlations with other variables 
Intercorrelations among the 18 variables are presented in Table 4.8. The 
patterns are generally very similar to phase 1 of Study 3 with any differences 
discussed below. In terms of the EI measures, the pattern of correlations were the 
same as phase 1. 
In relation to personality, the pattern was generally the same as phase 1. 
Attention and clarity were again related to all five aspects of personality, but in this 
phase, clarity was especially related (0.28) to Conscientiousness. EP was only related 
to two of the big five personality dimensions (Openness and Agreeableness). 
Emotional expression was only related to three of the big five personality dimensions, 
and was especially related to Agreeableness (0.31). Once again, EP and expression 
had lower correlations overall with personality than the other EI variables. 
In terms of cognitive ability, the pattern of results were the same as phase 1 with 
EP representing the only EI aspect related to verbal IQ. 
In reference to well-being, there was a postive correlation with EP and 
depression-enthusiam (0.24), which was also positively related to emotional clarity 
(0.27) and verbal IQ (0.25). Anxiety-contentment was not related to any of the other 
variables. 
In telIDS of coping, the sub-scale of Changing the situation was positively 
related to expression (0.25) and Extraversion (0.23). None of the other coping sub-
scales or the overall coping score were related to any of the other variables. Changes 
over time between phase 1 and 2 for all measures are considered in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.8 Correlations among all emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being, and coping variables employed in Study 3 
(phase 2). 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Aware 
2. Clarity .15 
3. Express .35 ** .30 ** 
4. EP .20 * .21 * .37 ** 
5. Verbal .14 .19 .23 .28 * 
6. Neuro .24 * -.31 ** .06 .09 -.03 
7. Extra .28 * .27 * .26 * .18 .07 -.04 
8. Open .25 * .30 ** .25 * .24 * .21 .06 .28 * 
9. Agree .30 ** .25 * .31 ** .26 * .18 -.01 .24 * .25 * 
10. Cons .26 * .28 * .19 .20 .02 -.20 .22 .30 ** .28 * 
11. A-C .05 .20 .09 .04 -.02 -.21 .21 .19 .18 .07 
12. D-E .13 .27 * .06 .24 * .25 * -.22 .16 .19 .21 .20 .55 ** 
13. Situation .22 .Q3 .25 * .20 -21 -.14 .23 * .22 .06 .09 -.01 .19 
14. Accom -.03 -.11 .08 .10 -.07 .00 .06 .07 -.07 .04 -.15 03 .49 ** 
15. Deval -.11 -.18 .07 .11 -.14 .00 -.09 .02 -.17 -.09 .02 -.10 .19 .49 ** 
16. Avoid -.09 -.10 .03 .05 -.21 .08 -.13 -.03 -.17 -.10 .07 -.05 .11 .29 * .70 ** 
17. Reduc .08 .02 -.02 .05 -.03 .20 -.02 -.06 .04 -.04 .10 .02 .20 .08 .19 .37 ** 
18. Cope tot .00 -.11 .08 .16 -.11 .12 -.00 -.07 -12 -.04 .02 -.03 .55 ** .66 ** .81 ** .79 ** .54 ** 
**p<O.Ol 
* P < 0.05 
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 with management students further strengthen the 
contention that EP represents a semi-independent ability within the EI construct. As 
in Study 2, the APT had a unitary component, scores showed good internal reliablity 
coefficients and test-retest reliability. 
In terms of construct validity, women scored significantly higher than men on 
the APT, in line with studies 1 and 2. EP shared small to moderate correlations with 
the EI scales of emotional cladty, emotional expression and emotional awareness, as 
in Study 2. EP was also related to the depression-enthusiam aspect of well-being, but 
not to any of the coping sub-scales or overall coping score. Coping was positively 
corelated with the EI aspect of expression, as predicted in the lieterature. The coping 
sub-scales generally had satifactory reliablities in phase 1, but were questionable in 
phase 2. Overall, the coping scales had higher reliability scores than with the nursing 
sample. 
The scale evidenced discdminant validity in that it did not correlate highly with 
personality factors and verbal IQ, as in Study 2. Although EP was related to four 
personality dimensions (Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness) in phase 1 and two (Openness and Agreeableness) in the second 
phase, the magnitude of these correlations were small enough for the scale to be 
independent from personality. The relationship between Neuroticism and EI vadables 
was the same as in Study 2. Importantly, once again, the APT showed the lowest 
correlations with the five personality dimensions in compatison with the other aspects 
ofEl. 
The relationship between the APT and verbal IQ was the same as in Study 2 
(discussed earlier). 
In terms of well-being, EP correlated positively with the depression-enthusiasm 
aspect in both phases. Anxiety-contentment was positively related to the EI aspect of 
emotional cladty in phase 1. Both aspects of well-being shared a negative 
relationship with Neuroticism in both phases. 
Emotional expression was the only EI vadable positively related to coping 
scores in both phases, as would be predicted by the literature (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; 
Stanton et al., 2000). Coping scores were also postively related to the personality 
aspect of Extraversion. Although the results are treated with caution due to the 
unreliable nature of some of the coping sub-scales, generally, the reliablities were 
satisfactory with the management sample. 
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Similarities and differences between the two samples 
Comparisons between the two samples were not the main focus of the 
longitudinal studies. Of more concern was replicating reliability and validity evidence 
for the measures, particularly the EP scale, and considering whether the measures 
were independent from personality and cognitive ability. This section summarises the 
similarities and differences between the two samples, and suggestions are made for 
why some of the findings may have occurred. It is noted, however, that further 
research in this area is necessary before detailed conclusions can be drawn. Full 
independent groups t-tests tables for phases 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix A.2-3. 
In terms of descriptive statistics, generally managers scored lower overall on all 
EI variables, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Bellack, 1999; Goleman, 1995) 
suggesting that so called caring professions (such as nursing or policing) would score 
higher on EI variables than business related professions (such as management and 
retail). 
In reference to personality, the only factor where managers scored higher than 
nurses across both phases was Extraversion. Perhaps they were specifically 
encouraged to outwardly show their emotional feelings, which would be perceived as 
demonstrating confidence and leadership skills in the field of management training 
more so than nursing. 
Scores on verbal IQ were no different between the samples in phase 1, and 
managers scored significantly lower than nurses in phase 2. 
In reference to well-being, the groups did not score significantly different in 
terms of depression-enthusiasm, but managers scored lower in both phases on anxiety-
contentment. This could be due to specific academic demands on the management 
group or personal reasons. 
Managers scored significant lower on coping variables than nurses in phase 1, 
but scored no lower than nurses on all but one of the coping scales in phase 2. This 
may be due to coping strategies they developed during the 6-month gap between the 
phases, or just that stress demands were higher for managers at phase 1. One of the 
limitations of the studies is not being able to control or measure the changes occuring 
between the testing phases. Alternatively, the fact that the coping scales had low 
reliability scores (particularly for the nursing sample) may have influenced the results. 
The alpha reliability scores for EI, personality, verbal IQ and well-being 
measures were generally acceptable to good across all phases for both samples. EP 
for example ranged between 0.84 and 0.88. The notable difference was for the coping 
measure where many of the scales had unsatisfactory reliability scores in the nursing 
sample, but were generally acceptable to good in the management sample. The results 
for the coping scales were subsequently treated with caution. Test-retest reliabilities 
69 
4. Reliability, validity and correlations of emotional perception with other variables 
were generally acceptable to good for both samples with EP scoring the highest of all 
the EI measures in both groups. The exception again was the coping scales where the 
test-retest reliabilities were very low for the nurses and notably higher (although still 
lower than desirable) for managers. 
The factor structure of the APT was remarkably similar across all four phases of 
the studies with a unitary factor providing the most appropriate solution each time. 
In terms of the correlations between the variables, the results were very similar 
across both samples, especially conceming EP. The APT showed small to moderate 
correlations with the EI scales of emotional clarity, emotional expression and 
emotional awareness, which was expected in light of previous research which has 
conceptualised EI as being a set of related abilities (e.g., Davies et al., 1998). Of all 
the EI variables, EP was most closely related to emotional expression for both nurses 
and managers. Demonstrating discriminant validity, EP did not correlate highly with 
personality or verbal IQ across all four phases. EP shared a small correlation with 
verbal IQ across the two phases for both samples. Although EP was related to the 
same four personality dimensions (Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness) in phase 1 for both samples, and only two personality dimensions 
(Extraversion and Openness in nurses; Openness and Agreeableness in managers) in 
phase 2, the magnitude of these cOlTelations were small enough for EP not to be 
considered as merely an aspect of ,personality. Notably, across both samples, 
Neuroticism did not cOlTelate with EP and expression, yet did correlate with 
awareness and clarity. Overall, the APT showed the lowest correlations with the five 
personality dimensions across both samples. 
Further validity evidence was demonstrated in that EP was related to 
theoretically relevant variables of well-being and coping across the two samples. In 
terms of well-being, the results across the two samples were similar in that both 
demostrated positive correlations between EI and aspects of well-being. Furthermore, 
emotional clarity was positively related to both aspects of well-being across the two 
samples. EP, however, was positively related to anxiety-contentment in nurses, and 
positively related to depression-enthusiasm in managers. Again, this could be due to 
different demands placed on each sample resulting in EP having different effects 
across groups, an issue worthy of further investigation in the future. With the 
exception of clarity, the correlations between EI measures and well-being were 
relatively small across both samples. 
The pattem of results for coping were quite different across the two samples. In 
phase 1 of the nursing sample, awareness and EP were positively related to coping 
scores, whereas in phase 2, clarity, expression and EP were positively related to 
aspects of coping. However, the alpha reliability scores for the coping scales were 
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unsatisfactory in the nursing sample, so the results were treated with caution. In 
contrast, expression was the only EI variable related to coping scores across both 
phases in the management sample. These results may be more valid, given the higher 
alpha reliability scores obtained with the management sample, and would be expected 
in terms of the literature (Ciarrochi et aI., 2002; Stanton et aI., 2000). 
To summarise, given that there were no controls or specific training programs 
implimented for either sample, the results were remarkably consistent. This was 
patiicularly apparent for EP in terms of its factor structure and reliability, its 
relationship with other EI variables and its independent status over personality and 
cognitive ability. 
General discussion 
The successful measurement of EP presents a significant challenge, but its 
identification as an important component of EI makes its measurement a worthwhile 
aim. Consistent with Davies et ai. (1998), the results of studies 2 and 3 suggest that 
EP represents a semi-independent ability within the EI construct. Davies et ai. (1998) 
called for the development of a reliable instrument to assess EP, and the results of 
these studies provide additional support for the reliability and construct validity for a 
new measure of EP (the APT) described in Chapter 2. 
The factor structure of the APT was almost identical across the two samples. 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of the APT suggested a unitary component 
solution, as in Study 1 using Psychology undergraduates, and that 14 items should be 
retained in the final version of the scale. Scores on the 14-item scale also showed 
good internal reliability coefficients. 
In Study 1, the APT showed evidence of construct validity. Scores were stable 
over time, women scored significantly higher than men on the APT, and scores on the 
APT were related to an objective measure of EP, demonstrating its sound theoretical 
basis. The scale also evidenced discriminant validity in that scores on the APT were 
not related to scores on the ACT, the measure from which it was developed. Studies 2 
and 3 provide additional validity evidence for the APT. In terms of construct validity, 
in line with Study 1, scores were stable over the 6-month period with test-retest 
reliabilities exceeding 0.70 in studies 2 and 3. Across all four phases of the studies, 
women scored significantly higher than men on the APT, in line with Study 1. 
Additionally, the APT correlated with other EI components including emotional 
clarity, emotional expression and emotional awareness, and was also related to 
theoretically relevant variables of well-being and coping. The scale showed evidence 
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of discriminant validity in that it did not correlate highly with personality factors and 
verbalIQ. 
EI has been classified as a type of ability within the traditional intelligence 
framework (e.g., Dawda & Hart, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Mayer et al., 1999; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990). One of the criteria for an ability is that there should be positive 
correlations between measures (Davies et al., 1998). This criterion was supported by 
the observation that EP correlates positively with a number of other measures of EI. 
The positive correlation of EP with the attention sub-scale of the TMMS suggests that 
identifying and being aware of one's own emotions is associated with the ability to 
perceive the emotions of others. Similarly, the positive correlation of EP with the 
clarity sub-scale of the TMMS indicates that being able to understand and 
discriminate among one's own emotions relates to perceiving emotions in others. 
FurthelIDore, it seems that the more emotionally expressive an individual is, the more 
skilled they are at perceiving the emotions of others, as indicated by the relationship 
between EP and the EEQ. Across both samples, EP is more closely related to 
expression than the other EI variables of awareness and clarity. 
The results of studies 2 and 3 demonstrate a complex relationship between 
personality and the various different aspects of EI. Ip phase 1 of both studies, all 
aspects of EI correlate with four of the big five personality dimensions (Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). However, Neuroticism does not 
correlate with EP and expression, yet does correlate with emotional awareness and 
clarity. In phase 2 of both studies, once again awareness and clarity correlate with all 
five aspects of personality including Neuroticism. EP was related to two of the big 
five personality dimensions and expression related to three, with neither being related 
to Neuroticism. In line with Salovey et al. (1995), there was a positive correlation 
between Neuroticism and emotional awareness, and a negative correlation between 
Neuroticism and emotional clarity. Notably, EP and expression showed lower 
correlations with the big five personality dimensions than awareness and clarity. 
To summarise these findings, it appears that Neuroticism is related to aspects of 
EI concerned with mood regulation/control of feelings (i.e. emotional awareness and 
clarity) but not with those concerning the perception and expression of emotion. 
In line with previous research demonstrating a link between EI and verbal IQ 
(e.g., Davies et al., 1998; Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) there was a small 
but significant correlation between EP and verbal IQ across all four phases of the 
studies. EI has been defined as being a type of ability within the injomJation-
processing approach and would therefore be expected to share some correlation with 
other cognitive ability factors, namely verbal IQ which involves understanding 
emotions in self and others. EP was the only EI variable to correlate with verbal IQ, 
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but the fact that this correlation was not too high indicates that the APT is measuring 
more than just those skills of verbal reasoning required when one is asked to ascribe 
the appropriate label to a situation or intention. 
Both theory and previous research suggests a link between EI and emotional 
well-being. Theresults of studies 2 and 3 show positive correlations between aspects 
of EI and well-being across both samples. EP was positively related to anxiety-
contentment in nurses and positively related to depression-enthusiasm in managers. 
Clarity was positively related to both aspects of well-being across the two samples. 
These results are consistent with research indicating that EI is associated with various 
aspects of well-being (as discussed in Chapter 1). Also consistent with the literature, 
both anxiety-contentment and depression-enthusiasm were negatively related to 
Neuroticism across all four phases. 
It makes sense that clarity was the EI variable most closely related to aspects of 
well-being. Clarity measures an individual's ability to understand and discriminate 
among their own emotions, which would presumably help with developing the ability 
to regulate emotional health and maintain a positive outlook. Being aware of one's 
own emotions (assessed by emotional attention) and perceiving the emotions of others 
(assessed by EP) are necessary but not perhaps the most fundamental aspects of EI 
concerned with regulating well-being. The ability to express emotions would seem 
more likely to be related to stress relief mechanisms (i.e., "letting it all out") than 
specifically regulating one's own well-being. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
correlations between EI variables and well-being were generally quite small, with the 
exception of clarity which were small to moderate. 
In terms of coping, a different pattern was observed across the two samples. In 
phase 1 of the study with nurses, EP and awareness were positively related to coping 
scores, whereas in phase 2, EP was positively related to three aspects of coping, with 
clarity and expression being related to one aspect. The alpha reliabilities for the 
coping scales were unsatisfactory in the nursing sample rendering the results as being 
somewhat questionable. In the management sample, expression was the only EI 
variable related to coping scores across both phases. This is in line with previous 
research suggesting expression is more closely related to coping than other EI 
vatiables (Ciarrochi et aI., 2002; Stanton et aI., 2000). In general, alpha reliablities 
were acceptable to good in the management sample and notably higher than with the 
nursing sample, so it would seem that these results are more valid. 
In conclusion, consistent with Davies et aI. (1998) the results of studies 2 and 3 
suggest that EP is tapping a semi-independent ability within the EI construct. Further 
support has been generated for the APT in terms of reliability and validity evidence. 
In general, the results are very similar across both samples, especially in terms of the 
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factor structure and reliablity of the EP scale, the relationship between EP and the 
other EI variables and the independent status of EP over personality and cognitive 
ability. Chapter 5 explores the predictive validity of EI and considers changes over 
time, for all measures, which may have occurred. 
Revised model of emotional intelligence 
A model of EI was proposed in Chapter 3 (see Fig 3.1). From the results of 
studies 2 and 3, it appears that EP and expression remain the potential independent 
components of EI, whereas attention and clarity are simply aspects of personality. 
This is illustrated in Fig 4.1. Emotional awareness overlaps particularly with the 
personality dimension Agreeableness, while emotional clarity is especially related to 
Conscientiousness. Both awareness and clarity significantly correlate with 
Neuroticism, which is not related to EP and expression. 
Fig 4.1 The revised model of emotional intelligence. 
emotional 
perception 
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Chapter 5 
Predictive validity of emotional perception and 
change across time 
Chapter 4 described two studies investigating the reliability and validity of EP 
and its correlations with other variables. The results of these studies suggest that EP 
represents a semi-independent construct within EI. The scale designed to assess EP 
(the APT, described in Chapter 2) was reliable, scores were stable over time and a 
one-factor solution was consistently obtained. In terms of construct validity, EP was 
related to other EI components, well-being and coping, and women scored higher than 
men on the scale. The scale did not overlap to any great extent with personality and 
cognitive ability, demonstrating discriminant validity. This Chapter presents data 
pertaining to academic performance in order to assess whether EP evidences 
predictive validity. Additionally, further analyses from studies 2 and 3 are presented 
in order to assess whether scores on the measures change during the 6-month time gap 
between testing phases. 
EI has been heralded as a predictor of successful performance, both in terms of 
occupational effectiveness and academic achievement. The former however, has 
received the lion's share of research to date. Many of the proposed claims for the 
predictive validity of EI abilities have been anecdotal and results have been rather 
mixed (as discussed in Chapter 1), so further investigation is required. 
The structure of this Chapter follows that of the previous one. The results of 
Study 2 are presented first, followed by the results of Study 3. Similarities and 
differences between the two samples are then considered followed by a general 
discussion. 
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Study 2 
This section describes the collection of data and analyses regarding academic 
performance and presents additional analyses from the data set to assess change in 
scores across time. 
Academic achievement 
Four grades were obtained for each individual in order to assess academic 
achievement. The first was an overall grade for a module in information technology 
assessing computer and technical skills through both coursework and examination. 
The second was an overall grade for a module in nursing assessing understanding of 
nursing practices and theories through both coursework and examination. The third 
was a seminar grade derived from individual seminar presentations given to groups of 
around 30 nursing undergraduates at the end of the nursing module. Although tutors 
graded these presentations, they did not constitute part of the formal assessment and 
were therefore independent of nursing grades. The forth was an overall grade for a 
module in human biology assessing bodily function through multiple choice questions 
(MCQ's) and an examination with short answer questions. 
Academic grades were obtained from academic tutors and pertained to nursing 
undergraduates all studying at the time of administering questionnaires. For details 
about confidentiality procedures adopted refer to Chapter 4 (Study 2, phase 1). 
Results 
Correlations with other variables 
Correlations among the academic achievement measures and the other 18 
variables are presented in Table 5.1. IT grades were positively related (0.21) to verbal 
IQ and negatively related (-0.15) to the depression-enthusiasm aspect of well-being. 
Nursing grades were positively related to EP (0.31) and to a lesser extent with 
expression (0.15) and Openness (0.17). Seminar grades were positively related (0.58) 
to EP and Openness (0.27), and to a lesser extent with Conscientiousness (0.20), 
verbal IQ (0.18) and clarity (0.16). Biology grades did not significantly correlate with 
any of the other variables. 
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Table 5.1 Correlations among academic achievement measures and emotional 
intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being and coping variables. 
Measure IT Nursing Seminar Biology 
grade grade grade grade 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception .03 .31 ** .58 ** .15 
2. Emotional awareness -.06 .11 .lD -.15 
3. Emotional clarity -.01 .03 .16 * .09 
4. Emotional expression .00 .15 * .12 -.11 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism -.03 -.01 -.01 .05 
6. Extraversion -.03 .02 .03 -.08 
7. Openness .01 .17 * .27 ** -.15 
8. Agreeableness .02 .05 .lD .01 
9. Conscientiousness .lD .05 .20 ** -.07 
Cognitive ability 
lD. Verbal IQ .21 ** .14 .18 * .09 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-Contentment -.06 .00 .03 .04 
12. Depression-Enthusiasm -.15 * -.08 -.01 -.04 
Coping 
13. Situation -.11 -.07 .11 -.09 
14. Accomodation -.04 -.06 .02 -.11 
15. Devaluation .02 .03 -.03 -.01 
16. A voidance -.02 .03 -.08 .07 
17. Reduction -.12 .04 .05 -.13 
18. Coping total -.07 -.00 .01 -.07 
Academic achievement 
19. IT grade .39 ** .18 * .25 ** 
20. Nursing grade .36 ** .09 
21. Seminar grade .02 
22. Biology grade 
**p<O.Ol 
* p < 0.05 
77 
5. Predictive validity of emotional perception and change across time 
Predictive validity 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine the degree to which 
performance on EI measures, personality, verbal IQ, well-being and coping predict 
academic achievement. Multiple regression analyses were not conducted on the 
biology grades as they did not correlate with any of the predictor variables. The 
remaining three measures of academic achievement were independent in terms of 
assessment, although there were small but significant correlations between them as 
would be expected. Information technology grades correlated with nursing grades (r 
= 0.39, P < 0.05) and to a lesser extent with seminar presentation grades (r = 0.18, P < 
0.05). Nursing grades were related to seminar presentation grades (r = 0.36, P < 
0.05). 
4% of the variance in information technology grades was explained by the 13 
predictors [F (13,164) = 1.53, n.s.]. 
Multiple regression analyses on nursing grades 
9% of the variance in nursing grades was explained by the 13 predictors [F(13,164) = 
2.23, p < 0.05], with EP scores making the greatest contribution. 
Multiple regression analyses on seminar presentation grades 
40% of the variance in seminar presentation was explained by the 13 predictors [F(13, 
164) = 10.01, p < 0.05], with EP scores making the greatest contribution. The results 
of the mUltiple regression analyses are presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Multiple regression of Information Technology (IT) grades, nursing grades and seminar presentation grades on emotional 
intelligence, personality, verbalIQ, well-being and coping variables. 
Predictor 
Emotional intell!gence 
l. Emotional perception 
2. Emotional awareness 
3. Emotional clarity 
4. Emotional expression 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism 
6. Extraversion 
7. Openness 
8. A!!feeableness 
9. Conscientiousness 
Cognitive ability 
10. VerbalIQ 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 
12. Depression-enthusiasm 
C<~ping 
13. Coping total 
** p < 0.01 
* p< 0.05 
IT grades 
Beta Unique variance 
(%) 
.008 0 
-.070 0 
-.084 0 
.009 0 
-.049 0 
-.038 0 
-.027 0 
.036 0 
.142 1 
.250 ** 6 
.078 0 
-.255 ** 4 
-.015 0 
R=.l1 Adjusted R2 = .04 
Nursilll . grades Seminar presentation grades 
Beta Unique variance Beta Unique variance 
(%) (%) 
.303 ** 7 .619 ** 33 
.089 0 .019 0 
-.135 1 -.017 0 
.078 0 -.070 0 
-.103 0 .072 0 
-.050 0 
-.264 ** 8 
.083 0 .166 * 3 
-.061 0 -.109 2 
.014 0 .203 * 4 
.105 0 .058 0 
.068 0 -.048 0 
-.172 1 .030 0 
-.036 0 -.104 2 
R=.15 Adjusted R2 = .09 R= .44 Adjusted R2 = .40 
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Change over time between phase 1 and phase 2 of Study 2 
A summary of change over time for the nursing students is provided below. Full 
repeated measures t-test tables between all variables across phase 1 and 2 can be found in 
Appendix A.2-3. 
During the 6-month time gap between testing phases, scores on most measures 
decreased, with the exception of verbal IQ and certain aspects of personality which 
increased. Also, Neuroticism scores along with four of the coping scales were no 
different over time. The magnitude of the differences were generally moderate. Changes 
in EI variables were expected according to the literature (e.g., Goleman, 1995) which 
suggests that EI is adaptable. However, it was somewhat surprising that none of the 
scores for EI measures increased. There was no control during the 6-month time gap 
between testing, and perhaps with specific training programs, scores may have improved. 
During phase 1 nurses completed a 60-item personality scale, but used a reduced 
30-item measure in phase 2. In order to compare across both phases, a new score was 
calculated for phase 1 using only the 30-items later used in phase 2. In terms of 
Neuroticism scores, there was no change over time, but scores on the other four aspects 
of personality increased. The magnitude of the differences for personality were generally 
lower than for other variables, indicating that it is a relatively stable trait. 
Scores on verbal IQ increased over time, even though an equivalent version of the 
measure was used in phase 2. This could be due to improved performance at phase 2 or 
that the group found the equivalent version somewhat easier. 
The fact that well-being scores changed over time is consistent with the literature 
(e.g., WatT, 1990) suggesting fluctuations are likely to occur for a multitude of job-
related and personal reasons. 
There were no significant differences in scores on four of the coping scales over the 
6-month period, but the overall coping score decreased over time. This could be due to 
the fact that only certain coping strategies were required, that coping in general was not 
required, or that the questionable reliability of the measure (particularly the sub-scales) 
influenced the results. 
It is acknowledged that this avenue of research needs to be explored more fully in 
order to more thoroughly assess the implications of change across time. This would 
however detract from the central issue of the thesis, but is worth exploring in future 
research. 
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Summary 
EP evidenced predictive validity when assessing academic achievement. APT 
scores had the highest contribution of all predictor variables when accounting for seminar 
presentation grades and nursing grades. EP did not explain any of the variance in IT or 
biology grades which were assessed using more traditional methods. Overall, APT scores 
were positively related to academic achievement, more so than other aspects of EI, 
personality, verbal IQ, well-being and coping. 
There was evidence of scores changing over the 6-month time gap between the 
testing phases, lending support to the claim that EI components may be adaptive. This 
also suggests that EI, or aspects of it, are more likely to be abilities than stable traits such 
as aspects of personality. 
Study 3 
The structure of this section follows that of Study 2. Data pertaining to academic 
performance are considered first, followed by an analysis of change across time. 
Academic achievement 
One overall grade was obtained for each individual in order to assess academic 
achievement. This was for a module in management assessing understanding of 
managers practices and theories through both coursework (25%) and exam (75%). 
Separate scores for each individual were obtained for both the coursework and exam 
components. 
Confidentiality procedures and obtaining academic grades were conducted in the 
same way as in Study 2. 
Results 
Correlations with other variables 
Con-elations among the academic achievement measure and the other 18 variables 
are presented in Table 5.3. With respect to the aspects of the academic achievement 
measure, total management grades were positively related to emotional awareness (0.30) 
and verbal IQ (0.27) in particular, and negatively related (-0.30) to Neuroticism. Exam 
scores were positively related to emotional awareness (0.30) and to a lesser extent with 
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Openness (0.23) and verbal IQ (0.22), and were negatively related to Neuroticism (-0.28) 
and Accomodation coping (-.21). Coursework grades were positively related to verbal 
IQ (0.42) and Openness (0.24) in particular, and negatively related to Neuroticim (-0.23). 
Table 5.3 Correlations among the three aspects of the academic achievement measure 
and emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, personality, well-being and coping 
variables. 
Measure Managing Managing Managing 
grade total grade exam grade c/w 
(%) (75%) (25%) 
_ ... _ ........... _-_._ ..... _ ...• _ ....... -
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception .13 .16 .17 
2. Emotional awareness .30 ** .30 ** .18 * 
3. Emotional clarity .09 .08 .01 
4. Emotional expression .06 .09 .21 * 
Personality 
5. Neuroticism -.30 ** -.28 ** -.23 ** 
6. Extraversion .14 .16 .12 
7. Openness .22 * .23 ** .24 ** 
8. Agreeableness .11 .10 .18 * 
9. Conscientiousness .20 * .18 * .09 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ .27 ** .22 * .42 ** 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-Contentment .17 .13 .13 
12. Depression-Enthusiasm .22 * .18 * .20 * 
Coping 
13. Situation .12 .08 .10 
14. Accomodation -.16 -.21 * -.21 * 
15. Devaluation -.08 -.13 -.02 
16. Avoidance -.12 -.14 -.08 
17. Reduction .14 .11 .22 * 
18. Coping total -.03 -.08 .01 
Academic grades 
19. Managing grade total (%) .99 ** .70 ** 
20. Managing grade exam (75%) .65 ** 
21. Managing grade c/w (25%) 
**p<O.Ol 
* p < 0.05 
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Predictive validity 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine the degree to which 
performance on EI measures, personality, verbal IQ, well-being and coping predict 
academic achievement. Separate scores for each individual were obtained for both the 
coursework and exam components, so there were significant correlations between the 
three aspects as would be expected. The total management grade (%) correlated with 
exam scores (r = 0.99, P < 0.05) and to a lesser extent with coursework scores (r = 0.70, P 
< 0.05). Exam scores were related to coursework scores (r = 0.65, p < 0.05). The total 
management grade (%) was not included in the multiple regression analyses as the 
correlation with exam scores was effectively perfect. 
Multiple regression analyses on exam scores (75%) 
14% of the variance in exam scores was explained by the 13 predictors [F(13,115) = 
2.62, P < 0.05], with emotional awareness scores making the greatest contribution. 
Multiple regression analyses on coursework scores (25%) 
16% of the variance in coursework scores was explained by the 13 predictors [F(13,U5) 
= 2.95, P < 0.05], with verbal IQ scores malting the greatest contribution. The results of 
the mUltiple regression analyses are presented in Table 5.4. 
83 
5. Predictive validity of emotional perception and change across time 
Table 5.4 Multiple regression of exam scores and coursework scores on emotional 
intelligence, personality, verbalIQ, well-being and coping variables. 
Predictor 
Emotional intelligence 
1. Emotional perception 
2. Emotional awareness 
3. Emotional clarity 
4. Emotional expression 
Personalit~ 
5. Neuroticism 
6. Extraversion 
7. Openness 
8. Agreeableness 
9. Conscientiousness 
Cognitive ability 
10. Verbal IQ 
Well-being 
11. Anxiety-contentment 
12. Derression-enthusiasm 
Coping 
13. Coping total 
** p < 0.01 
* P < 0.05 
Exam scores (75 %) 
Beta Unique 
variance 
(%) 
.041 0 
.299 ** 7 
-.082 0 
-.122 1 
-.231 * 4 
.063 0 
.155 2 
-.026 0 
.076 0 
.055 0 
.027 0 
.034 0 
-.095 0 
R= .23 Adjusted 
R2= .14 
Change over time between phase 1 and phase 2 of Study 3 
Coursework scores 
(25%) 
Beta Unique 
variance 
(%) 
.019 0 
.034 0 
-.147 2 
.112 0 
-.117 1 
-.120 1 
.169 3 
.058 0 
.080 0 
.325 ** 9 
.044 0 
.055 0 
-.030 0 
R= .25 Adjusted 
R2= .16 
A summary of change over time for the management students is provided below. 
Full repeated measures t-test tables between all variables across phase 1 and 2 can be 
found in Appendix A.2-3. 
Across phase 1 and phase 2, most of the scores on the measures decreased, with the 
exception of verbal IQ, aspects of personality and coping which did not change over time. 
In general, the magnitude of the differences were small to moderate. Similar to the 
findings for Study 2, scores on the EI variables changed over time, even if somewhat 
Surp11singly they decreased. As with the nursing sample, there was no control during the 
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interim period between testing. Perhaps had the managers been given specific training 
techniques, their EI scores may have improved. 
In terms of personality, Neuroticism and Openness scores did not change over 
time, but scores on the other three aspects of personality decreased. The magnitude of 
the differences for personality were generally lower than for other variables, indicating 
that it is a relatively stable trait. 
Verbal IQ scores were no different over time. This suggests that the equivalent 
version used in phase 2 was of the same difficulty level as the original version used in 
phase 1. 
Well-being scores were also no different over time, which may seem somewhat 
surprising considering the nature of well-being which is expected to fluctuate with life 
events, therefore usually changing over time. However, they may have been fluctuations 
within the sample where some scores increased and others decreased, resulting in a net 
effect of zero. 
There was no difference in any of the coping scores over time. As with nurses, this 
could be attributed to the fact that specific coping mechanisms were not required to any 
great extent at either phase, or a result of poor internal reliability scores on the measure. 
However, in general, reliability scores for the coping scale were higher with managers 
than for nurses, so the results should be treated with less caution in this particular sample. 
As mentioned in Study 2, more research needs to be conducted in order to comment 
further on these issues. 
Summary 
In reference to academic achievement, emotional awareness made the greatest 
contribution to predicting exam scores and verbal IQ contributed most to predicting 
coursework scores. EP did not contribute to predicting academic achievement in the 
management sample, but the measures were of a more traditional format somewhat like 
the IT and biology grades assessed in Study 2. 
As with the nursing sample, there was evidence of scores changing over the 6-
month time gap between the testing phases, suggesting that EI components may be 
abilities which are adaptive. 
85 
5. Predictive validity of emotional perception and change across time 
Similarities and differences between the two samples 
In terms of performance, predictive validity of the variables in relation to academic 
achievement was demonstrated in both samples. However, in nurses, EP made the 
greatest contribution to performance, whereas in managers, emotional awareness and 
verbal IQ made the greatest contribution. This appears to be a result of the type of 
performance being assessed rather than differences across the groups per se. By nature of 
the course, nurses were assessed using more practical methods (such as seminar 
presentations) and were required to demonstrate skills (such as communication and 
understanding) which were more likely to be related to EP. Thus EP was related to 
seminar presentation and nursing grades but not to IT and biology grades, where methods 
of assessment were more traditional and required the demonstration of technical skills. 
The results for the IT grades for nurses were similar to the results of the management 
sample, where again the form of assessment was more traditional. Thus EP was not 
related to the academic achievement measure in managers. 
In reference to changes over time between phase 1 and phase 2, an overall 
similmity between the samples was that scores on most variables tended to decrease over 
time. The magnitude of the differences between testing phases were generally smaller for 
managers than for nurses. Scores on all four EI variables decreased within the 6-month 
time gap in both samples. 
In terms of personality, the difference between the samples were that scores on four 
of the personality scales increased slightly by phase 2 for nurses, whereas scores on three 
of the scales decreased slightly by phase 2 for managers. The similarities were the fact 
that although in different directions, the magnitude of the differences for both samples 
were generally smaller than most other variables, indicating that personality is relatively 
stable over time. Furthermore, scores on Neuroticism were no different over time for 
either sample. 
In reference to verbal IQ, scores increased slightly over time for nurses, but were 
no different for managers. An equivalent version of the test was used in phase 2 for both 
samples and it may just be that nurses found this equivalent test somewhat easier than the 
first, or scored higher due to practice effects. 
Scores on well-being changed over time for nurses but not for managers. Aspects 
of well-being constantly change over time for different reasons, so initially it may seem 
surprising that scores remained stable for managers. However, as discussed earlier, this 
may be due to fluctuations within the group resulting in no change overall. The change 
for the nursing sample could be due to the demands of the course (such as a vital essay to 
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submit prior to administration of the questionnaire pack in phase 2) or due to personal 
events. 
Coping scores did not change over time for either sample, but it was difficult to 
ascertain whether this was because there was no increased demands requiring coping 
strategies, or a result of problems with the reliability of the measure. 
General discussion 
The fact that predictive validity is an important aspect of intelligence seems to have 
escaped many of the current conceptualisations of EI (Davies et al., 1998; Dulewicz & 
Higgs, 1998a; 1998b). There is a lack of empirical evidence to demonstrate the 
predictive validity of EI, and many claims have been anecdotal (as discussed in Chapter 
1). The data reported here focused on the predictive validity of the variables in relation 
to academic achievement. In Study 2 with nurses, of all the predictor variables (other EI 
components, verbal IQ, personality, well-being and coping), EP had the greatest 
contribution when predicting both seminar presentation and nursing grades. Those people 
who scored higher on EP achieved better academic grades. This effect was greater for 
seminar presentation than nursing grades, a result that can be interpreted as reflecting the 
greater contribution of EP to performance related assessment where skills such as closely 
monitOling other people's reactions in order to make a good seminar presentation are 
fundamental. More traditional methods of assessment such as essay writing and 
examinations require a different set of skills. Skills such as communication and 
understanding were required in the nursing module, whereas the IT module for example, 
required demonstration of technical and computer skills. Although both were assessed by 
coursework and examination, skills necessary for the nursing module were more closely 
related to what is being measured by EP. Consequently, EP scores made a contribution 
to predicting nursing grades, but were not related to information technology grades. 
Similarly, the biology module required the demonstration of more traditional skills 
assessed by examination and MCQ, which is not closely related to what is being 
measured by EP. 
In the management sample, academic achievement was measured by a module 
assessing management practices and theories through exam and coursework. EP was not 
related to academic achievement scores, which again were assessed by more traditional 
means. Emotional awareness made the greatest contribution to exam scores, whereas 
verbal IQ was most important for coursework scores. In contrast to nurses, emotional 
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awareness had an influence over managers academic achievement scores. This may be 
due to the fact that managers are trained to focus on emotions within themselves, and 
may use self-awareness to a greater extent when completing tasks (Dulewicz, 1994; 
Dulewicz & Higgs, 1999). Nurses on the other hand are primarily trained to focus on the 
emotions of others, hence EP may playa more important role when they complete tasks 
and problems. 
To summarise, it appears that EP demonstrates predictive validity, particularly 
when performance involves practical skills. It may therefore be more accurate to say that 
EP predicts performance in terms of communication/practical ability rather than 
academic achievement per se. 
Researchers need to specify clearly not only which particular aspect of EI is being 
measured, but also which aspect of performance is being assessed. Individual 
components of EI may predict different aspects of academic achievement, which is one of 
the reasons for conflicting findings within the literature on the predictive validity of EI. 
The data from studies 2 and 3 have shown that the EI-performance relationship can only 
be explored when both sides of the coin have been thoroughly operationalised. EI 
abilities may be limited in their application to certain types of performance, if we define 
peliormance in terms of intellectual capacity and traditional assessments, but may be 
crucial for other aspects of performance, such as practical presentations. This is 
important work which needs to be conducted, but is not the focus of the thesis. 
EI has been described as an adaptive ability that may change with age and 
experience (e.g., Goleman, 1995). This view is supported by the fact that EI variables 
changed over time for both nurses and managers. It was somewhat surprising perhaps 
that the scores decreased, but nevertheless the claim that EI variables are adaptive was 
suppOlted. This may not occur naturally, but it is possible that with specific training 
schemes targeted to improve EI skills, scores may increase over time. Furthermore, these 
results suggest that EI is more of an ability related to traditional forms of intelligence as 
proposed by the infOlmation-processing approach (Mayer et aI., 1999) and less likely to 
be a stable trait like personality. 
Although EP appears to be semi-independent (see Chapter 4) and potentially useful 
with long-term effects, the longitudinal studies leave the unanswered question of whether 
EP has a role to play in actual behaviour. The questionnaire based nature of studies 2 and 
3 makes this question impossible to address, and it has been suggested (Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000) that the status of the EI construct needs to be explored using 
experimental methodologies not purely relying on self-report data. The following study, 
therefore, examines the effects of EP in a social setting using a quasi-experimental design 
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with objective measures. In the longitudinal studies, EP had particular influence over 
practical performance (i.e., when giving seminar presentations), so may have an 
important role to play in successful interpersonal interactions. The study described in the 
following Chapter uses embarrassment as a framework to evaluate the role of EP in the 
social environment when giving group presentations. This is a move towards obtaining 
objective, rather than purely self-report data. 
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Chapter 6 
Emotional perception in the social environment 
"The rate at which a person can mature is directly proportional to the 
embarrassment he can tolerate." 
Doug Englebart (1980) 
The first part of this thesis used self-report methods to investigate the influence 
of EP on pelformance and to assess whether it had longitudinal effects. It was 
demonstrated (in Chapter 5) that EP influenced practical performance when giving 
seminar presentations. As a result, it was suggested that EP may have an important 
role to play in social situations. These effects cannot be investigated using 
questionnaire-based methods, so this part of the thesis describes a study using quasi-
experimental methods to investigate the effects of EP in the social environment. 
EP clearly relates to the perception of self and others which is likely to have 
implications in social settings. Individuals who are good at perceiving emotions in 
other people would presumably react accordingly in a social situation, thus may 
develop more successful personal interactions. EP is likely to be related to a number 
of social emotions, in particular self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, 
shame, guilt and pride. These emotions involve complex cognitive processes, such as 
the evaluation of one's behaviour from a self-perspective, as well as from considering 
the effect one's behaviour may have on other people. The three self-conscious 
emotions of embarrassment, shame and guilt constitute a cluster of emotions relating 
to transgression, shortcomings or failures, and Keltner & Buswell (1997) argue that 
the distinction between them arises in the type of violation which occurs. The 
antecedents of embarrassment involve a violation of social convention which increase 
social vulnerability or exposure, whereas guilt is related to the transgression of moral 
rules and shame to failures to live up to expectations of others or society in general. 
In one particular study, participants listed few of the same antecedents for 
embarrassment and shame (9% overlap) or embarrassment and gUilt (5% overlap, 
Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Another study found that embarrassment occurred more 
frequently during public, interpersonal interactions than shame and guilt, and the 
antecedents of shame and guilt were rated as being twice as moral in their 
connotations as those of embarrassment (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
Embarrassment, more so than shame and guilt, occurs during public, interpersonal 
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interactions and seems to implicate the "outer" or public self rather than the "inner" or 
private self (e.g., Goffman, 1967; cited in Keltner & Buswell, 1997). 
As stated above, the area in which EP is most likely to have theoretical 
implications is in social environments involving interpersonal relations. It was 
therefore decided that using the framework of embarrassment would be a useful way 
in which to investigate the effects of EP. Embarrassment was chosen as it is more 
likely to occur in a public setting than the other self-conscious emotions and 
represents the "outer" self, making it easier to measure than some of the other self-
conscious emotions. 
Despite our sometimes all too frequent experience of the cause and effects of 
this self-conscious emotion, its position within the social sciences has been unclear. 
Some researchers (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Miller, 1996) view embarrassment 
as being a key social emotion, crucial in maintaining successful interpersonal relations 
and playing a key role in socialisation practices such as the negotiation of social roles 
and status, motivation of behaviour, development of the conscious and conformity. In 
contrast, traditional emotion researchers (e.g., Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1977) have 
largely ignored embarrassment. It does not appear as a 'basic' emotion and is not 
even held as distinct by many, being seen as a version of shame, sadness and fear by 
different theorists. 
In general, there has been a lack of research on embarrassment and findings are 
often inconsistent. Chapter 6 discusses research from the embarrassment literature 
pertaining to the selection of a suitable method for the study, and to evaluating the 
potential role of EP in social interaction. For a justification of why embarrassment 
should be classified as a distinct emotion, and a detailed discussion of the five major 
theories of embarrassment, refer to Keltner & Buswell (1997). 
First, this Chapter considers the different methodological approaches which 
have been employed to investigate the detection of embarrassment, and assesses the 
relative contribution of perceptivity and expressivity to responses associated with 
embanassment. Second, the role that EP, in conjunction with expressivity and 
empathy, may have to play in the experience of embarrassment is evaluated in Study 
4. 
Detecting embarrassment 
It is necessary that embanassment is recognisable by others in order for it to 
have reliable interpersonal effects. Also recognition of others' embarrassment is said 
to underly the experience of "empathic embaiTassment" in which observers find it 
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distressing to witness others' embarrassment (Marcus & Miller, 1999). Practically, 
assurances that embarrassment is typically obvious may help reduce stress in 
awkward social situations. Knowing that making one's discomfort plain may increase 
social approval, becoming embarrassed may be a sufficient reaction to many social 
predicaments (Miller, 1996). 
Research has shown that in general, people are accurate judges of 
emban'assment. Across a series of five studies, Keltner (1995) found that people 
accurately identified embarrassment in spontaneous videotapes. Observers tended to 
evaluate expressions according to a prototype of the embarrassment display. 
Accuracy was correlated with the number of signs of embarrassment in the display, 
peaking at 92% when the prototypical display was shown. The prototypical display 
unfolds in the following reliable sequence: gaze aversion; a smile control, which is a 
lower facial action that potentially inhibits the smile; a non-Duchenne smile, which 
only involves the zygomatic muscle action that pulls the corners of the lips upward; a 
second smile control; head movement down; and then face touching, which occurred 
about 25 % of the time. Across studies, observers identified shame with above chance 
accuracy, but infrequently (approx. 5% of the time across studies) confused shame 
and embarrassment. Embarrassment has also been identified accurately from still 
photographs and there is some evidence to suggest that it is recognised cross-
culturally (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). However the use of static photographs or 
selected videotapes may lack the informativeness of complex, interpersonal 
environments in which embarrassment naturally occurs. 
There is a lack of research in general focusing on the recognition of 
embarrassment, and even fewer studies have presented observers with displays of 
embarrassment in natural settings. In response to cdticisms of traditional methods, 
Marcus & Miller (1999) asked female members of small groups to perform either an 
embarrassing task (dancing to pre-recorded music) or an innocuous task while their 
peers watched them from an adjacent room. Each participant performed, and each 
rated the embarrassment of each of her peers. Social relations analyses on the 
resulting round-robin data demonstrated that observers generally agreed about the 
extent of the particular person's embarrassment, despite their perceptual 
idiosyncrasies. 
These data suggest that live displays of embarrassment are recognisable by 
others, but can be criticised on two main grounds. First, performers were not asked to 
provide self-reports of embarrassment, so although there was a high degree of 
consensus among observers, it is impossible to determine whether the audiences' 
perceptions were accurate. Second, although the stimuli were more ecologically valid 
than photographs or videotapes, the embarrassment-eliciting task was still somewhat 
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artificial. The study was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting and participants' 
reactions may have differed in important ways from embarrassment occurring in 
everyday life. 
Taking these concerns into account, Marcus & Miller (1999) examined the 
interpersonal perception of embarrassment during a natural, real-life situation which 
often elicits embarrassment. 207 participants in various university courses judged the 
embarrassment felt by their peers during classroom presentations, and reported how 
they themselves felt during their own presentations. The resulting round-robin data 
demonstrated that naturally occurring embarrassment is recognisable by others; 
audiences agreed about who was and who was not embarrassed, and their judgements 
were reliably correlated with the targets' self-reports of embarrassment. The results 
suggest that intense embarrassment is usually obvious, with perceptual idiosyncracies 
emerging in observers' judgements only when the presenters' reactions are less 
severe. In contrast, empathic embarrassment differed from perceptions of others' 
embmnssment per se, and depended more on perceiver idiosyncrasies than the 
behaviour of the target. Although this study could not determine the specific 
information observers were using to estimate embarrassment in others, and did not 
measure observers' ability to distinguish embarrassment from related states, it 
demonstrated the methodological improvement of using round-robin data in a 
naturalistic setting. 
The contribution of perceptivity and expressivity to detecting 
embarrassment 
It has been suggested that interpersonal sensitivity results from a combination of 
perceptivity and expressivity with neither being considered to the exclusion of the 
other (Snodgrass, 1985; Snodgrass, 1992). A number of studies suggest that 
expressivity of participants contributes a large portion of the variance to interpersonal 
sensitivity. For example, Sabatelli, Buck, & Dreyer (1982) analysed communication 
accuracy between married couples and found the greatest percentage in variance was 
accounted for by sender and unique relationship effects and that little variance was 
accounted for by receiver effects. Nakamura, Buck, & Kenny (1990) found this 
expressive behaviour contributed more to perceivers judgements than other contextual 
information. Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal (1995) found that expressive 
individuals were more easy to judge accurately. In a clinical setting, it has been 
shown to be relatively easy to determine the thoughts and feelings of two out of three 
targets from their expressive behaviour (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). 
Furthermore, in a study examining the effects of gender and leadership roles, results 
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indicated that interpersonal sensitivity was associated more with high expressivity on 
behalf of the sender than with the perceiver's perceptivity. Finally, specific to 
embanassment, Marcus & Miller (1999) found that perceptions of embanassment 
involved a combination of the information provided by the targets (28% of the 
variance) and from the idiosyncratic viewpoints of the perceivers (23% of the 
variance). In contrast, perceiver variance (39%) clearly outweighed target variance 
(0.08%) in reports of empathic embanassment. Audience members experienced 
sympathetic reactions to their peers not so much because of their peers' behaviour, but 
because of their own idiosyncrasies. 
There are a number of criticisms of studies which have attempted to assess the 
relative contributions of perceptivity and expressivity to embanassment ratings. First, 
many studies have simply measured embarrassment ratings of the target and audience, 
correlating the responses to check if judgements were accurate and to see the relative 
contribution of expressivity from the target and perceptivity of the audience. 
Furthermore, studies have focused mainly on the accuracy of audience perceptions of 
embanassment and have largely ignored factors which may affect the targets 
embanassment level. 
Study 4 
Taking into consideration the various methodological approaches and criticisms 
of previous research (outlined above), it seems that the investigation of 
embanassment needs to be conducted in natural settings. Also, a wider range of 
vmiables which may affect target's embarrassment levels, in particular, need to be 
assessed. Consequently, Study 4 investigates the effects of EP in a natural social 
setting by measuring embanassment ratings during class presentations, in addition to 
a variety of potential mediating factors. The issue is not necessarily whether 
perceptivity, expressivity or empathy make the greatest contribution to embanassment 
ratings per se, but how they may effect targets and audiences in different ways. 
From a theoretical perspective, Study 4 aims to assess the effects of EP in a 
social environment by using ratings of embanassment in a real-life setting, and the 
degree to which target levels of EP, expressivity and empathy predict these. From a 
practical perspective, knowledge about factors which affect embanassment levels 
may make situations such as class presentations less daunting. In most cases, 
misperceptions of embanassment levels lends people to believe they are more easily 
embarrassed than others which could lead them to fear embanassing circumstances to 
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a needless extent. This could have an undesirable influence on subsequent 
interactions. 
It is predicted that presenters will rate themselves as more embarrassed than 
audience members rate them. Presenters' ratings will be a function of how 
embarrassed the audience rates them as being and presenter perceptibility. Audience 
ratings will be a function of how embarrassed the presenter rates themselves as being 
and presenter expressivity. 
Methods 
Participants 
At the beginning of the semester, students were informed of the aims and nature 
of the study which would be conducted during a first year Psychology course. It was 
explained that participation would involve completion of a set of three questionnaires, 
and ratings of class presentations which would occur during the module. Informed 
consent was obtained from interested volunteers. Initially 188 undergraduates 
volunteered to participate in the study, however, because a complete set of round-
robin ratings was necessary (i.e., every participant must rate and be rated by every 
other participant), students who did not present, or who had multiple absences could 
not be included in the final analysis. These exclusion criteria resulted in a final 
sample of 109 participants (34 male, 75 female) ranging from 18 - 45 years old 
(Mean = 27.2, SD = 7.2). All students made a formal class presentation in groups of 4 
or 5. Participants were given 30 minutes experimental participation to count towards 
the two hours required for the module if they took part in the study. 
Materials 
The presenters' self-ratings of embarrassment were measured using three pairs 
of semantic differential items of proven utility (see Apsler, 1975; "embarrassed -
unembarrassed"; "poised - awkward"; and "composed - flustered"), on a 7-point 
scale. Scores on these three scales were combined into one overall score for 
embarrassment. The same items were also used to assess audience members' 
perceptions of how embarrassed each presenter appeared. EP was assessed using the 
14-item APT (as used in studies 2 and 3). Emotional expression was assessed using 
the 16-item Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire (EEQ, King & Emmons, 1990), 
also used in studies 2 and 3, and empathy was assessed using a 33-item measure of 
emotional empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1970). All three questionnaires were rated 
on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
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Procedure 
During the initial session at the beginning of the semester, participants 
completed the APT, EEQ and empathy scale. 
Throughout the semester, whenever a student made a class presentation, each 
member of the class was given an evaluation fOlm with which to judge the speaker's 
embarrassment. These forms included Apsler's (1975) pairs of semantic differential 
items with space for any additional comments. The audience completed the form as 
the presentation progressed, rating each presenter in turn. Then, immediately 
following the presentation, each presenter used the same set of items to indicate how 
they had felt during the talk. Presenters were urged to focus on the presentation itself 
and to not think about the ratings the audience were providing. 
Results 
The three semantic differentials for the embatTassment scale correlated highly 
so were combined as a single measure. These correlations are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Correlations among the semantic differentials for embarrassment 
ratings. 
Semantic differential 
1. Embarrassed-unembatTassed 
2. Poised-awkward 
3. Composed-flustered 
* p < 0.01 
1 
.73 * 
.77 * 
2 3 
.80 * 
The means and standard deviations for both the self-report measures and 
embatTaSsment ratings were similar across all eight classes, plus the fact that the 
classes were all run in the same fashion each week with a relatively equal number of 
students, the data from all eight classes were combined for the final analysis. A table 
of descriptive statistics for all variables across the eight groups is presented in 
Appendix AA. 
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Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics calculated for each measure are presented in Table 6.2. In 
general, the summary statistics for the self-report measures were comparable to those 
obtained with the same measures in the past (e.g., Apsler, 1975; King & Emmons, 
1990; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1970). 
Table 6.2 Means and standard deviations for all variables. 
Mean (SD) 
1. EP of presenters 71.84 (9.30) 
2. Emotional expression of presenters 74.23 (12.13) 
3. Empathy of presenters 157.02 (17.94) 
4. Presenters' embal1'assment ratings of themselves 9.63 (4.17) 
5. Audience embal1'assment ratings of presenters 7.75 (2.10) 
Correlations 
Intercol1'elations among the five variables are presented in Table 6.3. EP scores 
were positively cOl1'elated with emotional expression, as in studies 2 and 3, but were 
not related to empathy scores. Emotional expression and empathy were positively 
related. EP scores were related to presenters' embal1'assment ratings of themselves, 
where people with high EP rated themselves as feeling less embal1'assed during their 
talk than people with low EP. EP scores of presenters were not related to audience 
ratings of presenters' embal1'assment. In line with previous research, emotional 
expression was related to audience embalTassment ratings of presenters. Specifically, 
audience members rated highly expressive presenters as being less embal1'assed than 
presenters who were less expressive. Emotional expression was related, to a lesser 
extent, with presenters embarrassment ratings: Presenters with higher scores on 
expression rated themselves as being less embal1'assed dming talks than those with 
low expression scores. Finally, as predicted in the literature, presenters' 
embal1'assment ratings of themselves were positively related to audience 
embal1'assment ratings with audience members rating presenters as less embaI1'assed 
than they actually felt. 
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Table 6.3 Correlations among self-report questionnaires and embarrassment 
ratings. 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. EP of presenter 
2. Expression of presenter .33 * 
3. Empathy of presenter .02 .27 * 
4. Presenters' emb ratings of themselves -.38 * -.25 * .06 
5. Audience emb ratin~s of presenters -.06 -.48 * -.15 .28 * 
* P < 0.01 
Comparing audience embarrassment ratings with presenter ratings 
As predicted, audience members tended to rate presenters as being significantly 
less embm1"assed than they actually felt [t(108) = 4.76, p < 0.05]. 
Analyses of presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves 
A multiple regression analysis (all variables entered) with presenters' self-
ratings as the dependent vatiable and presenters' self-reported EP, expressivity and 
empathy, plus audience embanassment ratings as predictor vmiables. 
Only presenter EP and audience ratings made significant conttibutions to 
predicting presenters' embanassment ratings, together accounting for 19% of the 
variance [F (4,104) = 7.47, p < 0.05]. These results are presented in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Multiple regression of presenters , embarrassment ratings of themselves on 
the self-report measures and audience embarrassment ratings of presenters. 
Predictor 
1. EP 
2. Expressivity 
3. Empathy 
4. Audience ratings 
**p<O.Ol 
* p < 0.05 
Presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves 
Beta Unique variance (%) 
-.349 ** 13 
-.063 0 
.118 0 
.246 * 6 
R =.22 Adjusted R2 = .19 
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Analyses of audience embarrassment ratings of presenters 
A multiple regression analysis (all variables entered) with audience ratings of 
presenter embarrassment as the dependent variable, and presenter self-ratings of 
embatTassment, EP, expressivity and empathy as the predictor variables was 
conducted. In contrast with the earlier analysis, only presenter self-ratings of 
embarrassment and self-report of emotional expressivity made significant 
contributions, together accounting for 21% of the variance [F (4,104) = 8.20, p < 
0.05]. These results are presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Multiple regression of audience embarrassment ratings of presenters on 
the self - report measures and presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves. 
Predictor 
1. EP 
2. Expressivity 
3. Empathy 
4. Presenters' ratings 
**p<0.01 
* p < 0.05 
Discussion 
Audience embarrassment ratin~s of presenters 
Beta Unique variance (%) 
.172 2 
-.410 ** 14 
-.053 0 
.241 * 5 
R=.24 Adjusted R2 = .21 
Embarrassment often results from performing in front of an audience, and is 
even more likely to occur if a mistake is made. Class presentations involve 
conspicuousness and increase the importance of social evaluation and so often elicit 
embarrassment. Study 4 examined instances of real-life embarrassment occurring 
through class presentations, in order to determine the effects of EP in a social 
environment. The main aims were to assess the accuracy of audience ratings of 
embarrassment in a natural environment, to assess the contribution of EP, expressivity 
and empathy to embarrassment ratings, and to determine how they may affect 
presenters and audiences in different ways. Limitations of the method used include 
the fact that the attention of the audience may have been directed to the presenters' 
emotions, and may have been influenced by practice effects over time. However, the 
method was considerably more ecologically valid than many previous studies of 
embarrassment and emotion recognition (Marcus & Miller, 1999). 
The results of Study 4 indicate that audience members can accurately identify 
embarrassment in live, naturalistic settings, and that EP and expressivity both 
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contribute to embarrassment ratings with EP having more of an influence over 
presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves, and expression influencing audience 
embarrassment ratings of presenters. Empathy had no effect on embarrassment 
ratings. Each of these effects is discussed in more detail below. 
Audience members were able to accurately identify how embarrassed a 
presenter was. These data therefore provide naturalistic support for the notion that the 
embarrassment display is a clear signal which can be readily decoded by observers. 
Although no measure was taken of the nature of these displays, and in particular 
whether they followed the prototypical sequence of events identified by Keltner & 
Buswell (1997), it is clear that experienced embarrassment is generally easily 
perceived. In addition, and as predicted, although audience members' ratings were 
reliable predictors of presenters' self-ratings of embarrassment, audience members 
tended to rate presenters as being less embarrassed than they actually felt. These data 
are important in two respects: From a theoretical viewpoint, the fact that 
embarrassment is recognisable in a natural setting is a necessary requirement for 
embarrassment to exert reliable interpersonal effects. From a practical perspective, 
these data offer reassurance to people who feel they appear extremely embarrassed. 
In general we do not appear to be as embarrassed as we feel. Wider dissemination of 
findings such as this may increase confidence levels and reduce fear, thus hopefully 
leading to greater enthusiasm for delivering presentations as well as the multitude of 
other activities which commonly lead to feelings of embarrassment. 
As predicted, presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves were a function 
of EP, and not expressivity or empathy. Individuals with high scores on EP rated 
themselves as being less embarrassed during a presentation than individuals with low 
scores on EP. The ability to perceive the emotions of others is of significant 
importance when assessing the successfulness of a presentation delivery. Individuals 
with high EP are more accurate at assessing the emotional display of others and 
presumably can monitor and adjust their performance in a social setting accordingly. 
The reassurance which comes with having a good idea of how your audience are 
responding makes a presenter feel more at ease, thus reducing embarrassment levels 
during a talk. Skills such as closely monitoring audience reactions during a talk 
appear to be fundamental to a successful performance. Neither expressivity nor 
empathy significantly affected presenters' self-ratings of embarrassment. 
Audience ratings of presenters were largely a function of presenter's 
expressivity scores. Audience members rated presenters with high expressivity as 
being less embarrassed than presenters with low expressivity. It seems that presenters 
who expressed themselves more during talks were perceived by audience members as 
being less embarrassed than individuals who were less expressive. This is in line with 
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previous research showing expressivity to be an important factor when inferring the 
thoughts and feelings of others. For example, Ambady et al. (1995) found that 
expressive individuals were more "legible," or easy to judge accurately and 
Marangoni et al. (1995) found that it was possible to infer emotions of two out of 
three targets from their expressive behaviour. Neither EP nor empathy significantly 
affected audience embarrassment ratings of presenters. 
Audience ratings were not affected by presenter's empathy scores. This may 
not be because empathy is not an important contributor to embarrassment ratings per 
se, but because we actually need to consider audience empathy data. Unfortunately 
this was not possible from the current data. Because feedback was given to 
presenters, and in order to keep this anonymous, audience members were not 
identified. Therefore there was no record of audience levels of EP, expression or 
empathy. Thus the data from Study 4 cannot address whether audience empathy 
affected embarrassment ratings. 
So it appears that the most important factor when rating embarrassment levels 
is monitoring other peoples' reactions. For presenters, this means that EP skills need 
to be highly developed in order to assess audience reactions. In contrast, audience 
members rely on monitoring presenters' reactions, which are displayed most clearly 
by the degree to which they can express themselves. 
Researchers have for a long time puzzled over the discrepancy between 
people's own perceptions and others' perceptions of them. It is possible that EP may 
mediate between the two helping to account for this difference. An analysis 
conducted on the data from Study 4 correlated presenters' self-report scores (EP, 
expressivity and empathy) with the difference between presenters embarrassment 
ratings and audience embarrassment ratings. EP was the only measure to correlate 
with the difference scores (1' = -0.36, P < 0.05). Specifically, for presenters with high 
EP there was a significantly smaller discrepancy between presenters and audience 
embarrassment ratings than for presenters with low EP. The suggestion that EP acts 
as some kind of mediating variable is treated with caution due to its limitations: EP is 
only represented by presenter scores and where there is only one score for presenters, 
there are many scores from audience members resulting in unbalanced data for the 
type of analysis performed. Consequently, these data were not included in the main 
analyses, but the suggestion that EP may account for the difference between people's 
perceptions of themselves and other's perceptions of them would be worth 
investigating in future research. 
The method used in Study 4 had its limitations. First, the embarrassment 
ratings may have been influenced by practice effects and audience members' attention 
was specifically directed towards the presenters' emotions. Second, the data did not 
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provide sufficient level of detail in order to determine the specific information 
audience members were using to rate embarrassment in others. Third, the data 
provide no evidence regarding observers' ability to distinguish embarrassment from 
related states such as shame. Also we could not know how embarrassment was being 
expressed. 
Nevertheless, the study did advance knowledge of interpersonal perceptions of 
emotion in a naturalistic setting. Furthermore, participants were provided with some 
useful feedback about internal and external judgements of embarrassment. Wider 
dissemination of these findings could benefit many people who, for a multitude of 
reasons, experience feelings of embarrassment in their day-to-day lives. 
Previously, we have looked at EP using questionnaire-based methods. The 
longitudinal studies showed that the measure was reliable, useful and had predictive 
validity, particularly over practical performance. The work was criticised, however, 
for employing self-report rather than objective measures. Study 4 used a quasi-
experimental design to look at the effects of EP in a natural setting, further 
investigating the fact that it may influence practical performance. Indeed, EP proved 
to play an important role in interpersonal perceptions of embarrassment, but still left 
unanswered is whether EP is important in the moment-by-moment regulation of 
behaviour. The following Chapter presents a framework in which to investigate the 
detailed behavioural effects of EP. 
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The contribution of emotional perception to 
attentional bias research 
The second part of this thesis used a quasi-experimental design to investigate 
the effects of EP in the social environment. This third part takes this a stage further 
using a series of studies to investigate the theoretical influence of EP in actual 
moment-by-moment regulation of behaviour. 
Most emotion research has used attention to look at the detailed effects of 
behaviour. EP involves the detection of affective material within the environment, so 
it is possible that attention towards emotionally meaningful stimuli may be mediated 
by EP. This section of the thesis uses the attentional bias framework in order to 
consider the effects of EP on behaviour. The investigation of attentional biases for 
threat and other types of emotional stimuli has concentrated largely on anxiety. 
However, it is important to describe this research as it provides a number of ways in 
which to consider the behavioural effects of EP. Therefore, it is necessary to first give 
an overview of this research area, particularly the various methodologies employed, 
before describing the series of studies. This review is selective, particularly when 
describing cognitive theories of anxiety. 
This Chapter outlines the background of attentional bias research; describes two 
of the major cognitive theories of anxiety; considers the various methodological 
approaches used in attentional bias research; discusses recent experimental findings; 
considers the effects of time courses; looks at the role of depression in attentional bias 
and suggests the role that EP may play in this area of research. The purpose of this is 
to outline the background and rationale for the studies discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
General superiority of threat stimuli 
The attentional system plays a vital role in detecting and monitoring 
environmental and internal stimuli which are used to direct and organise behaviour. 
There is a clear evolutionary advantage to a species that can respond rapidly to the 
presence of potential threat. Threat can be dealt with more efficiently if the limited 
capacity processing resources of the individual can be rapidly brought to focus on the 
relevant stimuli. There is considerable evidence to suggest that people preferentially 
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attend to negative/threatening stimuli in the environment, which is generally termed 
the threat hypothesis. Pratto & John (1991) proposed that people automatically 
evaluate the "goodness" or "badness" of stimuli so that attention is directed to 
negative information. 
Many research paradigms have relied on word stimuli, which have been 
criticised in terms of ecological validity and a whole class of lexical effects such as 
frequency, age of acquisition and orthography. Thus there has been a growing 
recognition of the need for more ecologically valid, informative stimuli. One such 
class of stimuli is facial expressions, a form of social communication which is argued 
to be innate and particularly good at communicating threat (e.g., Ohman, 1993). 
Angry faces appear to be particularly attention grabbing for infants (Oatley & Jenkins, 
1996), and similar results have been found with adults who could detect an angry face 
in a crowd more efficiently than a happy face in a crowd (e.g., Fox, Lester, Russo, 
Bowles, Pichler & Dutton, 2000; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Neurophysiological evidence 
(e.g., LeDoux, 1995) has shown that a direct pathway leading from the sensory 
thalamus to the amygdala allows mammals to respond defensively to an ambiguous 
stimulus before the object is identified as either threatening (e.g., a snake) or 
innocuous (e.g., a branch). It has even been proposed that humans are "hard-wired" 
for the recognition of anger or threat from fairly "low-level" sources of information 
(Ohman, 1993). Mogg, McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer, & Bradley (2000) 
concluded that although the relative effects of positive and negative information on 
attracting attention in nonclinical subjects have to some extent been rather mixed, all 
individuals orient to stimuli that are judged to be significantly threatening. Although 
they found some evidence to suggest that happy faces may be processed in a similar 
way to angry faces, Fox, Russo, & Dutton (2002) SUppOlt the claim that there is 
"something special" about angry faces and that evolution found a way to efficiently 
process and respond to threat signals (e.g., an angry face) in the visual environment. 
There is, however, an alternative to the threat hypothesis which is known as the 
emotionality hypothesis. This theory suggests that positive emotional stimuli might 
capture attention to the same extent as negative emotional stimuli. In contrast to the 
threat hypothesis, which predicts that threatening (i.e., angry faces) will have the most 
powelful effects on attention, the emotionality hypothesis predicts that positive (i.e., 
happy faces) will have the same effect. 
Fox et al. (2000) directly compared the threat and emotionality hypotheses 
using the face in the crowd technique (see face in the crowd paradigm section below 
for a description). According to the threat hypothesis, an angry face should be 
detected quicker than a happy face in a neutral crowd, and displays of "all angry" 
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faces should hold attention, thus be responded to slower than either "all happy" or "all 
neutral" displays. According to the emotionality hypothesis, there should be no 
difference between locating an angry or happy face in a neutral crowd, and "all happy" 
displays should result in slower responses than "all neutral" displays and be 
comparable to "all angry" displays. The results supported the threat rather than the 
emotionality hypothesis. People were faster when locating a different angry face 
compared to a happy face in a neutral crowd, and displays of "all angry" faces were 
responded to slower than "all happy" faces suggesting that angry faces held attention 
for longer than happy faces. 
Other studies have found support for a general emotionality effect (e.g., 
Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Fox et aI., 2002; Gilboa-
Schechtman et aI., 1999; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Martin, Williams, & Clark, 
1991), but this does not seem to be consistent. More direct tests of the threat and 
emotionality hypothesis need to be conducted in order to cast light on the debate. 
This is one of the aims of the studies described in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Individual biases for emotional information 
Attentional bias for threat has been proposed to underly vulnerability to 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Mathews, 1990; Mathews, 1993; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 2003; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; 1997). 
Individuals with a tendency to adopt a threat-vigilant style will have an increased 
perception of danger in the environment, thus will experience anxiety more often than 
those who show no such attentional bias. Vulnerability to anxiety is proposed to be 
associated with different processing styles that are elicited by stressful events (e.g., 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In vulnerable individuals, a 
stressful event, such as a house move or divorce, is more likely to elicit a "vigilant" 
processing style, where attention is grabbed by relatively mild threatening cues. Thus, 
these individuals will be exposed to a plethora of information about potential dangers, 
resulting in increased anxiety. In less vulnerable individuals, the same event may be 
insufficient to trigger a shift from the default "avoidant" mode, in which threatening 
information is ignored. Consequently, it is the type of processing style that is 
triggered by events which causes vulnerability to anxiety, rather than biases being 
merely a by-product of emotional variations. Mathews & MacLeod (2002) conduct a 
comprehensive review of the nature of these processing styles and discuss new data on 
the experimental induction of attentional and interpretive biases. They conclude that 
their review represents the most convincing evidence to date that specific processing 
biases can playa causal role in the development of vulnerability to anxiety. 
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It is important to consider that attentional biases may not be specific to anxiety, 
but that other variables may also have an influence over such processes. 
Emotionality, for example, has been identified as being a potential confound of 
attentional bias research (Martin et aI., 1991), and has subsequently been included in 
studies investigating attentional biases in anxiety (Reidy & Richards, 1997a; 1997b). 
Indeed, Reidy & Richards (1997a) found an interaction between anxiety and 
emotionality for negative words which just failed to reach significance. In this study, 
threatening and matched positive words were classed as 'emotional', whereas the non-
threatening and matched positive words were classed as 'non-emotional.' Extending 
this idea, it is not only the emotionality of the stimuli which may effect results, but 
individual levels of emotionality may also influence attentional bias research. 
EP, for instance, may have an effect on attentional focusing to emotionally-
meaningful stimuli. People high in EP are presumably better at processing all types of 
emotional information, which is likely to influence responses on attentional tasks. As 
a result, they are likely to successfully identify whether a stimulus represents a 
potential threat or not. Also, individuals with high EP may be more interested in 
emotional material and focus on it for longer. In contrast, individuals with low EP 
tend to be less skilled at surveying the emotional landscape. They may therefore 
respond more quickly to angry faces on attentional tasks, as they have difficulty 
deciding whether threat is real or imagined. Additionally, they may not be interested 
in maintaining attention on emotional stimuli. Like individuals with high anxiety, low 
EP may lead to an accentuation of the normal threat bias, albeit for different reasons. 
In terms of the relative contribution of the threat and emotionality hypotheses, 
the general emotionality effect may be more apparent for EP, which involves 
surveying all types of emotional information. Anxiety effects may just occur for 
threatening stimuli. 
Cognitive theories of anxiety 
1) The interaction hypothesis 
Williams et al. (1988; 1997) proposed that two mechanisms were responsible 
for the preattentive and attentional bias to threat in anxiety: the Affective Decision 
Mechanism (ADM) and Resource Allocation Mechanism (RAM); see Fig 7.1. 
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Fig 7.1 The interaction model of anxiety. 
Stimulus I Affective 
input --+ Decision 
Mechanism 
/" 
State anxiety 
(mimics effect of 
high threat input) 
High 
:r 
threat 
Resource Allocation Mechanism k:/ High trait anxiety: orient towards location of threat 
Low trait anxiety: shift attention away from threat 
Trait anxiety determines whether processing 
resources are directed towards or away from a 
stimulus that has been judged to be threatening 
The ADM, influenced by state anxiety and stimulus threat input, assesses the 
threat value of environmental stimuli and passes this information on to the RAM, 
affected by trait anxiety, which directs attention towards or away from threatening 
stimuli. As threat inputs from the ADM increase, high trait anxious individuals 
should become more vigilant, and low trait anxious individuals more avoidant, of 
threat. So, according to this theory, attentional biases are an interactive function of 
trait-anxiety and state anxiety (threat input). 
2) The cognitive-motivational theory 
Mogg & Bradley (1998) have criticised the interactive hypothesis on the 
grounds that it makes counterintuitive predictions for low trait anxious individuals. 
According to the interactive theory, as threat stimuli increases, low trait anxious 
individuals become more avoidant of threat. However, in order for the attentional 
system to function effectively, attention should always be directed to real danger or 
severe threats. Therefore, low trait anxious individuals should exhibit greater 
vigilance for high rather than mild threat stimuli. Consequently Mogg & Bradley 
(1998) proposed an alternative theory to account for attentional biases in anxiety. 
This theory is compatible with biological models of anxiety and has been influenced 
by theories of personality, emotion and cognitive neuroscience. The cognitive-
motivational theory consists of two main functional systems: a Valence Evaluation 
System, which is responsible for the appraisal of stimulus threat value, and a Goal 
Engagement System, which directs behaviour towards external stimuli; see Fig 7.2. 
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Fig 7.2 The cognitive-motivational model of anxiety. 
Stimulus inp~ 
Situational ~ 
context 
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Biological / 
preparednes 
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Evaluation 
System 
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threat 
No 
threat 
Trait anxiety reflects reactivity of 
Goal Engagement System 
Interrupt current goals ('danger' mode) 
Orient to threat 
Pursue current goals (default 'safety'mode) 
Prioritise positive stimuli 
Ignore minor negative stimuli 
Valence Evaluation System to aversive stimuli 
In contrast to the interactive hypothesis, the cognitive-motivational theory 
proposes that trait anxiety influences the appraisal of stimulus threat value, rather than 
the direction of attentional bias, so all individuals, including those with low trait 
anxiety, should be more vigilant for high rather than mild threat stimuli. This 
suggests that the relationship between stimulus threat value and attentional bias is 
curvilinear. Emotionally neutral stimuli that have no threat value should evoke no 
attentional bias. However, when stimuli are appraised as being mildly aversive and 
having a low subjective threat value, there may be a tendency to direct attention away 
from them (e.g., avoidance of threat words or faces in low anxious individuals, 
Bradley, Mogg, Millar, Bonham-Carter, Fergusson, Jenkins, & Pan, 1997; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). This avoidance of tlivial negative stimuli in the 
environment may serve to maintain attention on current goals and also assist in mood 
regulation, (i.e., to maintain a positive mood). However, as the subjective appraisal of 
threat value increases (due to increasing threat value, or trait anxiety) then attention is 
increasingly likely to be allocated towards it. For a detailed discussion of cognitive 
and biological formulations of anxiety, see Mogg & Bradley (1998). 
To summalise, at this stage it is difficult to conclude which of these two 
approaches offers the best explanation for attentional biases in anxiety. Few studies 
have directly tested the two theolies against one another, but one that did found 
support for the cognitive-motivational theory (Mogg et aI., 2000). More research is 
needed before we can decide where anxiety has its effect in attentional processing. 
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Different methodological approaches to examining attentional biases 
A variety of different methods have been used to examine attentional biases 
for threat. Earlier studies used words as threat stimuli. Several researchers have used 
the modified Stroop task. Typically, highly anxious individuals display longer 
reaction times to name the colours of threatening words (e.g., danger) than to name 
neutral words (e.g., chair), compared to non-anxious controls (Richards & French, 
1990; Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & Williams, 1992; Richards & 
Millwood, 1989). However, although the Stroop task has been used to demonstrate 
attentional bias for a wide range of anxiety disorders, it has lead to a rather mixed 
pattem of results (e.g., reviews by Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), with some 
studies even suggesting that increasing threat inputs may suppress rather than enhance 
the Stroop interference effects (e.g., Mathews & Sebastian, 1993). With regard to 
non-clinical studies, attentional biases for threat-related words are often not found in ' 
individuals who have high levels of trait anxiety within the normal population unless 
they are under stress (Mogg & Bradley, 2003). The emotional Stroop task has given 
rise to interpretative difficulties: anxious individuals' longer reaction times to threat-
related words have been interpreted in terms of attention being preferentially allocated 
to the threat content, interference at the response stage or even momentary elevation in 
arousal disrupting pelformance and leading to slower colour naming. The task has 
also been classified as being an impure measure of attention, as it may involve post-
attentional processing of the stimuli (Mogg et aI., 2000). 
Interpretative biases have also been investigated in anxiety. When presented 
with ambiguous stimuli, highly anxious individuals tend to provide a threat rather than 
neutral interpretation. For example, Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews (1987) presented 
non-clinical participants high and low in trait anxiety with threat/neutral homophones 
(e.g., die/dye) in a spelling task. They found that high trait anxious participants 
tended to favour threat-related spellings compared to low trait anxious participants. 
This general finding was replicated by Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck (1989) using a 
clinically anxious sample. This interpretative bias for threatening information has 
also been found using ambiguous sentences (e.g., "the two men watched as the chest 
was opened"), where clinically anxious individuals tended to favour the threatening 
interpretations more than recovered anxious patients or normal controls (Eysenck, 
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991). Using a semantic priming paradigm, 
Richards & French (1992) presented ambiguous threat/neutral homographs to high 
and low anxious individuals. Each threat/neutral homograph (e.g., 'growth') was 
followed by either a threat-related associate (e.g., 'cancer'), a neutral associate (e.g., 
'tall') or an unrelated word (e.g., 'wind'). There were three stimulus onset 
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asynchronies (SOAs) of 500 msec, 750 msec and 1250 msec. When the SOA was 500 
msec, all participants showed priming (faster RTs to related than unrelated trials) for 
both meanings. At 750 msec, the only significant priming effect was for the threat-
related meaning in the high anxiety group and a similar trend was found at 1250 msec. 
These methods, however, have been faced with similar interpretative difficulties and 
criticisms of response bias as in the Stroop paradigm. 
Given the problems with these tasks, MacLeod et aI. (1986) developed the dot 
probe paradigm, which provides a more direct measure of attentional biases. 
Typically, participants are presented with a series of word-pairs (one threat-related, 
one neutral), on a computer screen. Each pair is presented briefly and when it 
disappears, a probe (usually a small dot) is presented in the former location of one of 
the words. Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the dot 
probe. Research has shown that individuals with GAD are faster to detect probes 
which replace threat words than neutral words, in comparison with normal controls 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Furthermore, evidence shows that normal individuals with 
high levels of trait anxiety show increased vigilance for threat words (Mogg et aI., 
2000). These results are consistent with an attentional bias favouring threat stimuli. 
The dot probe paradigm has advantages over the above paradigms in that it does not 
rely on intelference effects and is independent of response bias, requiring a neutral 
response (button pressing) to a neutral stimulus (dot probe). It can therefore be 
concluded that the dot probe task is a 'purer' measure of attentional bias. 
Attentional biases for emotional faces 
The research paradigms described above have generally relied on word stimuli 
to investigate attentional biases in anxiety. This has been criticised on several 
grounds: First, single words are arbitary symbols which are not usually the source of 
threat in the environment making the stimuli not ecologically valid (Gilboa-
Schechtman et aI., 1999). Second, it is unclear whether familiarity or frequency of use 
may contribute to results that employ words as stimuli. Anxious subjects are likely to 
spend more time thinking about threatening events, and to describe themselves as 
featful, anxious, etc. Thus they are more familiar with, and show higher frequency of 
use of words that relate to threat. This may account for attentional biases to word 
stimuli rather than threat value per se (Bradley et aI., 1997). Third, single words have 
a relatively mild threat value, and so are not likely to be very informative about 
attentional biases for more highly emotional stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 2003). 
As a result of these criticisms, there has been a growing recognition of the 
need to use more informative, ecologically valid stimuli to examine attentional biases. 
Consequently facial expressions have been used in attentional bias studies. They are 
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not only more ecologically valid than words, which are indirect representations of 
social signals, but also avoid the many confounds associated with word stimuli (as 
discussed earlier). 
Recent experimental findings using facial stimuli 
Two main methods have been appropriated for investigating attentional biases: 
The dot probe task and face in the crowd paradigm. Findings from these two areas of 
research are discussed in the following sections. 
Dot probe paradigm 
A pictorial version of the dot probe task was used to investigate emotion-
related biases in selective attention in non-clinical subjects (Bradley et aI., 1997). On 
each trial, an emotional photograph (either threatening or happy) was paired with a 
neutral photograph of the same person and presented simultaneously on a screen for 
500 msec. Following the presentation of the face pair, a dot probe appeared in the 
former location of one of the faces and participants were required to press the 
appropriate response button (left or right) to indicate the position of the probe. The 
results showed evidence of an emotional-congruent attentional bias (i.e., Dysphoric 
Group x Face Valence interaction effect). Particularly, non-dysphoric individuals 
(i.e., those with low levels of anxiety and depression) showed an attentional bias away 
from threatening faces, relative to happy or neutral faces, in comparison with 
dysph0l1C individuals. However, significant intercorrelations between the anxiety and 
depression measures made it unclear whether avoidance of threat faces was associated 
with low levels of anxiety, depression, or a common underlying factor such as 
negative affect. 
A subsequent non-clinical study included two exposure durations for the face 
stimuli (500 and 1250 msec) to examine the time course of the attentional bias 
(Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998). Results showed that high trait anxious 
individuals were more vigilant for threat faces relative to happy faces across both 
exposure durations. This finding of vigilance for angry faces in normal individuals 
with increased levels of trait anxiety was replicated using only the 500 msec exposure 
duration (Mogg & Bradley, 1999a). 
Mogg et al. (2000) evaluated the differential predictions from the two 
cognitive theories of anxiety outlined above in a non-clinical sample. To recap, the 
two theories make opposite predictions regarding the relationship between stimulus 
threat value and attentional biases in low trait anxiety. According to the cognitive-
motivational view (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), both high and low trait anxious 
individuals should show greater vigilance for high rather than mild threat stimuli. In 
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contrast, according to the interaction hypothesis (Williams et aI., 1988; 1997), high 
trait anxious individuals should become more vigilant, and low trait anxious 
individuals more avoidant of threat, as stimulus threat value increases. Two 
experiments were conducted to examine these different predictions by manipulating 
stimulus threat value. High threat (e.g., murder victims, mutilated bodies) and mild 
threat (e.g., soldier holding gun) pictorial scenes were paired with non-threat (e.g., 
person playing piano) pictures presented in a dot probe detection task. The results 
from both experiments indicated a significant main effect of stimulus threat value on 
attentional bias. There was increased vigilance (or reduced avoidance) of threat, as 
threat value increased. This main effect was significant even in low trait anxious 
individuals, consistent with the cognitive-motivational view. In line with much of the 
previous research using the dot probe paradigm, these results reflected initial orienting 
to threat as the pictures were presented for 500 msec. 
The above studies examined attentional biases for faces in non-clinical anxiety, 
but similar research has been conducted to see whether such biases exist in clinical 
anxiety. For example, attentional biases for faces in generalised anxiety disorder were 
investigated using the dot probe task with threatening, happy and neutral faces shown 
for two exposure durations: 500 and 1250 msec (Bradley et aI., 1999). Anxious 
patients showed greater vigilance for threat faces relative to neutral faces, compared 
with normal controls. This effect occurred across both exposure durations. Anxious 
patients also showed increased vigilance for happy faces, but this was only significant 
in the second half of the task. This suggests that the threat bias may be mediated by 
relatively automatic processes involved in initial orienting of attention, whereas the 
bias for positi ve faces in clinical anxiety may depend on later strategic processes. 
Using the dot probe paradigm, Mogg & Bradley (1999b) examined whether 
attentional bias for threat does indeed operate in early pre-attentive processes, i.e., 
even when the stimuli are presented outside awareness. Pairs of faces (threat or 
happy) and neutral, were briefly displayed (for between 14 to 34 msec), they were 
then masked, and the probe then appeared after the offset of the mask. The results 
indicted a preference to orient attention towards the location of the masked threat, 
rather than the masked happy faces, consistent with a pre-attentive bias for threat 
faces. This effect was particularly apparent when the threat face and probe were 
presented in the left visual field, which is in line with research indicating a right 
hemispheric dominance in threat processing (e.g., Christianson, Saisa, & Silfvenius, 
1995). Furthermore, the pre-attentive bias for threat faces was greater in high rather 
than low trait anxious individuals. 
A further experiment Mogg & Bradley (2002) examined whether the anxiety-
related bias for masked threat faces could be replicated, and assessed the relationship 
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between the pre-attentive bias and measures of trait and social anxiety. The results 
indicated that anxious individuals were faster to respond to probes replacing masked 
threat than neutral faces, and that this pre-attentive bias for threat appeared to be 
plimalily a function of high levels of social anxiety and social avoidance, rather than 
trait anxiety. The bias was also more apparent when threat faces were presented in the 
left visual field, which is compatible with the previous findings (Mogg & Bradley, 
1999b) and once again suggests light hemisphere dominance in processing of threat. 
In summary, anxiety levels consistently seem to influence dot probe results with 
highly anxious individuals showing a bias towards threat stimuli. In terms of the 
cognitive theolies introduced earlier, initial evidence seemed to offer support for the 
interaction hypothesis, but more recently support has been shown for the cognitive-
motivational hypothesis. Further research is required to distinguish between these two 
approaches. 
In terms of EP, as outlined earlier, if individuals with high EP are better at 
surveying the emotional scene, then they will be unlikely to demonstrate a threat bias. 
On the other hand, individuals with low EP, who may be less competent at processing 
emotional information, would be expected to demonstrate a threat bias. These 
hypotheses are subsequently tested in Chapter 8. 
Face in the crowd paradigm 
The second major paradigm that has been used to investigate attentional biases 
for threat faces is the face in the crowd technique; which has been argued to be more 
ecologically valid than the dot probe task (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995). In this task, 
patticipants are presented with several faces. On some tlials, all faces have identical 
emotional expressions, whereas on other tlials one ('target') face displays a different 
emotion from the rest of the "crowd". Participants are required to detect the presence 
or location of the target face as quickly as possible (e.g., an angry face in a happy 
crowd, or a happy face in an angry crowd). The target face is said to "pop-out" of the 
display and search is considered to be automatic if search times do not increase 
substantially with increasing numbers of distracters in the display. Search slope is 
generally calculated by dividing the mean increase in overall response time by the 
number of additional faces. For example, if response time increases from 300 msec 
for a 4-item display to 400 msec with a 9-item display, the search slope would be 20 
msec/item. Search slopes of less than 10 msec per face are generally thought to 
demonstrate automatic or pre-attentive search, whereas search slopes of more than 10 
msec per face are thought to reflect selial or controlled visual search (Fox et aI., 
2000). 
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Hansen & Hansen (1988) required participants to determine whether displays of 
four and nine faces were all the same or whether one face was different from the rest. 
They found that an angry face in a happy crowd was detected significantly faster than 
a happy face in an angry crowd. Interestingly, an angry face was detected as rapidly 
among four happy faces as among nine happy faces; whereas a happy face took longer 
to find among nine angry faces than among four angry faces. The authors concluded 
that facial displays of threat were detected automatically, whereby threat stimuli are 
more prone to 'pop-out' from the visual scene and capture attention, compared with 
positive stimuli. In contrast, detection of a discrepant happy face required a serial and 
linear search. 
Fox et aI. (2000) made two major criticisms of the Hansen & Hansen (1988) 
study. First, differences in reaction times between detecting an angry and happy target 
face may have resulted because angry distracters hold attention for longer than happy 
distracters, thus participants took longer to respond to a happy face in an angry crowd. 
This indicates that angry faces do still hold attention, but does not present clear 
evidence that angry faces 'pop-out' of the crowd per se. The authors propose that a 
better method would be to examine reaction times to angry and happy target faces 
among neutral crowds. Second, there may have been inadvertent visual cues (such as 
a dark spot on the chin of the angry face) present in the stimuli used by Hansen & 
Hansen. Indeed, Purcell et aI. (1996; cited in Fox et aI., 2000), removed these 
artefacts by using gray scale versions of the same stimuli used by Hansen & Hansen 
(1988) and could find no evidence for 'pop-out' of angry faces. 
The problems of controlling for inadveltent shadows and other visual features 
when using real faces can be overcome by using schematic faces. Research has shown 
(e.g., Fox et aI., 2000) that emotional expressions are readily recognised from simple 
eyebrow and mouth line drawings. In consideration of these methodological 
criticisms, Fox et aI. (2000) re-evaluated the face in the crowd effect in a series of five 
experiments. The combined results of the five experiments confirmed the existence of 
the face in the crowd effect using simple schematic facial expressions. Schematic 
angry (or sad - Experiment 5) faces tend to: (1) hold visual attention in same displays 
resulting in slower responding, and (2) speed up detection time when they appear 
among three (or seven) neutral or happy distracter crowds, indicating fast and efficient 
detection of threat. Furthermore, these results are unlikely to be confounded by some 
low-level visual feature of the display because the pattern disappeared when the face 
displays were inverted (Experiment 3) or when the mouth was presented in isolation 
(Experiment 4). Although these results do not strictly support the view that angry 
faces 'pop-out' of a crowd automatically (as search slopes were always serial, i.e., 
above 10 msec per item), they do support the view that detection of threat is faster and 
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more efficient than the detection of positive emotional expressions. Initially, the 
authors were interested in testing for differences in anxiety levels. However, this 
factor did not interact with face detection times in any of the five experiments and was 
therefore not discussed further. 
A similar set of studies Ohman et al. (2001), using the face in the crowd-
technique, generally found support for Fox et aI's (2000) study by establishing a threat 
advantage with schematic faces. Discrepant threatening faces were more quickly and 
accurately found among both neutral and emotional distractor faces than discrepant 
friendly faces (Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5), for crowds of different sizes (Experiments 2 
and 3), and for both upright and inverted stimulus displays (Experiment 4). In 
contrast to Fox et al. (2000), threatening faces were more effectively located than sad 
or scheming faces (Experiment 5), suggesting the effect was specific to threat rather 
than dependent on general properties of stimuli such as negative valence or 
uniqueness. This difference may be due to the fact that the schematic faces were 
slightly different across the two studies, or as suggested by Fox et al. (2000), certain 
individuals may interpret ambiguous faces in "the worst possible way" (i.e., 
ambiguous sadness = anger). Furthermore, there was no evidence of enhanced dwell 
time for "same" threatening faces in the current study, which again is in contrast to 
Fox et aI's study. Overall, however, the advantage for detecting threatening stimuli 
was remarkably consistent, and the only condition that did not produce a threat 
advantage was the short (1 sec) exposure with emotional distractors in Experiment 1. 
The authors were not testing for differences in anxiety levels. 
Other studies, however, have found a significant relationship between anxiety 
and the threat superiority effect using the face in the crowd technique. Byrne & 
Eysenck (1995) reported that high trait anxious individuals were faster in detecting the 
location of angry faces in happy crowds than low trait anxious individuals. Mogg & 
Bradley (1998) describe a similar study they conducted, using an array of 8 rather than 
12 faces, where the threat superiority effect was observed for all participants, and that 
this effect was more apparent in high than low state anxious individuals. 
Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (1999) examined the hypothesis that individuals with 
generalised social phobia (GSPs), like other anxious individuals, would exhibit 
attentional bias towards threat stimuli. Using the face in the crowd technique, GSPs 
and nonanxious controls (NACs) detected an angry, happy, neutral or disgust target 
face in a crowd of 12 distracter photographs. Results indicated that all participants 
showed an attentional bias for angry faces than for happy faces in a neutral crowd, but 
this was far more pronounced for GSPs. In contrast to previous studies using 
state/trait anxious individuals, GSPs were more distracted (i.e., slower) than NACs 
when making decisions for angry and happy versus neutral crowds, suggesting general 
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sensitivity to emotional expression. This is in line with clinical observations 
suggesting that GSPs concern with others' emotional reactions to their actions is not 
limited to negative reactions only. Also, because it is common for GSPs to fear being 
ridiculed, they may have interpreted a crowd of happy faces as threatening. Finally, 
GSPs were faster at detecting anger than disgust expressions when presented in a 
neutral crowd; NACs did not show this pattern. 
In summary, anxiety levels do seem to influence face in the crowd results, but 
findings are not always consistent. Consequently, there is no concluding evidence at 
this point to distinguish between either of the cognitive theories introduced earlier. 
In terms of EP, according to the hypotheses outlined earlier, individuals with 
low EP may be expected to show a bias for angry faces. When using the face in the 
crowd paradigm, this will be reflected in quick detection of a single angry face in a 
neutral crowd, or maintaining attention on a display of all angry faces. These 
hypotheses are subsequently tested in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Time courses of attentional biases 
An important consideration when using these paradigms concerns the time 
course of attentional biases. First, it has been questioned whether the frequently used 
exposure time of 500 msec is actually a valid measure of initial orienting to threat. It 
could be that even this short exposure time may allow for shifts of attention. 
Consequently, individuals may initially orient to the neutral stimulus and then shift 
attention to the threat stimulus, showing an apparent bias to threat. 
To examine this issue, Bradley, Mogg, & Miller (2000) monitored direction of 
gaze while participants performed a dot probe task with face stimuli. Each trial 
consisted of the presentation of an emotional face (threatening, sad or happy) paired 
with a neutral facial expression of the same person, for 500 msec. Participants then 
had to make a manual response to a dot probe. There were two measurements of 
attentional bias: (1) manual reaction times to probes (covert orienting), and (2) 
direction of initial eye movement towards or away from the emotional face (overt 
orienting), occUlTing at around 250 msec following the presentation of the face pair. 
The results showed evidence of anxiety related attentional-biases. In particular, the 
manual reaction time data showed that higher state anxiety was associated with greater 
vigilance for threat, which appeared to be independent of Beck Depression Inventory 
scores. This effect was concordant with the other attentional bias measure of initial 
eye movement. Where participants made eye movements to negative faces relative to 
positive faces, they showed a con'esponding vigilance for threat in their reaction time 
data. Thus, from the results of this dot probe task, it was concluded that reaction time 
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responses following an exposure time of 500 msec are valid in reflecting the direction 
of initial orienting to emotional stimuli. 
Mogg & Bradley (2003) discuss a further study of eye movements to emotional 
faces in clinical anxiety. The task employed a similar methodology to the experiment 
described above, but faces were presented for 1000 msec. In contrast with the 
previous study, no correspondence was found between the two attentional bias 
measures of manual reaction time and initial eye movement. This suggests that 
reaction time data may not be accurate about the direction of initial orienting when 
longer exposure times (such as 1000 msec rather than 500 msec), are used for facial 
stimuli in the dot probe task. 
The second issue concerning the time course of attentional biases is the extent to 
which anxiety influences all aspects of selective attention. Research suggests that the 
attentional system is not unitary (e.g., Allport, 1989; LaBerge, 1995, cited in Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). Posner & Peterson (1990; cited in Bradley et aI., 1998), proposed that 
three distinct subsystems underlie orienting: attentional shifting, engagement and 
disengagement. There is accumulating evidence that anxiety is associated with a bias 
in pre-attentive processes in initial orienting of attention to threat (e.g., words/faces 
presented for exposure times of 500 msec or less). However, an important question is 
what subsequently occurs. Three main possibilities have been suggested: The first 
hypothesis suggests a "vigilance-avoidance" pattern of processing where, following 
initial orienting to threat, anxious individuals then divert their attention away from the 
threat stimulus in order to minimise discomfort. This pattern of bias may well 
contribute to the maintenance of anxiety states. Rapid detection of a threat stimulus, 
which is actually harmless, followed by avoidance, is likely to interfere with 
habituation or objective evaluation thus contributing to a failure of emotional 
processing. Another, perhaps more traditional view, is that anxious individuals show 
a bias throughout the cognitive system. Once their attention has focused on a threat 
stimulus, they have difficulty disengaging it. A third suggestion is that anxiety-related 
bias only operates in initial vigilance to threat and there is no anxiety-related bias in 
processes responsible for sustained attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
Bradley et al. (1998) investigated the time course of attentional biases for facial 
expressions (threat, happy and neutral) in high and low trait anxious individuals. The 
face pairs were presented at two exposure durations, 500 and 1250 msec. Participants 
were then required to press one of two keys to indicate the type of probe (: or .. ) that 
appeared, rather than just indicating the presence of the dot probe. This forced-choice 
task has the advantage of encouraging attention to be allocated equally to both halves 
of the display and making sure each trial was responded to. The results provided clear 
evidence of an attentional bias for threatening faces, but not emotional faces in 
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general, in high trait anxiety. This result was significant at the 500 msec exposure 
time, but only a non-significant trend at the 1250 msec exposure. 
Mogg & Bradley (in preparation) examinined the time course of attentional 
responses to fear-provoking stimuli in individuals with phobia. Photographs of 
spiders were presented in a dot probe task at three different exposure times: 200, 500 
and 2000 msec. Spider-phobic individuals were found to be more vigilant for the 
phobic stimuli at 200 msec, compared to non-phobic controls. Neither group showed 
a bias for the phobic stimuli at longer exposure times. These results suggest that 
anxiety-related attentional biases for threat are more robust at shorter stimulus 
durations reflecting pre-attentive orienting. This is in line with Bradley et aI's (1998) 
results where differences between high and low trait anxious individuals were clearly 
significant at 500 msec exposure time, but were only non-significant trends at the 
1250 msec exposure. 
The studies described above, however, found no avoidance of threat at the longer 
stimulus durations. One possible explanation is that avoidance strategies may only be 
apparent for highly emotional stimuli which induce an aversive mood state, and the 
stimuli used in these studies did not elicit sufficient anxiety to reveal the hypothesised 
vigilance-avoidance pattern (Mogg & Bradley, 2003). 
Taking these suggestions into consideration, Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon (in 
press) conducted a dot probe study using high threat pictorial scenes (e.g. person 
being attacked with knife; mutilated corpse) paired with neutral scenes, in which the 
stimulus pairs were presented for either 500 or 1500 msec. The main hypothesis was 
that high anxious individuals will show enhanced initial orienting to high threat 
scenes (i.e. vigilance at 500 msec), but avoidance of high threat at the longer exposure 
duration of 1500 msec. As the high threat pictures included scenes depicting attack, 
injury, death and mutilation, blood-injury (BI) fear 'as well as trait anxiety was 
assessed, as BI fear may be a more specific predictor of attentional biases for these 
stimuli rather than general vulnerability to anxiety. The results showed that high trait 
anxious individuals were more vigilant for high threat scenes at the shorter exposure 
duration (500 msec). Furthermore, when the sample was re-allocated to groups on the 
basis of BI fear scores, individuals with high BI fear showed vigilance for high threat 
scenes at 500 msec, and avoidance of them at 1500 msec, which is consistent with 
expectation from the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis. 
In contrast, there has been a growing body of evidence suggesting that highly 
anxious individuals take longer to disengage from threat stimuli. Traditional probe-
detection tasks do not enable us to determine whether attention is directed from one 
class of stimulus or another. Both locations are task relevant, and presentation times 
are relatively long (often 500 msec), so participants may attend alternately to both 
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locations and then continue to dwell on threat-related stimuli once they have been 
detected. Similarly, in the face in the crowd technique, stimulus presentation times 
are relatively long so may allow for multiple shifts of attention across the visual scene. 
It is not feasible, therefore, to distinguish between differences in initial orienting and 
differences in attentional disengagement using these methods (Fox et aI., 2002). Due 
to these limitations, a new method, known as the cue-validity paradigm, has been 
developed to investigate the ability to disengage attentional resources (or dwell-time) 
from threatening material. A threat-related or neutral cue is presented alone for a very 
brief period in one of two possible locations. A target can then appear in either the 
same (valid trial) or in a different (invalid trial) location. The logic is that if 
attentional dwell-time increases in highly anxious individuals for threat-related 
stimuli, then they should be slower in detecting a target on invalid trials following a 
threat-related cue, relative to a positive or neutral cue. 
The hypothesis that angry faces would lead to enhanced dwell-time (delayed 
disengagement), especially in high trait anxious individuals was partially suppOlted in 
three experiments (Fox et aI., 2002). In Experiment 1, highly anxious individuals 
took longer to disengage from angry and happy faces relative to neutral as reflected by 
increased responses times on invalid trials. Response times on invalid trials were 
equivalent across the different cue types for low trait anxious individuals. Thus there 
was delayed disengagement for emotionally valenced faces (positive or negative) in 
high, but not low, trait anxious individuals. In Experiment 2, all participants 
responded slower to angry faces on valid trials relative to either happy or neutral 
faces. This supports the notion that angry faces have a special significance for all 
individuals and in contrast to Experiment 1, attention is not necessarily disrupted by 
faces expressing positive as well as negative emotions. Also, contrary to Experiment 
1, there was no anxiety-related effect for angry faces. In Experiment 3, individuals 
with high, but not low, trait anxiety had difficulty disengaging from angry and 
jumbled facial stimuli. These results support the general hypothesis that threat or 
ambiguous cues can disrupt attention for individuals with high trait anxiety. 
However, it was noted that the threat value of the jumbled face may be the key feature 
rather than the ambiguity as it was unwisely constructed from an angry face. Overall, 
these results add tentatively to the growing evidence that individuals (especially when 
they are highly anxious) take longer to disengage attentional resources from 
threatening information such as angry facial expressions (e.g., Compton, 2000; Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) and threatening pictures (Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
To summarise, it appears that attentional bias for threat in anxious individuals is 
consistently evident at shOlter stimulus exposures, but the tendency to maintain 
attention on threat material may diminish over longer periods. If anxiety-related 
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vigilance for threat diminished e?tirely over time, this would be consistent with 
hypothesis three outlined above where trait anxiety only influences initial orienting 
processes and does not systematically influence other aspects of attention. However, 
more recent evidence, introduced above, suggests that this is not the case and that 
highly anxious individuals have difficulty disengaging from threat related stimuli. 
Further supporting evidence, using new techniques such as the cue-validity paradigm, 
is required to more conclusively address the debate over time courses of attentional 
biases. At this stage, however, there appears to be more evidence in support of the 
disengagement model than the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis. 
Attentional biases in depression 
One debatable issue is whether depression is associated with an attentional bias 
for negative information that corresponds to the bias found in anxiety. Anxious 
people dwell (if only for a short time) on threatening stimuli and perceive threat in 
ambiguous events. Although we do not know yet if depressed people show delayed 
dwell times, their ruminative styles qualify as prolonged attention to negative 
thoughts, and they do evidence negative selectively in initial interpretations. 
Continual habits to see the world in negative ways predict depressive symptomology 
later on (Hertel, 2002). Similarly, trained habits of interpretation can give rise to 
anxious states and rumative tendencies predict future symptoms of anxiety as well as 
depression. Anxiety and depression overlap cognitively and may therefore .be 
expected to show similar patterns of attentional bias. 
Several studies have failed to find evidence of biases for negative information in 
clinical depression using Stroop and dot probe tasks (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & 
White, 1995; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
These results cannot be attributed to methodological difficulties with the tasks, as in 
each study, clinically anxious individuals without depressive disorder did show 
evidence of a bias for negative information. It should be noted, however, that these 
tasks involve selection between different stimuli. While these studies seem to be 
fairly consistent in failing to show evidence of pre-attentive biases, other studies have 
found such biases in depressed individuals. They have tended to use relatively long 
exposure durations or included a priming condition. For example, depression-
congruent biases have been found at 730 msec on the 'colour perception' task, and at 
1000 msec on the dot-probe task (McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Mogg, Bradley & 
Williams, 1995; cited in Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Furthermore, depressed individuals 
have shown significantly greater priming of depression-related information, even 
when i,t is presented so briefly that they could not identify its content (Hertel, 2002). 
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Together with the considerable evidence of depression-related biases on explicit 
memory tasks (e.g., Blaney, 1986; cited in Mogg & Bradley, 1998), these findings 
suggest that depression is associated with biases in both automatic and strategic 
aspects of memory. It may be that anxiety is involved in initial orienting of visual 
attention to threat stimuli, whereas depression may be associated with a bias in later 
aspects of processing. Alternatively, depression may not be associated with the 
selection of stimulus information from the visual scene and in initial orienting, as 
assessed by certain attentional tasks. If this is the case, perhaps the key is to examine 
the length and quality of the dwell times on attentional tasks, which may help 
distinguish between anxiety and depression effects in later aspects of attentional 
processing. To summarise, threat-biases do occur for depression but not as 
consistently as for anxiety. When they do occur, anxiety effects are rarely ruled out 
completely. 
The studies in Chapters 8 and 9 do not include priming conditions and it is 
intended that the exposure duration will be quite short (500 msec) in line with many 
other studies using the dot probe and face in the crowd paradigm. Given that 
depression-congruent biases are often only found at longer stimulus durations and 
with priming conditions, measures of depression will not generally be included in the 
studies. They will only be included where depression levels may influence the results 
for other reasons, i.e., when using sad as well as angry and happy faces. 
Summary of studies using facial stimuli 
The main point to emerge from these studies investigating attentional biases for 
emotional faces is the general consensus of the findings. Whether using the dot probe, 
face in the crowd or cue-validity paradigm, the vast majority of studies revealed 
attentional biases for threat stimuli which are more pronounced for people with high 
anxiety levels. There is variation in the results, as some studies found attentional 
biases for emotional stimuli in general, some studies implicated trait anxiety, others 
state anxiety as the primary influence on attentional biases. One study suggested that 
trait anger not anxiety influences att~ntion to angry faces (Van Honk, Tuiten, De 
Haan, Van den Hout, & Starn, 2001). Another study reported that social anxiety is 
involved in the classification of fear but not anger (Richards, French, Calder, Webb, 
Fox, & Young, in press), However, enhanced classification of faces as expressing 
anger was apparent for all individuals when placed in a stressful situation. It is likely 
that such variability can mainly be attributed to differences in methodology, such as 
the way in which participants were selected using anxiety scores, differences between 
self-report measures used and more fundamental differences in procedure, such as 
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stimulus exposure times and task instructions. Nevertheless, the findings using facial 
stimuli do generally tend to follow the same pattern and are more ecologically valid 
than findings using word stimuli. In many studies using word stimuli, anxiety related 
biases are often not found unless some sort of stressor is used. 
There appear to be two main areas in the study of attentional biases where many 
questions remain unexplored: First, important in both anxiety and depression is the 
subsequent control of attention beyond the initial focus. Few studies have considered 
this issue, and future research should focus on this area using new techniques such as 
the cue-validity paradigm. Second, most of the research has concentrated on the 
relationship between attentional biases and emotional disorders such as anxiety and 
depression. As discussed earlier, EP represents a potential variable which may fill the 
gap in attentional bias research. Chapters 8 and 9 describe a series of four studies 
which investigate how EP may influence attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. 
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Chapter 8 
The role of emotional perception in the focus of 
attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, EI research has been criticised for relying purely on 
self-report data. Previous studies in this thesis have used questionnaire (studies 1, 2 
and 3) and quasi-experimental methods (Study 4). As a result, the studies described in 
Chapters 8 and 9 use objective experimental methodologies in order to consider the 
behavioural effects of EP on attention. 
Attentional bias research has concentrated largely on the relationship between 
attentional biases and anxiety (see Chapter 7). The studies described in Chapters 8 
and 9 investigate the potential contribution of EP to attentional processing. EP 
involves surveying the emotional landscape, which is likely to influence responses to 
attentional tasks. The vmious ways in which EP may do this were discussed in 
Chapter 7. Consequently, there is a gap within the attentional bias research which 
needs explOling. 
This Chapter describes two studies investigating how EP may direct and 
maintain attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. The dot probe and face in the 
crowd methodologies, (described in Chapter 7), are employed. For both studies, 
results are treated as being significant if probability levels are < 0.05. Results where 
probability levels are < 0.10 will be treated as a trend. Where trends are of relevance 
to the hypotheses they will be discussed further, which is in contrast to non-significant 
effects which will not be discussed. Trends, however, will be treated with more 
caution than significant results. 
Study 5 
Study 5 considers whether attentional biases for emotional faces, which has 
been reported to be influenced by anxiety, is also mediated by EP. 
Attentional bias for threat has been proposed to underly vulnerability to anxiety 
disorders (discussed in Chapter 7). Consequently, it was suggested that this 
accentuation of the normal threat bias may also be present for individuals with low 
EP, albeit for a different reason (see Chapter 7). This study considers whether 
individual levels of EP affect biases towards threat stimuli. Before reporting the 
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study, details concerning the selection of an anxiety measure, and the choice of 
methodology to be employed are discussed. 
First, any study of attentional biases needs to include a measure of anxiety. A 
number of measures purportedly assess generalised anxiety. Perhaps the most widely 
used of these is the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI measures both State anxiety and Trait 
anxiety each on a separate sub-scale. State anxiety is the intensity of an emotional 
state of anxiety at a given moment in time and is characterised by tension, 
apprehension, nervousness, worry and autonomic arousal. Trait anxiety is a relatively 
stable individual difference in anxiety level, like a stable personality characteristic. 
Both sub-scales consist of 20-items with a 4-point response scale. The State-anxiety 
scale consists of the responses "not at all, somewhat, moderately so, very much so," 
and asks for responses referring to feelings "right now, at this moment" on items such 
as "I feel calm, I am tense, I feel upset." 10 items are reversed scored on the State 
anxiety sub-scale. The Trait anxiety sub-scale also consists of a 4-point response 
scale with different options of "almost never, sometimes, often, almost always," and 
asks for an indication of how you "generally feel." Examples of items are "I feel like 
a failure, I feel rested, I am content." Nine items are reversed scored on the Trait 
anxiety sub-scale. The advantages of the ST AI are the fact that it has been applied 
extensively in research, its psychometric properties are well established and norms are 
widely available. 
Another scale used to measure anxiety is the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI, 
Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988; cited in Wells, 1997). This 21-item self-report 
measure is designed to assess the severity of physiological and cognitive anxiety 
symptoms (e.g. numbness or tingling, feeling hot, wobbliness in legs) over the 
preceding week including the day of administration. Responses are recorded on a 4-
point scale consisting of the options "not at all, mildly, moderately, severely," 
corresponding to individual scores of 0-3. The total score is the sum of the 21 ratings 
of individual items. The scale is fairly quick to administer and norms are available 
but has been criticised for only assessing worry rather than anxiety in general 
(Edelmann, 1992) and does not provide a measure of trait anxiety. Research has 
shown (see Chapter 7), that both state and trait anxiety have influenced attentional 
bias results, so it is important to assess both in Study 5. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS, Zigmond, 1983) has also 
been used to assess anxiety. The HADS is a 14-item scale designed to provide a brief 
state measure of both anxiety (seven items) and depression (seven items). The 
anxiety responses are recorded on a 4-point scale where the options vary for each of 
the items. For eample, the item "I feel tense or wound up" has the options "most of 
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the time, a lot of the time, time to time occasionally, not at all" whereas the item "I get 
sudden feelings of panic" has the options "very often indeed, quite often, not very 
often, not at all." Each item is scored from 0-3 so total scores range from 0-21. 
Although the HADS is convenient as it is very short, again it only assess state anxiety. 
As discussed earlier, Study 5 needs to assess both state and trait anxiety in order to 
adopt an inclusive approach at this early stage in the series of studies. 
Having considered three alternatives for measuring anxiety, the STAI was 
chosen for Study 5 and subsequent studies. The fact that it is robust, has been used 
widely in research and provides assessment of both state and trait anxiety were the 
main reasons for selecting the measure. 
Second, in terms of the methodology, many studies have relied on word stimuli 
to investigate attentional biases, but this has been criticised on several grounds (see 
Chapter 7). As a result of these criticisms, the series of four studies use facial stimuli 
to investigate attentional biases, which have been shown to be more informative and 
ecologically valid (discussed in Chapter 7). Two main paradigms (dot probe and face 
in the crowd) have been appropriated to investigate attentional biases for emotional 
faces. Study 5 employs the dot probe methodology with photographs from the Ekman 
series in which to do this. As reported in Chapter 7, anxiety levels have consistently 
influenced results of experiments using the dot probe methodology, so it seems 
appropriate to see whether this is also the case for EP. 
It is hypothesised that individuals with low EP, who may be less competent at 
processing emotional information, will show a bias for angry relative to neutral faces. 
On the other hand, individuals with high EP are more skilled surveying the emotional 
landscape and are likely to successfully identify whether threat is of real danger or not, 
so should demonstrate no such bias for angry faces. Consistent with previous research 
(discussed in Chapter 7), it is hypothesised that individuals with increasing levels of 
anxiety will show a bias for angry faces. Thus for different reasons, low EP and 
increasing levels of anxiety lead to an accentuation of the normal threat bias. 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-five (22 male, 33 female) undergraduates volunteered to participate in the 
Study in exchange for course credit. The mean age was 27 years (range 18 - 50). 
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Materials 
Se{f-reportrneasures 
EP was assessed using the 14-item APT (as in studies 2, 3 and 4). State and 
Trait Anxiety were assessed using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, 
Spielberger et aI., 1983l The STAI was chosen as the measure of anxiety for reasons 
discussed above. 
Attentional task 
The facial stimuli for the dot probe task consisted of pairs of photographs of five 
different individuals taken from the Ekman series (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). For each 
person, one angry, one happy and one neutral photograph was selected all with 
recognition rates of at least 85%. Three of the individuals were male, two were 
female. An additional set of face pairs were prepared as practice items3• All 
combinations of face pairs were presented to both the left and right with two different 
probes, producing 40 angry-neutral face pairs, 40 happy-neutral face pairs and 40 
angry-happy face pairs. The face pairs always consisted of two poses from the same 
person. The size of each facial image displayed on the computer screen was 45 x 70 
mm and the distance between their inner edges was 70 mm. A full list of materials 
can be found in Appendix B.5-8. 
Procedure 
Prior to the attentional task, each participant completed the two self-report 
measures. They were then seated at a comfortable distance in front of the computer 
and were told they were about to take part in a reaction time experiment examining 
how people process and attend to visual information. Each trial consisted of a central 
fixation cross (+) for 500 msec, which was replaced by the display of a pair of faces, 
side by side, for 500 msec. Immediately following the display of the face pair, the 
probe stimulus was presented in the location of one of the faces. Participants were 
required to press one of two keys to indicate whether the type of probe was a colon ( : 
) or two dots ( .. ). The left index finger was used for one probe ( : ), while the right 
index finger was used for the other probe ( .. ). The probe remained displayed until 
one of the response keys was pressed. There was then an inter-stimulus interval of 
2 Differences in detection of angry and happy faces between participants with high and low levels of 
state anxiety were tested. However, this factor did not interact with face detection times in Study 5 so is 
not mentioned further. A number of other researchers have also found no effect for state anxiety (e.g., 
Fox et aI., 2000; Fox et aI., 2002; Mogg et aI., 2000; Van Honk et aI., 2001). 
3 References to exact images were as follows: anger (EM5-14, JBl-23, MF2-7, M02-11, WF3-1 & A1-
14), happiness (EM4-7, JBl-9, MFl-6, MOl-4, WF2-12 & Al-6), and neutral (EM2-4, JBl-3, MFl-2, 
MOl-5, WF2-5 & Al-2). 
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500 msec before the fixation cross for the next trial was presented. There were 24 
practice trials to help participants familiarise themselves with the procedure, followed 
by 120 experimental trials. These were broken up into four blocks of 30 trials with 
the opportunity for participants to take a short break if they wished. Each trial 
appeared once in every block. There were an equal number of each type of probe, i.e., 
dots (left or right on the screen) and colons (left or right on the screen) in each block. 
Participants were encouraged to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Presentation order was randomised for each participant. 
Results 
Self-report measures 
Median splits were perfOlmed on both EP scores and STAI trait anxiety scores. 
For EP, those sCOling more than the median of 70 (n = 28) were allocated to the high 
EP group, and those scoring 70 or less (n = 25) to the low EP group. Similarly, 
participants were divided into two groups according to whether or not their trait 
anxiety scores were less or equal to the median of 40 (n = 27) or greater than 40 (n = 
26). One participant with an extreme trait anxiety score of 79 was removed from the 
data set. The con'elation between EP and trait anxiety scores was not significant (r = -
0.01, n.s.). 
Data screening 
For all participants, mean RTs were computed for each condition following a 
series of steps. Responses less than 250 msec or greater than 1500 msec were 
removed as they were either too quick or too slow in relation to the spread of the data 
reflecting anticipatory or delayed/missed responses. Missing data were then replaced 
with the overall mean. Finally, the mean for each subject within each experimental 
condition was calculated using harmonic means, which is the most suitable measure 
of central tendency following the screening methods used (Ratcliff, 1993). 
Participants were removed if missing data and errors accounted for more than 15% of 
the total. This criterion did not result in the removal of any participants. Following 
data screening, a second participant was excluded from further analysis as their 
average reaction time (RT) was more than 2 standard deviations above the mean. This 
left a total of 53 participants. The overall mean RT was 613 (SD = 121). Table 8.1 
summarises the RT data. 
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Table 8.1 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to probes (in msec). 
Face Type Face Probe Low trait High trait LowEP High EP Low EPlLow Low EPlHigh High EPlLow High EPlHigh 
Location Location Anxiety Anxiety trait Anxiety trait Anxiety Trait Anxiety trait Anxiety 
N=27 N=26 N=25 N=28 N=12 N=13 N=15 N=13 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
ANGER Left Left 576 (111) 644 (117) 623 (122) 600 (116) 595 (91) 679 (120) 585 (126) 650 (104) 
(relative to Left Right 573 (99) 645 (116) 621 (134) 600 (95) 578 (107) 694 (131) 589 (102) 640 (95) 
neutral) Right Left 585 (113) 643 (118) 627 (120) 604 (117) 603 (90) 675 (130) 601 (134) 642(111) 
Right Right 588 (108) 644 (110) 620 (117) 613 (110) 614 (104) 650 (120) 603 (120) 655 (95) 
HAPPY Left Left 577 (114) 650 (117) 619 (121) 609 (122) 600 (91) 662 (125) 590 (132) 666 (107) 
(relative to Left Right 588 (101) 639 (107) 620 (113) 609 (103) 603 (90) 660 (123) 608 (113) 652 (98) 
neutral) Right Left 585 (115) 634 (119) 627 (127) 597 (112) 625 (100) 663 (136) 595 (131) 632 (97) 
Right Right 572 (105) 651 (118) 627 (133) 600 (105) 590 (96) 680 (134) 585 (114) 651 (108) 
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Power 
The cell sizes in studies 5, 6 and 7 were all above 10 resulting in an acceptable 
level of power (Cohen, 1992), and are comparible with those found in the literature. 
Calculating attentional bias scores 
To simplify the analyses, attentional bias scores were calculated for each 
emotional face type by subtracting the mean RT when the emotional face and probe 
were in the same position, from the mean RT when the emotional face and probe were 
in different positions (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 
1992). 
Angry Bias Score = Y2 [ (ArPI - AIPI) + (AIPr - ArPr) ] 
where A = angry face, P = probe, l' = right position, and I = left position. ArPI refers 
to RT when the angry stimulus was on the right and probe was on the left, and 
likewise for the other abbreviations. A separate bias score was calculated similarly for 
trials with happy-neutral face pairs. A positive value indicates a shift of attention 
towards the emotional face relative to the neutral face (vigilance), and a negative 
value indicates a shift away from the emotional face toward the neutral face 
(avoidance). 
To test the main hypotheses, two separate 2 x 2 independent groups ANOV As 
were carried out using EP scores (high vs. low) and trait anxiety scores (high vs. low) 
as the independent valiables, and either angry or happy bias scores as the dependent 
variable. 
Analysis of the angry bias 
In the analysis of angry bias, there was no significant main effect of EP [F(3,49) 
= 0.34, MSe = 3466.39, n.s] and no significant main effect of trait anxiety [F(3,49) = 
0.75, MSe = 3466.39, n.s.]. However, there was a significant interaction between EP 
and trait anxiety [F(3,49) = 4.69, MSe = 3466.39, P < 0.05], where a combination of 
low EP and high trait anxiety scores resulted in a positive bias for angry faces (Fig 
8.1). Full ANOV A tables for the analysis of angry bias can be found in Appendix 
A.5. 
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Fig 8.1 Interaction between emotional perception and trait anxiety on angry bias 
scores. Positive values indicate bias towards anger relative to neutral. 
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In the analysis of happy bias there was no significant main effect of EP [F(3,49) 
= 0.01, MSe = 4559.04, n.s.], but there was a significant main effect of trait anxiety 
[F(3,49) = 4.82, MSe = 4559.04, P < 0.05], with low anxious individuals showing a 
bias towards happy faces and high anxious individuals avoiding happy faces (Fig 8.2). 
There was no interaction between EP and trait anxiety [F(3,49) = 0.34, MSe = 
4559.04, n.s.]. Full ANOVA tables for the analysis of happy bias can be found in 
Appendix A.5. 
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Fig 8.2 Happy bias scores (in msec) for trait anxiety groups. Positive values indicate 
bias towards happy faces relative to neutral. 
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Discussion 
The aim of Study 5 was to investigate how EP may influence attention to 
emotionally meaningful stimuli. Anxiety was included as it has been con"sistently 
shown to influence attentional biases. The results showed a threat bias for participants 
with low scores on EP, but only those who also had increased levels of anxiety. There 
was also a bias towards happy stimuli for participants with low anxiety scores, and 
away from happy stimuli for participants with higher scores on anxiety. 
The results of Study 5 suggest that a combination of EP and anxiety are 
important in explaining attentional biases for threat. It may be that EP and anxiety 
operate in the same way but are independent, due to the lack of con"elation between 
the two. Individuals with low EP are less skilled at identifying whether threat is of 
real danger or not, so are likely to focus on an angry face in case it is important. 
Increased levels of anxiety may sensitise the individual to threat, providing a threat-
vigilant style with an increased perception of danger in the environment. Thus for 
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different reasons, low EP and increased levels of anxiety lead to an accentuation of the 
normal threat bias. 
The pattern of results from Study 5 can be explained thus. Participants low on 
EP and with higher levels of anxiety focus on an angry face in case it is important, and 
rapidly direct attention towards threat due to a threat-vigilant style. Those with high 
EP and increasing levels of anxiety focus rapidly on threat but are able to redirect 
attention elsewhere, thereby showing a bias away from angry faces. A similar pattern 
is observed for those low in EP and with lower levels of anxiety, although this is 
likely due to a lack of attentional focus to start with. Perhaps a certain threshold level 
of anxiety is required to direct attention towards threat in the first place. Finally, 
paIticipants with high EP and low levels of anxiety show no bias reflecting chance 
fluctuations in the focus of attention. 
In the analysis of happy bias, individuals with increasing levels of anxiety 
showed a bias away from happy faces, whereas individuals with low scores on anxiety 
showed a bias towards happy faces. This suggests that the anxiety-related attentional 
bias was specific to threat information, rather than emotional material in general. 
However, given a simple binary choice of one of two faces, it may be relatively easy 
to identify an unambiguous happy face as being non-threatening, hence individuals 
with increasing levels of anxiety show a bias away from them. It is possible that with 
a more difficult task using different stimuli that anxious individuals would not be able 
to divert their attention away so quickly. 
There are several limitations of using the dot probe methodology which may 
have influenced the results. First, there were only two stimuli in the environment, so 
the dot probe methodology cannot specifically determine whether attention is directed 
toward one class of stimulus or away from another. The relatively simple task 
consisting of a binary choice may lead to the easy identification of unambiguous non-
threatening stimuli. For example, when faced with a more complex task, highly 
anxious individuals may not find it so easy to divert their attention away (or not have 
their attention grabbed) by happy faces. Second, there are problems of controlling for 
inadvertent shadows and other visual features when using real faces (as discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
In consideration of these methodological criticisms, Study 6 employs a different 
experimental paradigm: the face in the crowd technique, pioneered by Hansen & 
Hansen (1988) in order to fUlther investigate the role EP in potentially threatening 
decisions. 
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Study 6 
The results from Study 5 suggest that a combination of EP and anxiety are 
responsible for attentional biases for threat. However, the previous discussion 
described a number of methodological criticisms of the dot probe task. In an attempt 
to overcome these limitations, Study 6 employs the face in the crowd technique to 
further examine the contribution of EP to attentional processing. This technique has 
been argued to be a purer measure than the dot probe task (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995), particularly because it is a more realistic task consisting of a number of stimuli. 
Furthermore, photographs of real faces were used in Study 5, for which it is 
impossible to control for inadvertent shadows and other visual features. These 
problems were overcome in Study 6 by using the schematic faces developed by Fox et 
aI. (2000). 
The face in the crowd task presents participants with a 'crowd' display, 
normally consisting of a number of faces arranged in a grid of varying size, and the 
task is to indicate whether all the faces are the same or whether one is different from 
the rest. 
Based on the results of Study 5, it is hypothesised that individuals with low EP 
will show a bias for angry faces. As discussed earlier, individuals with low EP appear 
to be less skilled at processing affective stimuli, thus may focus on angry faces in case 
they are important. This will be reflected in rapid detection of a single angry face in a 
neutral crowd, or having attention held for longer by a display of all angry faces. 
Based on previous research and the results of Study 5, it is predicted that individuals 
with increasing levels of anxiety will show a bias for angry faces due to a general 
vigilance for threat stimuli. This will be shown by quicker detection of a different 
angry face in a neutral crowd, or dwelling for longer on all angry crowds. 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty (18 male, 32 female) undergraduates volunteered to participate in the study 
in exchange for course credit. The mean age was 24 years (range 21 - 48). 
Materials 
Self-report measures 
EP was assessed using the 14-item APT. Trait Anxiety was assessed using the 
STAI (Spielberger et aI., 1983). 
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Attentional task 
The stimuli, taken from Fox et al. (2000), were composed of nine schematic 
faces arranged in a 3 x 3 grid (Fig 8.3). There were nine types of display in total. The 
three same displays consisted of nine faces all displaying the same expression (all 
angry, all happy, all neutral). These were presented 18 times each giving a total of 54 
same displays. The six different displays consisted of eight distractor faces expressing 
the same emotion and one target face expressing a different emotion. All distractor 
expressions were combined with all target expressions, making six different target-
distractor combinations. The target could occur at any of the nine positions in the 
grid. Thus there were 54 different displays (3 crowds x 2 distractors x 9 locations). 
The faces were drawn in black against a white background. The size of each face 
displayed on the computer screen was 35 x 40 mm; the distance between their inner 
edges was 35 mm horizontally and 15 mm vertically. A full list of materials can be 
found in Appendix B.5-8. 
Fig 8.3 Examples of stimulus displays used in Study 6. (a) All angry faces (same 
display), (b) 1 angry face in a background of neutral faces (different display). 
(a) 
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(b) 
Procedure 
Prior to the attentional task, each participant completed the two self-report 
measures. They were then seated at a comfortable distance in front of a computer and 
were told they were about to take part in a reaction time experiment examining how 
people process and attend to visual information. Each trial consisted of a central 
fixation cross (+) for 500 msec, which was replaced by the display of faces in a grid. 
Participants were then required to press one of two keys to indicate whether the 
display of faces were all the same or if one face was different. The left index finger 
was used for the "same" displays, while the right index finger was used for the 
"different" displays. The faces remained displayed until one of the response keys was 
pressed. There was then an inter-stimulus interval of 500 msec before the fixation 
cross for the next trial was presented. There were 20 practice trials to help 
participants familiarise themselves with the procedure followed by 108 experimental 
trials. These were broken up into three blocks of 36 trials with the opportunity for 
participants to take a short break if they wished. There were 18 same displays and 18 
different displays (three taken from each of the six combinations) in each block. 
Participants were encouraged to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Presentation order was randomised within blocks. 
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Results 
Self-report measures 
Median splits were pertormed on both EP scores and STAI trait anxiety scores. 
For EP, those scoring more than the median of 70 (n = 25) were allocated to the high 
EP ~roup, and those scoring 70 or less (n = 25) to the low EP group. Similarly, 
participants were divided into two groups according to whether or not their trait 
anxiety scores were less or equal to the median of 39 (n = 25) or greater than 39 (n = 
25). The correlation between EP and trait anxiety scores was not significant (r = -0.24, 
n.s.). 
Data screening 
The data screening process was the same as for Study 5. The only difference for 
Experiment 2 was that responses less than 400 msec or greater than 3000 msec were 
removed as they were either too quick or too slow in relation to the spread of the data. 
No participants were removed from the data set following the screening process. 
The overall mean RT was 1512 (SD = 550). Due to the unbalanced design, 
separate analyses were computed for 'same' trials and for 'different' trials. For both 
analyses there were two independent groups factors; EP (high vs. low) and trait 
anxiety (high vs. low). 
Analyses of the same displays 
A 2x2x3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the RT data with the two 
independent groups factors outlined above (EP and anxiety) and one within groups 
factor, type of crowd (all angry, all happy, all neutral). Table 8.2 summarises the RT 
data. 
Table 8.2 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the 'same' 
displays (in msec). 
AnglY crowds Happy crowds Neutral crowds 
Meal! (SD) Meal! (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait Anxiety N=25 1638 (380) 1592 (384) 1384 (395) I 
High trait Anxiety N=25 1807 (349) 1677 (350) 1510 (325) 
Low EP N=25 1768 (376) 1637 (367) 1435 (355) I 
High EP N=25 1677 (368) 1532 (373) 1459 (379) ! 
Low EP/Low trait Anxiety N=11 1681 (400) 1613 (415) 1484 (375) 
Low EPlHigh trait Anxiety N=14 1838 (355) 1657 (340) 1536 (334) I 
High EP/Low trait Anxiety N=14 1605 (376) 1577 (373) 1410 (430) 
High EPlHigh trait Anxiety N=11 1769 (354) 1702 (379) 1440 (382) I 
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There was a main effect for type of crowd [F(1,46) = 48.13, MSe = 66869.63, p 
< 0.05] with Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons indicating that angry crowds were 
responded to more slowly than happy crowds, which were responded to more slowly 
than neutral crowds (Fig 8.4). There were no main effects for either EP [F(1,46) = 
0.27, MSe = 358700.18, n.s.] or anxiety [F(1,46) = 0.94, MSe = 358700.18, n.s.]. 
There was no interaction between EP and type of crowd [F(1,46) = 0.86, MSe = 
66869.63, n.s], or trait anxiety and type of crowd [F(1,46) = 1.35, MSe = 66869.63, 
n.s.]. The three-way interaction between type of crowd, EP and anxiety did not reach 
significance [F(l, 46) = 0.26, MSe = 66869.63, n.s.]. Full ANOVA tables for analyses 
of the same displays can be found in Appendix A.6. 
Fig 8.4 Mean reaction times for the same crowd displays. 
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A 2x2x2 mixed ANOV A was conducted on the RT data with the two 
independent groups factors outlined above (EP and anxiety) and one within groups 
factor, type of target (angry in neutral crowd, happy in neutral crowd). Table 8.3 
summarises the RT data. Analyses for a neutral face in angry and happy crowds were 
conducted but results were non-significant and are not discussed fUlther. 
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Table 8.3 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the 
'different' displays (msec). 
Angryface Happy face 
(neutral crowd) (neutral crowd) 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait Anxiety N=25 1212 (270) 1245 (275) 
High trait Anxiety N=25 1062 (200) 1325 (242) 
LowEPN=25 1064 (226) 1295 (256) 
HighEPN=25 1211 (249) 1275 (268) 
Low EP/Low trait Anxiety N=ll 1148 (265) 1273 (287) 
Low EPIHigh trait Anxiety N=14 998 (200) 1313 (240) 
High EP/Low trait Anxiety N=14 1264 (274) 1224 (276) 
High EPIHigh trait Anxiety N=l1 1145 (210) 1342 (257) 
There was a main effect for type of target [F(I,46) = 45.30, MSe = 12096.82, P 
< 0.05] with angry faces being detected more quickly than happy faces, and no main 
effects for either EP [F(1,46) = 0.81, MSe = 112385.38, n.s.] or anxiety [F(I,46) = 
0.17, MSe = 112385.38, n.s.]. There was an interaction between EP and type of target 
[F(I,46) = 10.19, MSe = 12096.82, P < 0.05], and an interaction between trait anxiety 
and type of target [F(I,46) = 23.11, MSe = 12096.82, P < 0.05]. The three-way 
interaction between type of target, EP and anxiety did not reach significance [F(I,46) 
= 0.30, MSe = 12096.82, n.s.]. Full ANOV A tables for analysis of different displays 
can be found in Appendix A.6. 
Simple main effects for EP 
The interaction between type of target and EP is presented in Fig 8.5(a). 
Individuals with low EP were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than 
individuals with high EP [F(I,48) = 4.74, Mse = 12096.82, P < 0.05], but there was no 
significant difference between individuals with low and high EP finding a happy face 
in a neutral crowd [F(1,48) = 0.69, Mse = 12096.82, n.s.]. There was no significant 
difference between individuals with high EP locating an angry face in a neutral crowd 
than a happy face in a neutral crowd [F(1,24) = 2.30, Mse = 12096.82, n.s.], but 
individuals with low EP were quicker at locating a discrepant angry than happy face in 
a neutral crowd [F(I,24) = 55.23, Mse = 12096.82, P < 0.05]. 
Simple main effects for anxiety 
The interaction between type of target and trait anxiety is shown in Fig 8.5(b). 
High trait anxious individuals were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd 
than low anxious individuals [F(I,48) = 4.99, Mse = 12096.82, P < 0.05], but there 
was no significant difference between low and high anxious individuals finding a 
happy face in a neutral crowd [F(I,48) = 1.14, Mse = 12096.82, n.s.]. High trait 
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anxious individuals were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than a 
happy face in a neutral crowd [F(1,24) = 89.21, Mse = 12096.82, P < 0.05], but for 
low trait anxious individuals, the difference between locating an angry and happy face 
in a neutral crowd did not reach significance [F(1,24) = 0.67, Mse = 12096.82, n.s.]. 
Fig 8.5 Mean reaction times for the different displays involving interactions 
between (a) emotional perception and type of target and (b) trait anxiety and type of 
target. Both angry and happy targets are relative to a neutral crowd. 
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Discussion 
The aim of Study 6 was to replicate the threat bias found in Study 5, and to 
further examine the contribution of EP to the processing of emotionally meaningful 
stimuli using a purer task with more realistic stimuli. 
There was a threat bias for individuals with low EP or individuals with 
increased levels of anxiety. When displays were all the same, people were slower (i.e. 
more distracted) when detecting angry rather than happy or neutral crowds. This 
indicated that a display of all angry faces held attention the longest for all individuals. 
When displays contained a different face, participants were faster to detect the 
different face when it was angry rather than happy in a background of neutral faces. 
Once again this demonstrates the superiority of threat stimuli which appear to grab 
attention for all individuals. This threat detection effect was greater for individuals 
with low EP and higher levels of anxiety. 
Individuals with low EP were faster at locating a discrepant angry face in a 
neutral crowd than individuals with high EP; and low EP individuals were faster at 
locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than a happy face in a neutral crowd. As 
predicted, there was a tendency for individuals with low EP to show a bias towards 
threat stimuli, when locating a different angry face in a neutral crowd. This is in line 
with the results of Study 5 and the threat bias hypothesis. 
Individuals with increasing levels of trait anxiety were significantly faster at 
locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than individuals with low trait anxiety; and 
individuals with increased levels of anxiety were also faster at locating an angry face 
in a neutral crowd than a happy face in a neutral crowd. As predicted, there was a 
tendency for individuals with increasing levels of anxiety to show a bias towards 
threat stimuli, when locating a different angry face in a neutral crowd. This is in line 
with much of the previous research employing the face in the crowd paradigm (e.g., 
Byme & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 1999b), and lends support to the threat bias 
hypothesis. As the expected anxiety effect was demonstrated in Study 6, its absence 
in Study 5 is less conceming. This supports the suggestion that anxiety effects may 
not be produced when stimuli have a low threat-value (see general discussion below). 
Once again, a combination of low EP and increased levels of anxiety seem to be 
important in attentional bias for threat. As in Study 5, they operate independently and 
for different reasons both lead to an accentuation of the normal threat bias. However, 
this pattem may not be exclusive to threat stimuli, as there is some tentative evidence 
from the data to suggest that happy stimuli may be processed in a similar way. The 
means show that individuals with low EP were more distracted by angry and happy 
crowds than individuals with high EP. Similarly, individuals with increasing levels of 
140 
8. The role of emotional perception in the focus of-attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli 
anxiety were more distracted by both angry and happy crowds than individuals with 
lower levels of anxiety. These results would seem to suggest a general sensitivity to 
emotional matetial for both individuals with low EP and higher levels of anxiety. 
This may be the case for low EP individuals who have an overall difficulty processing 
emotional stimuli, which is most likely due to a lack of interest in the matetial in the 
first place. This bias for emotional information in low EP individuals is reflected in 
different ways according to whether displays contain a discrepant emotional face or 
are all the same (see general discussion below). In contrast, anxiety effects may still 
be explained by the threat hypothesis. Happy faces may also appear to be potentially 
threatening, particularly for highly anxious individuals who may fear social tidicule 
and being laughed at. There is no doubt that threat bias is more pronounced than any 
indication of a happy bias for all individuals. This highlights the importance of threat 
stimuli, but does not rule out the fact that happy stimuli may follow the same pattern, 
just to a lesser extent. 
The main limitation of Study 6 was the focus on compating angry and happy 
stimuli rather than consideting the possible similatities in processing between the two. 
More important than whether an angry face is detected quicker, or holds attention for 
longer than a happy face per se, is whether angry and happy faces are processed in 
similar ways. This compatison will enable us to assess the relative conttibution of the 
threat and emotionality hypotheses. 
General discussion 
The two studies described in Chapter 8 investigate how EP may direct and 
maintain attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. In Study 5, attentional biases 
towards angry faces were only found for participants who were low in EP and also had 
increasing levels of anxiety. In Study 6, detection of threat was again facilitated by a 
combination of low EP and increasing levels of anxiety. There was, however, some 
tentative evidence to suggest that happy faces may be processed in a similar way. 
In Study 5 using the dot probe task, the effects of EP appear to be explained by 
the threat hypothesis, where individuals with low EP showed a bias towards angry 
faces, but only when individuals also had higher levels of anxiety. For different 
reasons, low EP and increasing levels of anxiety lead to an accentuation of the normal 
threat bias. 
Individuals with low EP tend to be less skilled in surveying the emotional 
landscape. Consequently, as predicted, they may be less successful at processing a 
stimulus for its affective impact, thus they may focus on an angry face in case it is 
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important. This is not because they have a threat-vigilant style with increased 
perception of danger, like individuals with increasing levels of anxiety, but more 
likely as they are just less skilled at identifying whether threat is of real danger or not, 
so in this case respond to it quickly. On the other hand, individuals with high EP are 
more skilled surveying the emotional landscape. They may also be more interested in 
affective material, thinking more carefully about them, thus taking longer to respond 
to emotional faces. They are likely to successfully identify whether threat is of real 
danger or harmless demonstrating no bias for angry faces. 
The effects of anxiety also appear to be explained by the threat hypothesis in 
Study 5. Individuals with higher levels of anxiety showed an attentional bias for 
angry faces, only when they also had low EP. Increasing levels of anxiety result in a 
tendency to adopt a threat-vigilant style leading to an increased perception of danger 
in the environment. As predicted, in vulnerable individuals, a stressful event is more 
likely to elicit a "vigilant" processing style, where attention is grabbed by relatively 
mild threatening cues, such as the angry faces in Study 5. There was no main effect of 
anxiety, which is in contrast to many previous studies (e.g., Bradley et aI., 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1999b). This could be because the threat 
value of the stimuli may not have been sufficient to elicit attentional bias. Indeed, 
previous studies have found no attentional bias for threat in highly anxious individuals 
when the stimuli have been proposed to be low in threat value (Mogg & Bradley, 
2003). The lower threat value of the stimuli in Study 5 may be due to the various 
methodological problems encountered when using real faces, as discussed earlier. It is 
still a surprising result nonetheless. 
In Study 6 employing the face in the crowd technique, individuals with low EP 
showed a bias towards angry faces, particularly when locating a different angry face in 
a neutral crowd. This is in line with the prediction that a different angry face will grab 
attention, and low EP individuals will respond quickly in case it is important. In 
Study 5, it was suggested that this may occur because low EP individuals are less 
sldlled at identifying whether threat is of real danger or harmless, not because they 
adopt a threat-vigilant style like individuals with increasing levels of anxiety. 
However, it seems somewhat counter-intuitive that individuals with low EP should do 
better at the face in the crowd task. Presumably, individuals with high EP, who may 
be more skilled at surveying the emotional landscape, would be expected to do better. 
A possible explanation is that individuals with low EP do better at the task as they are 
less affected by the emotional content of the stimuli. As a result, they can treat the 
task as a traditional visual search exercise and respond more quickly to a different face 
in a neutral crowd. The lack of pop-out gradients (e.g., Fox et aI., 2000; Ohman et aI., 
2001) supports the notion that emotionally relevant information is not processed pre-
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attentively, so working out the emotions may take time. Individuals with high EP are 
more affected by emotional stimuli, so take longer to do the visual search task. If they 
were to do the task quickly, the emotional information may interfere with their visual 
search. 
It was also predicted that low EP individuals would have their attention held for 
longer by a display of all angry faces. Although there was a main effect 
demonstrating that displays of identical angry faces held attention for longer for all 
individuals, inspection of the means suggests only partial support for this hypothesis. 
Not only were low EP individuals more distracted by angry crowds, they were also 
more distracted by happy crowds than high EP individuals. This suggests a general 
sensitivity to emotional stimuli rather than just threat stimuli. Contrary to the 
explanation for Study 5, individuals with low EP may not focus on an angry face 
because it is threatening, nor interpret a happy face as being an ambiguous threat, they 
may just have difficulty processing emotional material. As mentioned earlier, this is 
reflected in quicker responding to a different angry face in a neutral crowd, due to a 
lack of interest in the emotional content of the stimuli. In contrast, when presented 
with whole scenes of emotional content (whether angry or happy displays), low EP 
individuals have their attention held for longer. This may be because they are less 
familiar surveying complex emotional scenes as they usually pay them little interest. 
Consequently, the scene is distracting, which results in difficulty processing the 
material and longer response times. 
The suggestion that positive emotional material is processed in a similar way to 
negative material is tentative at this stage as it is only based on the pattern of means. 
It is important to investigate further in order to cast light on the emotionality verses 
threat hypothesis (discussed in Chapter 7). 
In Study 6, consistent with the threat hypothesis, individuals with increasing 
levels of anxiety exhibited greater attentional bias for a discrepant angry face than a 
discrepant happy face in a background of neutral faces. As in Study 5, increasing 
levels of anxiety result in a tendency to adopt a threat-vigilant style leading to an 
increased perception of danger in the environment. Thus attention is grabbed by 
relatively mild threatening cues, such as the schematic angry face in Study 6. Similar 
to previous findings (Fox et aI., 2001; Mogg et aI., 2000), low anxious individuals 
also showed a bias toward detection of angry faces, but this bias was significantly less 
pronounced. 
It was also predicted that individuals with higher levels of anxiety would be 
slowed down by angry crowds more than they would by neutral or happy ones, as 
compared to low anxious individuals. Although there was a main effect 
demonstrating that displays of identical angry faces held attention for longer for all 
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individuals, inspection of the means suggests only partial support for this hypothesis. 
Individuals with higher levels of anxiety did dwell longer on all angry crowds than 
low anxious individuals, but they also responded slower (i.e., were more distracted) 
by happy crowds to a greater extent than low anxious individuals. Again tentative, as 
with EP is based on pattern of means, but suggests a general sensitivity to emotional 
stimuli, rather than purely threat stimuli. However, just because positive stimuli may 
capture attention in a similar way to negative stimuli, the results may still be explained 
in terms of a threat hypothesis. It is possible that for highly anxious individuals, who 
may fear social ridicule and being laughed at, that a happy face or smile may also 
appear to be potentially threatening. Indeed, using the face in the crowd technique, 
Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (1999) found that individuals with generalised social phobia 
were distracted by both angry and happy crowds, suggesting general sensitivity to 
emotional expression. This general sensitivity was not apparent in Study 5 employing 
the dot probe paradigm, where individuals with increased levels of anxiety showed a 
bias away from happy faces. However, the nature of the task consisted of a relatively 
simple binary choice where one happy face may have appeared to be unambiguously 
non-threatening. In contrast, the display of nine happy faces in Study 6 may have 
been more frightening to individuals with higher levels of anxiety. Additionally, the 
schematic happy faces used in Study 6 are argued to be more realistic than the 
photographs used in Study 5, thus were probably more threatening. 
In Study 5, although individuals with low anxiety did not show a significant bias 
away from threat stimuli, they did show a bias towards happy stimuli. Overall, 
therefore, the results appear to lend support to the interaction theory of anxiety 
(Williams et aI., 1988; 1997) outlined in Chapter 7, which predicts that high trait 
anxious individuals should become more vigilant, and low trait anxious individuals 
more avoidant of threat. However, Mogg & Bradley (1998) proposed an alternative 
cognitive-motivational theory to account for attentional biases in anxiety (also 
outlined in Chapter 7). In contrast to the interaction hypothesis, all individuals, 
including those with low trait anxiety, should be more vigilant for high rather than 
mild threat stimuli. When stimuli are appraised as being mildly aversive and having a 
low subjective threat value (as in Study 5), there may be a tendency to direct attention 
away from them. It could be, therefore, that with more ecologically valid stimuli or 
using stimuli with a higher subjective threat value, low anxious individuals would 
also show a bias towards threat. To summarise, the data from Study 5 seem to lend 
more support to the interaction hypothesis than the cognitive-motivational account, 
but were not conclusive at this stage. 
In Study 6, the results for anxiety provide support for the cognitive-motivational 
theory, where all individuals are proposed to be more vigilant for threat stimuli. In 
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contrast to Study 5, as subjective threat value increases (with the increasing number of 
stimuli used in Study 6 for example), individuals with both low and increasing levels 
of anxiety were indeed more vigilant for threat stimuli, with the effect being more 
pronounced for individuals with higher levels of anxiety. 
To summarise, the two studies described in Chapter 8 have identified EP as an 
important mediator in attentional biases to emotional material. Generally, the results 
lend support to the threat hypothesis, where people preferentially attend to threatening 
stimuli in the environment. In both studies, a combination of low EP and increased 
levels of trait anxiety result in a bias for angry faces. However, there were some 
tentative results from Study 6 indicating that low EP individuals and participants with 
increased levels of anxiety may show a similar bias towards happy stimuli. This 
would appear to lend support to the emotionality hypothesis, which suggests that 
positive emotional stimuli may capture attention to the same extent as negative 
emotional stimuli. Given the tentative evidence from Study 6 and previous results 
demonstrating a general sensitivity to emotional material (e.g., Fox et aI., 2002; 
Gilboa-Schechtman et aI., 1999; Martin et aI., 1991), the studies described in Chapter 
9 focus on the possible similarities in processing between emotionally meaningful 
stimuli. Additionally, they aim to assess the relative contribution of the threat and 
emotionality hypotheses to attentional processing. 
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Chapter 9 
The effect of emotional perception in attentional 
processing: General sensitivity to emotional material 
The results from the two studies described in Chapter 8 generally lend support 
to the threat hypothesis, where people preferentially attend to threatening stimuli in 
the environment. In both studies 5 and 6, a combination of low EP and increased 
levels of trait anxiety resulted in a bias for angry faces. However, there were some 
tentative results from study 6 indicating that low EP individuals and participants with 
increased levels of anxiety may show a similar bias towards happy stimuli, which 
would appear to lend support to the emotionality hypothesis. It makes sense that EP 
in particular, which involves scanning the environment for affective material, would 
influence responses to both positive and negative emotional stimuli. 
The two studies described in this Chapter aim to further examine the role of EP 
in attention, while attempting to cast light on the threat/emotionality debate. The face 
in the crowd methodology and an adapted version of this method are employed. For 
both studies, results are treated as being significant if probability levels are < 0.05. 
Results where probability levels are < 0.10 will be treated as a trend. As in Chapter 8, 
where trends are of relevance to the hypotheses they will be discussed further, which 
is in contrast to non-significant effects which will not be discussed. Trends, however, 
will be treated with more caution than significant results. 
Study 7 
As outlined above, although individuals predominantly show a bias for angry 
faces, the results of Study 6 provide some indication that angry and happy faces may 
be processed in similar ways. Study 7 uses a modified version of the face in the 
crowd task with schematic faces in order to further investigate the effects of EP in 
attentional processing. Specifically, it is designed to test the proposition that positive 
and negative emotions may be processed in similar ways. In order to do this, 
responses to various displays of angry and happy faces are compared, rather than 
directly comparing whether an angry face is more attention grabbing than a happy 
face per se. The task will therefore be able to tease apart the relative contribution of 
the threat and emotionality hypotheses. 
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The 'who's in the crowd task' 
The attentional task employed in Study 7 does not involve identifying or 
focussing on angry faces, it simply asks the participant to decide how many types of 
faces are present in the display. In this case, an angry bias (or happy bias) will be 
reflected in slower response times to the one angry (or happy) face, because as well as 
seizing attention, the face holds attention. This paradigm requires the participant to 
move their attention away from whatever grabbed it in the first place. For example, 
participants who display an angry (or happy) bias will have a narrow focus of 
attention towards angry (or happy) faces. This focus is very narrow when there is 
only one angry (or happy) face present in the display and it takes time to widen the 
focus in order to assess the whole visual scene. If participants were simply asked to 
identify the different face in the row of three, like in the face in the crowd task, then 
response times to the one angry (or happy) face would be expected to be quick. 
Instead, participants were asked to decide whether there were one, two or three types 
of faces in each display, which required them to widen attention to the whole visual 
scene in order to process all the stimuli. This would be difficult to do if focussed on 
one angry (or happy) face, as the face grabs and hold attention before the participant 
is able to move on to other faces in the display. Thus the response times to the one 
angry (or happy) face in the 'who's in the crowd' paradigm will be slower if 
reflecting an angry (or happy) bias. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, individuals with low EP appear to be less competent 
at processing the meaning of affective stimuli. This may be because they are less 
skilled at monitoring the affective environment, as a result of being less interested in 
emotional stimuli. Thus, due to a narrow focus of attention, it is predicted that 
individuals with low EP will show a bias for angry and happy faces, indicated by 
slower responses to the one angry (or happy) face. 
Individuals with increasing levels of anxiety have consistently demonstrated a 
threat bias, so they are expected to focus attention on angry faces. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 8, happy faces may also represent a source of potential threat, 
particularly for individuals with increased levels of anxiety. Due to a bias for threat 
(or potential threat), individuals with increased levels of anxiety are predicted to show 
a bias for angry and happy faces, reflected in slower reaction times to the one angry 
(or happy) face. 
147 
9. The effect of emotional perception in attentional processing: General sensitivity to emotional 
material 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-three (20 male, 33 female) undergraduates volunteered to participate in the 
Study, in exchange for course credit. The mean age was 26 years (range 18-50). 
Materials 
Self-report measures 
EP was assessed using the 14-item APT. Trait Anxiety was assessed using the 
STAI (Spielberger et aI., 1983). 
Attentional task 
The stimuli, taken from Fox et al. (2000), were composed of three schematic 
faces arranged in a horizontal line (see Fig. 9.1). There were ten types of display in 
total. The three one expression displays consisted of three faces all displaying the 
same expression (all angry, all happy, all neutral). These were presented six times 
each giving a total of 18 displays in order to balance out the number of responses. 
The seven different trials consisted of either two expression or three expression 
displays. The two expression displays consisted of two faces expressing the same 
emotion and one face expressing a different emotion. All combinations of 
expressions were combined, making six different displays. Each different face could 
occur at any of the three positions in the row. Thus there were 18 two expression 
displays. The three expression displays consisted of three different expressions (1 
angry, 1 happy, 1 neutral). Each face could occur at any of the three positions in the 
row. Thus there were six three expression displays. These were presented three times 
each, giving a total of 18 displays. The faces were drawn in black against a white 
background. The size of each face displayed on the computer screen was 35 x 40 
mm, the distance between their inner edges was 35 mm. A full list of materials can be 
found in Appendix B.5-8. 
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Fig 9.1 Examples of stimulus displays used in Study 7. (a) All angry faces (one 
expression display), (b) 1 angry face, 2 neutral faces (two expression display), ( c) 1 
angry, 1 happy and 1 neutralface (three expression display). 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Procedure 
Prior to the attentional task, each participant completed the two self-report 
measures. They were then seated at a comfortable distance in front of a computer and 
were told they were about to take part in a reaction time experiment examining how 
people process and attend to visual information. Each trial consisted of a central 
fixation cross (+) for 500 msec, which was replaced by the display of faces in a row. 
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Participants were then required to press one of three keys to indicate whether there 
were 1,2 or 3 expressions in the display. Three fingers on the participant's right hand 
were used to respond with each number key. The faces remained displayed until one 
of the response keys were pressed. There was then an inter-stimulus interval of 500 
msec before the fixation cross for the next trial was presented. There were 18 practice 
trials to help familiarise themselves with the procedure followed by 54 experimental 
trials. These were broken up into two blocks of 27 trials with the opportunity for 
participants to take a short break if they wished. There were nine one, nine two, and 
nine three expression displays in each block. Participants were encouraged to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. Presentation order was randomised within 
blocks. 
Results 
Self-report measures 
Median splits were performed on both EP scores and STAI trait anxiety scores. 
For EP, those scoring more than the median of 71 (n = 25) were allocated to the high 
EP group, and those scoring 71 or less (n = 28) to the low EP group. Similarly, 
participants were divided into two groups according to whether or not their trait 
anxiety scores were less or equal to the median of 40 (n = 26) or greater than 40 (n = 
27). The correlation between EP and trait anxiety scores was not significant (1' = -
0.20, n.s.). 
Data screening 
The data screening process was the same as for Study 6. No participants were 
removed from the data set following the screening process. 
The overall mean RT was 1510 (SD = 417). To test the main hypotheses, 
separate analysis of angry and happy displays (in neutral backgrounds) were 
computed. For both analyses there were two independent groups factors; EP (high vs. 
low) and trait anxiety (high vs. low). These analyses were chosen as the main focus 
of Study 7 was to compare angry and happy displays, rather than a direct comparison 
of whether an angry face is processed quicker than a happy face per se. 
Analyses of the angry displays 
A 2x2x3 mixed ANOV A was conducted on the RT data with the two independent 
groups factors outlined above (EP and anxiety) and one within groups factor, number 
of angry faces (1 angry, 2 angry, 3 angry) within a neutral background. Table 9.1 
summarises the RT data. 
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Table 9.1 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the angry 
displays (in msec). 
1 angry (2 2 angry (l 3 angry 
neutral) neutral) 
Meal! (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait Anxiety N=26 1568 (336) 1568 (439) 1371 (470) 
High trait Anxiety N=27 1810 (322) 1610 (437) 1375 (428) 
LowEPN=28 1825 (309) 1664 (495) 1419 (494) 
HighEPN=25 1542 (328) 1506 (345) 1323 (386) 
Low EPlLow trait Anxiety N=12 1586 (449) 1623 (494) 1482 (459) 
Low EPlHigh trait Anxiety N=16 2005 (463) 1696 (423) 1372 (339) 
High EPlLow trait Anxiety N=14 1554 (213) 1523 (298) 1278 (290) 
High EPlHigh trait Anxiety N=ll 1528 (449) 1486 (446) 1381 (452) 
There was a main effect for number of angry faces [F(2,98) = 23.11, MSe = 
49815.46, P < 0.05] with Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons indicating that 1 
angry face was responded to more slowly than 2 angry faces, which were responded 
to more slowly than 3 angry faces. There were no main effects for either EP [F (1,49) 
= 2.10, MSe = 530680.15, n.s.] or anxiety [F(1,49) = 0.37, MSe = 530680.15, n.s.]. 
There was no two-way interaction between EP and number of angry faces [F(2,98) = 
1.66, MSe = 49815.46, n.s.], but there was a two-way interaction between trait 
anxiety and number of angry faces [F(2,98) =3.13, MSe = 49815.46, P < 0.05]. There 
was also a three-way interaction between number of angry faces, EP and anxiety 
[F(2,98) =7.09, MSe = 49815.46, P < 0.05]. Full ANOVA tables for analyses of the 
angry displays can be found in Appendix A.7. 
Simple main effects for the two-way interaction 
The interaction between number of angry faces and trait anxiety is shown in 
Fig. 9.2. High trait anxious individuals were slowed down when locating 1 angry face 
in a neutral background relative to 2 angry faces in a neutral background [F(1,26) = 
9.94, MSe = 49815.46, P < 0.05], but there was no significant difference between 
locating 1 or 2 angry faces for low trait anxious individuals [F(1,25) =0.01, MSe = 
49815.46, n.s]. Finally, there was no significant difference between low and high 
anxious individuals locating 1 angry face [F(1,51) = 3.03, MSe = 49815.46, n.s.], or 2 
angry faces [F(1,51) = 0.10, MSe = 49815.46, n.s.]. 
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Fig 9.2 Two-way interaction between number of angry faces and trait anxiety. 
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There was a significant interaction between EP, trait anxiety and number of 
angry faces, where a combination of low EP and high trait anxiety scores resulted in 
locating 1 angry face in a neutral crowd slower than 2 angry faces [F(I,15) = 10.68, 
MSe = 49815.46, P < 0.05]. This interaction is shown in Fig 9.3. There was no 
significant difference between locating 2 angry faces or 1 angry face for individuals 
with high EP and low trait anxiety [F(I,13) = 0.12, MSe = 49815.46, n.s.]; for 
individuals with low EP and low trait anxiety [F(I,l1) = 0.11, MSe = 49815.46, n.s.], 
or for individuals with high EP and high trait anxiety [F(I,lO) = 0.77, MSe = 
49815.46, n.s.]. 
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Fig 9.3 Three-way interaction between emotional perception, anxiety and number of 
angry faces, (a) for one angry face, (b) for two angry faces. 
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Analyses of the happy displays 
A 2x2x3 mixed ANOV A was conducted on the RT data with two independent 
groups factors (EP and anxiety) and one within groups factor, number of happy faces 
(1 happy, 2 happy, 3 happy) within a neutral background. Table 9.2 summarises the 
RT data. 
Table 9.2 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the happy 
displays (in msec). 
J happy (2 2 happy (J 3 happy 
neutral) neutral) 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait Anxiety N=26 1584 (349) 1558 (316) 1208 (371) 
High trait Anxiety N=27 1693 (476) 1556 (396) 1207 (300) 
LowEPN=28 1715 (468) 1621 (359) 1246 (390) 
High EP N=25 1555 (344) 1486 (345) 1164 (258) 
Low EPlLow trait Anxiety N=12 1590 (484) 1632 (372) 1292 (498) 
Low EPIHigh trait Anxiety N=16 1810 (449) 1613 (362) 1212 (298) 
High EPlLow trait Anxiety N=14 1579 (291) 1495 (258) 1138 (209) 
High EPIHigh trait Anxiety N=11 1525 (484) 1474 (446) 1199 (418) 
There was a main effect for number of happy faces [F(2,98) = 50.80, MSe = 
50433.22, P < 0.05] with Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons indicating that 1 
happy face was responded to more slowly than 2 happy faces, which were responded 
to more slowly than 3 happy faces. There were no main effects for either EP [F (1,49) 
= 1.87, MSe = 315717.90, n.s.] or anxiety [F(1,49) = 0.04, MSe = 315717.90, n.s.]. 
There were no two-way interactions between EP and number of happy faces [F(2,98) 
= 0.31, MSe = 50433.22, n.s.], or between trait anxiety and number of happy faces 
[F(2,98) = 0.82, MSe = 50433.22, n.s.]. The three-way interaction between number of 
happy faces, EP and anxiety only just did not reach significance [F(2,98) = 2.88, MSe 
= 50433.22, n.s.], but there was a strong trend in the same direction as the angry 
displays, with one combination of EP and trait anxiety being significant: A 
combination of low EP and high trait anxiety scores resulted in locating 1 happy face 
in a neutral crowd slower than 2 happy faces [F(1,15) = 4.55, MSe = 50433.22, p < 
0.05]. This interaction is shown in Fig 9.4. There was no significant difference 
between locating 2 happy faces or 1 happy face for individuals with high EP and low 
trait anxiety [F(l,13) = 3.04, MSe = 50433.22, n.s.]; for individuals with low EP and 
low trait anxiety [F(l,ll) = 0.18, MSe = 50433.22, n.s.], or for individuals with high 
EP and high trait anxiety [F(l,lO) = 2.22, MSe = 50433.22, n.s.]. Full ANOVA tables 
for analyses of happy displays can be found in Appendix A.7. 
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(a) 
Fig 9.4 Interaction between emotional perception, anxiety and number of happy 
faces, (a) for one happy face, (b) for two happy faces. 
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Discussion 
The aim of Study 7 was to further investigate the effect of EP on attentional 
processing. In particular to consider whether displays of angry and happy faces were 
processed in similar ways, in order to assess the relative contribution of the attentional 
threat and emotionality hypotheses. 
The results of Study 7 again found a bias for angry faces for individuals with 
low EP and increasing levels of anxiety, as in studies 5 and 6. Importantly, there was 
a very similar pattern for happy faces, which almost reached significance. 
In the analysis of angry faces, there was a main effect where 1 angry face was 
detected slower than 2 angry faces, which was slower than 3 angry faces. Individuals 
with increased levels of anxiety were slower to locate 1 angry face than 2 angry faces 
in a neutral background. There was a three-way interaction between EP, trait anxiety 
and number of angry faces. Specifically, a combination of low EP and increased 
levels of anxiety significantly slowed down the detection of the single threat face. As 
discussed earlier, the 'who's in the crowd' task does not involve identifying or 
focussing on angry faces, so in this case, an angry (or happy) bias will be reflected in 
slower response times to the one angry (or happy) face, because as well as seizing 
attention, the face holds attention. 
In the analysis of happy faces, there was a main effect where 1 happy face was 
detected slower than 2 happy faces, which was slower than 3 happy faces. The three-
way interaction between EP, trait anxity and number of happy faces did not quite 
reach significance, but a combination of low EP and increased levels of anxiety did 
slow down the detection of the single happy face. 
Detection of both angry and happy faces was facilitated by a combination of 
low EP and increased levels of anxiety. This could be explained in terms of an 
emotionality hypothesis, where angry and happy faces would be expected to grab 
attention to the same extent. However, it seems that the effect may be more 
pronounced for EP than anxiety. Individuals with higher anxiety scores have 
demonstrated a tendancy to shift attention away from happy faces relative to neutral 
(Study 5), whereas individuals with low EP have shown no bias away from happy 
faces, just that they grab attention less than angry faces but more than neutral ones. 
Thus both may be vigilant for angry and happy faces, albeit for different reasons. The 
combined results from studies 5, 6 and 7 suggest an account where EP effects are 
accounted for by an emotional explanation and anxiety effects are accounted for by a 
threat explanation. 
According to this account, individuals with low EP should demonstrate 
attentional biases for other emotional stimuli, such as sadness or disgust. This is 
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because EP mediates responses to emotional material in general, rather than simply 
material which may be potentially threatening. Individuals with increasing levels of 
anxiety would not be expected to show vigilance for unambiguously non-threatening 
faces (such as sadness or disgust). This is because the bias is specific to threatening 
or potentially threatening material, not to emotional stimuli in general. This is 
contrary to what the emotionality hypothesis would predict and in contrast to the 
prediction made for individuals with low EP. 
Taking account of the hypotheses generated above, Study 8 uses the same face 
in the crowd technique as employed in Study 6, but substitutes the happy faces for 
schematic sad faces in order to evaluate the proposed account. 
Study 8 
Study 7 demonstrated that detection of both angry and happy faces were 
facilitated by a combination of low EP and increasing levels of anxiety. An account 
was proposed where EP effects can be explained by a general sensitivity to emotional 
material, whereas anxiety effects are accounted for by a threat explanation. Study 8 
uses the face in the crowd technique with schematic angry, sad and neutral faces to 
test the explanation. The account predicts that individuals with low EP will show an 
attentional bias towards sad faces, whereas individuals with increasing levels of 
anxiety will not. Sad faces were chosen as happy, surprise and fear expressions are 
all potentially threatening, and disgust faces are difficult to produce schematically. A 
sad face is emotional, therefore should grab the attention of low EP individuals, but is 
not threatening, so highly anxious individuals should not find it attention grabbing. 
There is a debate over whether depression effects attentional bias results 
(discussed in Chapter 7). Generally, biases for threatening information in depression 
have not been found, although people with high depression scores have demonstrated 
depression-congruent biases for sad faces (Hertel, 2002). However, depression scores 
have con-elated with anxiety measures, which has consequently made it difficult to 
determine whether results of attentional bias for sad faces has been due to anxiety 
levels, depression scores or a general result of negative affect. The Hospital Anxiety 
Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is included as an additional 
measure as depression levels may represent a potential confound. 
Study 8 aims to assess the validity of the new account outlined above and draw 
conclusions over the relative contribution of the threat and emotionality hypothesis. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Fifty (30 male, 20 female) undergraduates and members of the London fire 
brigade volunteered to participate in the Study. The undergraduates participated in 
exchange for course credit. The mean age was 28 years (range 20 - 52). 
Materials 
Self-report measures 
EP was assessed using the 14-item APT. Trait Anxiety was assessed using the 
ST AI. Depression was assessed using the 7 -item depression sub-scale of the HADS 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). This has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90, good face validity 
and construct validity, and is convenient as it is very short. 
Attentional task 
The stimuli were identical to those used in Study 6 except sad faces (Fig 9.5) 
were substituted for happy throughout. Displays and presentation of stimuli were 
identical to Study 6. A full list of materials can be found in Appendix B.5-8. 
Fig 9.5 A schematic sadface used in Study 8. 
Procedure 
Prior to the attentional task, each participant completed the three self-report 
measures. The procedure of the attentional task was identical to that of Study 6. 
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Results 
Self-report measures 
Median splits were perfonned on the EP scores, STAI trait anxiety scores and 
HADS scores. For EP, those scoring more than the median of 71 (n = 26) were 
allocated to the high EP group, and those scoring 71 or less (n = 24) to the low EP 
group. Similarly, participants were divided into two groups according to whether or 
not their trait anxiety scores were less than or equal to the median of 40 (n = 26) or 
greater than 40 (n = 24). Finally, for the HADS, those scoring more than the median 
of 5 (n = 24) were allocated to the high depression group, and those scoring 5 or less 
(n = 26) to the low depression group. The correlation between EP and trait anxiety 
scores was not significant (r = 0.12, n.s.), neither was the correlation between EP 
scores and depression (r = 0.03, n.s.), nor the correlation between trait anxiety and 
depression scores (r = 0.14, n.s.). 
Power 
It is noted that the cell sizes in Study 8 were lower than desirable, therefore the 
power of the study was somewhat reduced. 
Data screening 
Data were screened in the same way as for Study 6. This resulted in no 
participants being removed from the data set. 
The overall mean RT was 1340 (SD = 287). Due to the unbalanced design, 
separate analyses were computed for 'same' trials and for 'different' trials. For both 
analyses there were three independent groups factors; EP (high vs. low), trait anxiety 
(high vs. low), and depression (high vs. low). 
Analyses of the same displays 
A 2x2x2x3 mixed ANOV A was conducted on the RT data with the three 
independent groups factors outlined above (EP, anxiety, and depression) and one 
within groups factor, type of crowd (all angry, all sad, all neutral). Table 9.3 
summmises the RT data. 
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Table 9.3 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the 'same' 
displays (in msec). 
Angty Sad Neutral 
crowds crowds crowds 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait anxiety N=26 1629 (381) 1509 (310) 1367 (307) 
High trait anxiety N=24 1660 (320) 1510 (356) 1288 (340) 
LowEPN=24 1590 (349) 1463 (305) 1317 (308) 
High EP N=26 1693 (350) 1552 (351) 1339 (341) 
Low depression N=26 1683 (389) 1571 (318) 1423 (319) 
High depression N=24 1601 (304) 1435 (331) 1226 (309) 
Low EPlLow trait anxietylLow depression N=7 1556 (370) 1500 (367) 1499 (255) 
Low EPlLow trait anxiety/High depression N=6 1704 (301) 1540 (286) 1389 (380) 
Low EPlHigh trait anxietylLow depression N=5 1720 (328) 1495 (388) 1217 (302) 
Low EP/ High trait anxietyIHigh depression N=6 1408 (212) 1318 (274) 1119 (279) 
High EPlLow trait anxietylLow depression N=8 1748 (317) 1648 (222) 1428 (287) 
High EPlLow trait anxietyIHigh depression N=5 1451 (268) 1262 (207) 1059 (205) 
High EPlHigh trait anxietylLow deQression N=6 1716 (363) 1643 (360) 1502 (333) 
High EPlHigh trait anxietyIHigh depression N=7 1787 (294) 1572 (340) 1301 (349) 
There was a main effect for type of crowd [F(2,84) = 19.08, MSe = 66749.13, P 
< 0.05] with Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons indicating that angry crowds were 
responded to more slowly than sad crowds, which were responded to more slowly 
than neutral crowds (Fig 9.6). There were no other main effects or interactions. Full 
ANOV A tables for analyses of the same displays can be found in Appendix AA. 
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Analyses of the different displays 
A 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the RT data with the three 
independent groups factors outlined above (BP, anxiety, and depression) and one 
within groups factor, type of target (angry in neutral crowd, sad in neutral crowd). 
Table 9.4 summarises the RT data. Analyses were conducted for a neutral face in an 
angry/sad crowd but results were non-significant so are not discussed further. 
Table 9.4 Mean reaction time and standard deviations (in parentheses) to the 
'different' displays (in msec). 
Angry/ace Sad/ace 
(neutral crowd) (neutral crowd) 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Low trait anxiety 1175 (248) 1226 (270) 
High trait anxiety 1032 (226) 1218 (201) 
LowEP 1064 (252) 1090 (258) 
HighEP 1145 (249) 1344 (235) 
Low depression 1117 (239) 1282 (242) 
High depression 1094 (272) 1157 (218) 
Low EPlLow trait anxietylLow depression N=7 1162 (167) 1094 (138) 
Low EPlLow trait anxietyIHigh depression N=6 1133 (194) 1041 (158) 
Low EPIHigh trait anxietylLow depression N=5 1017 (131) 1191 (193) 
Low EPI High trait anxietyIHigh depression N=6 1100 (169) 1053 (151) 
High EPlLow trait anxietylLow depression N=8 1201 (150) 1504 (146) 
High EPlLow trait anxietyIHigh depressionN=5 1202 (198) 1190 (200) 
High EPIHigh trait anxietyILow depression N=6 1039 (122) 1285 (143) 
High EPIHigh trait anxietyIHigh depression N=7 1131 (198) 1323 (212) 
There was a main effect for type of target [F(1,42) = 12.61, MSe = 23093.36, P 
< 0.05] with angry faces being detected more quickly than sad faces in neutral 
crowds, and no main effects for either EP [F(1,42) = 3.84, MSe = 31734.52, n.s.], 
anxiety [F(1,42) = 3.31, MSe = 31734.52, n.s.], or depression [F(1,42) = 2.97, MSe = 
31734.52, n.s.]. There was an interaction between EP and type of target [F(1,42) = 
5.62, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05], and an interaction between trait anxiety and type of 
target [F(1,42) = 6.18, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05]. There was no interaction between 
depression and type of target [F(1,42) = 3.16, MSe = 23093.36, n.s.]. The remaining 
three-way and four-way interactions between type of target, EP, anxiety and 
depression did not reach significance. Full ANOV A tables for analyses of the 
different displays can be found in Appendix A.4. 
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Simple main effects for EP 
The interaction between type of target and EP is presented in Fig 9.7(a). 
Individuals with low EP were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than 
individuals with high EP [F(1,24) = 5.80, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05], and individuals 
with low EP were also faster at locating a sad face in a neutral crowd than individuals 
with high EP [F(1,24) = 12.50, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05.]. Individuals with high EP 
were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than a sad face in a neutral 
crowd [F(1,25) = 16.45, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05.], but for individuals with low EP, 
the difference between locating a discrepant angry or sad face in a neutral crowd did 
not reach significance [F(1,23) = 0.32, MSe = 23093.36, n.s.]. 
Simple main effects for anxiety 
The interaction between type of target and trait anxiety is shown in Fig 9.7(b). 
High trait anxious individuals were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd 
than low anxious individuals [F(1,48) = 12.99, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05], but there 
was no significant difference between low and high anxious individuals finding a sad 
face in a neutral crowd [F(1,48) = 0.10, MSe = 23093.36, n.s.]. High trait anxious 
individuals were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than a sad face in a 
neutral crowd [F(1,23) = 14.77, MSe = 23093.36, P < 0.05], but for low trait anxious 
individuals, the difference between locating an angry and sad face in a neutral crowd 
did not reach significance [F(1,25) = 0.92, MSe = 23093.36, n.s.]. 
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Fig 9.7 Mean reaction times for the different displays involving interactions between 
(a) emotional perception and type of target and (b) trait anxiety and type of target. 
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Discussion 
The aim of Study 8 was to modify the original face in the crowd technique used 
in Study 6, to include sad instead of happy faces, in order to test the prediction 
introduced at the end of the discussion for Study 7. The account predicts that the 
effects of EP can be explained by a general sensitivity to emotional material, so 
individuals with low EP will show an attentional bias towards sad faces as well as 
angry faces. Additionally, it predicts that the effects of anxiety can be explained by 
the threat hypothesis, so individuals with increasing levels of anxiety will only show 
an attentional bias towards angry faces but not sad faces. 
The results of Study 8 found a threat bias for individuals with a combination of 
low EP and increased levels of anxiety, as in studies 5, 6 and 7, indicating that a less 
than desirable level of power was not a major concern. Furthermore, support for the 
account was found. When displays were all the same, people were slower (i.e., more 
distracted) when detecting angry rather than sad or neutral crowds, indicating that 
angry faces hold attention for all individuals. When displays contained a different 
face, participants were faster to detect a different angry rather than sad face in a 
background of neutral faces, once again demonstrating an overall superiority of threat 
stimuli. 
Individuals with low EP were faster at locating a discrepant angry face and a 
discrepant sad face in a neutral crowd than individuals with high EP; and high EP 
individuals were faster at locating an angry face in a neutral crowd than a sad face in a 
neutral crowd. These results can be explained in terms of a general sensitivity to 
emotional material. 
Individuals with increased levels of anxiety were significantly faster at locating 
an angry face in a neutral crowd than individuals with low trait anxiety; and 
individuals with increased levels of anxiety were also faster at locating an angry face 
in a neutral crowd than a sad face in a neutral crowd. These results are explained in 
terms of a threat hypothesis. 
A controversial issue in the research is whether depression is associated with an 
attentional bias for negative information that corresponds to the bias found in anxiety. 
Anxiety and depression overlap cognitively and may therefore be expected to show 
similar patterns of attentional bias. Study 8 failed to find any evidence to suggest that 
depression is associated with attentional bias for negative information. This is in line 
with several other studies (see Chapter 7), and suggests depression may be associated 
with a bias in later aspects of processing, or not associated with the processes assessed 
by certain attentional tasks, such as the face in the crowd technique (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
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As in studies 5, 6 and 7, a combination of low EP and increasing levels of 
anxiety are involved in attentional bias for threat stimuli. Once again, the lack of 
correlation between the two indicates their mechanisms are likely to be different. 
Support was found for an account suggesting that the effects of EP can be explained 
by a general sensitivity to emotional material and effects of anxiety can be explained 
via a threat mechanism. 
General discussion 
This section discusses in more detail the results of the two studies described in 
Chapter 9. It also integrates the findings from the studies reported in Chapter 8, in 
order to draw some more general conclusions from the four studies. Overall, although 
there were differences across the results of the four studies, considering the variety of 
methodological approaches, they were remarkably consistent. 
Special significance of threat stimuli 
A consistent pattern to emerge across all four studies was the fact that angry 
faces seemed to hold a special significance for all individuals. Across all the studies, 
the effects for angry faces were the most pronounced, regardless of the method used. 
This is to be expected in light of previous research suggesting that people 
preferentially attend to negative/threatening stimuli in the environment, which is 
generally termed the threat hypothesis (discussed in Chapter 7). 
Previous research is not always clear about whether this bias refers specifically 
to threat material, or to negative material in general, but there is some evidence from 
the results of the final study to suggest that attentional biases may occur for negative 
material in general. In Study 8, angry faces grabbed attention significantly faster than 
sad faces for individuals with high EP, demonstrating a general preference for threat 
material. However, for individuals with low EP, angry faces did not grab attention 
significantly faster than sad faces. This is in contrast to Study 6, where angry faces 
grabbed attention significantly faster than happy faces for individuals with low EP. 
This cannot be attributed to methodological differences, as both studies employed the 
same method of the face in the crowd technique. Like angry faces, sad faces are 
negative, and this difference between the two studies may reflect the fact that negative 
material jumps out more than positive material, which has been suggested in the 
literature (see Chapter 7). 
Across the four studies, individuals mostly showed a preference towards angry 
faces. However, it seems that attention may be directed towards negative information 
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rather than positive information in general. It makes sense for individuals to respond 
quickly to potentially threatening/negative material in the environment before 
responding to positive material, which represents less of a potential danger. 
The influence of emotional perception to attentional processing 
This section is primarily concerned with explaining the influence of EP in 
attentional processing to emotionally meaningful stimuli. The effects of anxiety are 
also considered as there are robust findings for the influence of anxiety on attentional 
processing towards threat stimuli. Over the course of the four studies, support was 
found for an account where the effects of EP were explained by a general senstivity to 
emotional material, and anxiety effects were were accounted for by a threat 
explanation. Consistent throughout the four studies was the combination of low EP 
and increasing levels of anxiety resulting in a bias for angry faces. The results are 
summarised in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5 Summary of the results across the four studies for emotional 
perception (EP) and trait anxiety (TA). All results are significant unless otherwise 
ii1dicated. 
Attentional bias for Attentional bias for Attentional bias for 
angry faces happy faces sad faces 
Study 5 LowEP LowTA N/A 
High TA 
Study 6 LowEP LowEP N/A 
High TA High TA 
(Pattern of mean RT's) 
Study 7 LowEP LowEP N/A 
High TA High TA 
(Strong trend) 
Study 8 LowEP N/A LowEP 
High TA 
~- - ...... -~-- ... ---
The results from the two studies described in Chapter 8 generally supported 
the threat hypothesis with a combination of low EP and increased levels of trait 
anxiety resulted in a bias for angry faces. In Study 5, attentional biases towards angry 
faces were only found for individuals who were low in EP and also had increasing 
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levels of anxiety (see Chapter 8 for a full discussion of these results). In Study 6, 
detection of threat was facilitated for individuals with low EP and individuals with 
increased levels of trait anxiety. There was also some tentative evidence to suggest 
that angry and happy faces may be processed in a similar way (see Chapter 8 for a full 
discussion of these results). 
In Study 7, a bias for angry faces was once again demonstrated by a 
combination of low EP and higher levels of anxiety as in studies 5 and 6. In the 
analysis of angry faces, there was a three-way interaction where a combination of low 
EP and increased levels of anxiety significantly slowed down the detection of the 
single angry face. Importantly, the suggestion that angry and happy faces may be 
processed in similar ways was supported in Study 7. The analysis of happy faces 
closely followed the pattern for angry faces where a combination of low EP and 
higher anxiety individuals were slowed down when detecting the single happy face. 
Furthermore, the three-way interaction between EP, anxiety and happy faces almost 
reached significance. As discussed earlier, the 'who's in the crowd' task does not 
involve identifying or focussing on angry faces, so in this case, an angry (or happy) 
bias will be reflected in slower response times to the one angry (or happy) face, 
because as well as seizing attention, the face holds attention. 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, detection of both angry and happy faces 
was facilitated by a combination of low EP and increased levels of anxiety. This 
resulted in the development of an account where EP effects could be explained by 
emotional sensitivity and anxiety effects by a threat explanation. 
Individuals with low EP show a significant bias towards angry faces and a 
strong trend towards a bias for happy faces. It is proposed that this result can be 
explained in terms of a general sensitivity for emotional material. Individuals with 
low EP may be less affected by emotional stimuli and therefore less interested in 
surveying the emotional landscape. They may consequently have difficulty reading 
the emotions of others' and reacting accordingly. Thus in Study 7, the one angry (or 
happy) face grabs and holds their attention, due to their narrow visual focus, and they 
are not interested in surveying the rest of the visual scene which may contain other 
emotional stimuli. In contrast, individuals with high EP are more skilled at surveying 
the emotional landscape and interpreting the meaning of emotional material. Thus 
they may take more time surveying the whole scene with a wider visual focus. As a 
result, individuals with high EP do not necessarily have their attention grabbed and 
held by one angry or happy face. They process the rest of the visual scene in case 
there are other emotional stimuli present. According to the account outlined earlier, 
individuals with low EP should respond quicker to other emotional stimuli, such as 
sadness or disgust. 
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Individuals with increasing levels of anxiety show a significant bias towards 
angry faces and a strong trend towards a bias -for happy faces, which would appear to 
provide support for the emotionality hypothesis. However, it is suggested that these 
individuals are sensitized to threat, providing a threat-vigilant style with an increased 
perception of danger in the environment, whether real (in the case of the angry face) 
or imagined (in the case of a happy face where a smile may appear threatening). If 
this theory is correct, individuals with increasing levels of anxiety would not be 
expected to show vigilance for unambiguously non-threatening faces (such as sadness 
or disgust), which is contrary to what the emotionality hypothesis would predict and 
in contrast to the prediction made for individuals with low EP. 
The results of Study 8 found a threat bias for individuals with a combination 
of low EP and increased levels of anxiety, as in studies 5, 6 and 7. Furthermore, 
support for the account outlined above was found. 
Individuals with low EP demonstrated a bias towards angry and sad faces, 
patticularly when locating a discrepant angry or sad face in a neutral crowd. This 
result was predicted by the account outlined above and is in line with the results of 
Study 6, where individuals with low EP responded quickly to a different angry face in 
a neutral crowd. It seems counter-intuitive that individuals with low EP are better at 
the face in the crowd task. However, as discussed in Study 6, individuals with low EP 
are less affected by emotional stimuli so can respond more quickly treating the task as 
a traditional visual search exercise. Thus the results of Study 8 support the account 
that EP effects can be explained by a general sensitivity to emotional material, rather 
than by a threat explanation. Individuals with low EP show a bias (i.e., respond 
quickly) to sad faces, yet another type of emotional stimuli which are unambiguously 
non-threatening. Individuals with high EP are more sensitive to emotional material so 
dwell longer on emotional information. 
Individuals with increasing levels of anxiety showed a bias towards threat 
stimuli, patticularly when locating a different angry face in a neutral crowd. This is 
supported by much of the literature (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999b) and is consistent with the findings of studies 5, 6 and 7. Individuals with 
lower levels of anxiety also show preference for angry stimuli, just to a lesser extent. 
Individuals with increased levels of anxiety showed a bias towards angry faces, and in 
Study 7, also showed a bias towards happy faces. This seemingly provides support 
for the emotionality hypothesis, which suggests that positive and negative emotional 
stimuli capture attention to the same extent. However, in Study 8, individuals with 
increasing levels of anxiety showed no bias for sad faces, which is contrary to what 
the emotionality hypothesis would predict. In terms of a threat explanation, highly 
anxious individuals are sensitised to threat whether real (in the case of the angry face) 
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or imagined (in the case of a happy face where a smile may appear threatening). 
Consequently, they would not be expected to show bias towards unambiguously non-
threatening faces (such as sadness). Thus, the results of Study 8 lend support to the 
claim that anxiety effects can be explained in terms of a threat hypothesis. 
To summarise, individuals with low EP seem to be quicker in so many studies, 
which may be because they are less interested in emotional material (discussed in 
Chapter 8). This raises a suggestion that EP may also incorporate an element of 
emotional sensitivity. Although speculative, this idea is discussed further in Chapter 
10. 
Anxiety: Interaction hypothesis Vs Cognitive-motivational theory 
Athough not the major focus of the four studies, some consideration was given 
to determining which cognitive theory offered the best account of anxiety. The 
relationship between anxiety and attention is complex and the review in Chapter 7 
was selective when discussing various theoretical alternatives. However, two 
established theories which have divided the literature for a number of years were 
considered in more detail. The interaction hypothesis (Williams et aI., 1988; 1997) of 
anxiety predicts that high trait anxious individuals should become more vigilant, and 
low trait anxious individuals more avoidant of threat (see Chapter 7). In contrast, the 
cognitive-motivational theory (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) predicts that all individuals, 
including those with low trait anxiety, should be more vigilant for high rather than 
mild threat stimuli (discussed in Chapter 7). Overall, the combined results of the four 
studies suggest that the cognitive-motivational theory offers a better account of 
anxiety than the interaction hypothesis. 
The results of Study 5 appeared to lend support to the interaction hypothesis, 
but for various methodological reasons (see Chapter 8), the results were inconclusive. 
In studies 6 and 7, arguably using more ecological stimuli in the form of 
schematic faces, both high and low anxious individuals showed a bias towards the 
detection of angry faces. The bias for low anxious individuals was significantly less 
pronounced than that for high anxious individuals but demonstrates that all 
individuals tend to focus on threat stimuli, lending support to the cognitive-
motivational theory. 
The results of Study 8 also support the cognitive-motivational theory in terms 
of the results for anxiety and depression. In terms of anxiety, low anxious individuals 
once again showed a bias towards angry faces, even though it was far less pronounced 
than for individuals with high anxiety. Furthermore, the fact that depression did not 
seem to be associated with attentional bias for negative information in initial orienting 
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lends further support to the cognitive-motivational theory. The interaction theory of 
anxiety (Williams et aI., 1988; 1997), suggests that anxiety and depression are 
associated with different patterns of cognitive bias. However, the specific 
mechanisms responsible for such biases are unclear. The absence of biases in initial 
orienting in clinical depression is unexpected from this theory, given the high levels 
of anxiety often found in clinically depressed individuals. However, such findings 
can be interpreted in terms of the cognitive-motivational theory. This approach 
proposes that initial orienting processes depends on two mechanisms: one involved in 
the appraisal of the negative valence of the stimuli, and the other detelmining 
behaviour towards external goals and stimuli. Therefore, although depression seems 
likely to be associated with a negative bias in the appraisal of emotional stimuli this is 
not reflected in initial orienting mechanisms. Mogg & Bradley (1998) have suggested 
that the absence of biases in initial orienting to external negative stimuli may be due 
to depression impairing, or lowering the level of functioning of, the goal engagement 
system, reflecting a general deficit in external goal-orientated behaviour. 
To summarise, although not the main concern of the studies, the results 
generally lend support to the cognitive-motivational theory being a more accurate 
account of anxiety than the interaction hypothesis. 
To conclude, although there were differences in the results across the series of 
studies, considering the variety of methodological approaches employed, they were 
remarkably consistent. As discussed above, threatening/negative material does seem 
to hold a special significance for all individuals as the effects for angry/sad faces were 
the most pronounced. Over the course of the four studies, SUppOlt was found for an 
account where the effects of EP can be explained by a general sensitivity to emotional 
material and the effects of anxiety can be explained by a threat hypothesis. Athough 
not the major focus of the studies, some consideration was given to determining 
which cognitive theory offered the best account of anxiety. Overall, the combined 
results suggest that the cognitive-motivational theory offers a better account of 
anxiety than the interaction hypothesis. 
The following Chapter draws together the overall conclusions from the thesis. 
First the results of the empirical chapters are summarised. Second, the questions that 
were raised in Chapter 2 are re-considered. It is evaluated to what extent these have 
been answered, if there are any alternative explanations for the results, and what work 
remains outstanding. 
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Conclusions 
"All yet seems well; and if it ends so meet, 
The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet. " 
All's well that ends well, Act 5 Scene 5 
This Chapter begins by summarising the results of the six empirical chapters 
(chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9). It then looks back at the questions that were raised in 
Chapter 2 and evaluates to what extent these have been answered, and what work 
remains outstanding. 
Summary of empirical work 
The status and measurement of an emotional perception component within 
emotional intelligence 
Study 1, reported in Chapter 2, described the construction and validation of a 
short self-repOlt measure of EP. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of the APT 
suggested a unitary component solution. Scores showed good internal reliability 
coefficients, and eight-week test-retest reliability indicated that scores were stable 
over time. The scale showed evidence of construct validity. Women scored 
significantly higher than men on the APT, a finding that is consistent with previous 
research on sex differences in the perception of emotion (e.g., Ciarrochi et aI., 2000; 
Mayer & Geher, 1996). Also, scores on the APT were related to an objective measure 
of EP. The scale showed evidence of discriminant validity as scores on the APT were 
not significantly related to scores on the Affective Communication Test (ACT, 
Friedman et aI., 1980). From these results, it was concluded that the APT offered the 
potential to measure EP in addition to objective measures, if fUlther reliability and 
validity evidence could be obtained. 
Reliability, validity and correlations of emotional perception with other variables 
Studies 2 and 3, described in Chapter 4, considered the relationship between EP 
and theoretically relevant variables within the EI framework using two different 
samples. In general, the findings were consistent across both samples. The results 
provided additional support for the reliability and validity of the APT. PCA of the 
APT suggested a unitary component solution and scores showed good internal 
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reliability coefficients. In terms of construct validity, women scored higher than men 
on the APT, and the APT correlated with the EI scales of emotional clarity, emotional 
awareness and emotional expression. The magnitude of these correlations were small 
to moderate, which was to be expected in light of previous research which has 
conceptualised EI as being a set of related abilities (e.g. Davies et aI., 1998; Goleman, 
1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The APT also showed small to moderate correlations 
with the theoretically relevant variables of well-being and coping. The scale showed 
evidence of discriminant validity. In comparison with the other EI scales, the APT 
showed the lowest correlations with both personality dimensions and verbal IQ. This 
demonstrates the independent status of EP over and above these variables. These 
results demonstrate that EP represents a semi-independent ability within the EI 
construct. 
Predictive validity of emotional perception and change across time 
Chapter 5 described further results from studies 2 and 3 in order to assess the 
relationship between EP and various aspects of performance. Additionally, changes 
in scores across time were considered for all measures. In terms of predictive 
validity, APT scores predicted seminar presentation grades and nursing grades more 
strongly than other EI components, personality, verbal IQ, well-being and coping 
variables. EP appears to demonstrate predictive validity, particularly when 
pelformance involves practical skills. It appears that EP predicts performance in 
terms of communication/practical ability rather than academic achievement per se. In 
terms of changes over time, scores on EI measures changed over the 6-month time 
gap between testing phases for both samples, indicating that EI variables are adaptive. 
It also suggests that EI is more of an ability than a stable trait. Although EP appears 
to be semi-independent, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, and these results suggest that 
the APT is potentially useful with long-term effects, the longitudinal studies cannot 
assess the role of EP in actual behaviour due to their questionnaire-based nature. 
Emotional perception in the social environment 
Previous empirical work, described above, relied on questionnaire data, which 
makes it impossible to address the question of whether EP has behavioural outcomes. 
As a result, Study 4, described in Chapter 6, used a quasi-experimental design to 
evaluate the role of EP in social interaction. Specifically, the study investigated the 
effects of EP in a social environment by using ratings of embarrassment during class 
presentations, and the degree to which target levels of EP, expressivity and empathy 
predict these. The results indicated that audience members could accurately identify 
embarrassment in live, naturalistic settings, and that EP and expressivity both 
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contribute to embarrassment ratings with EP having more of an influence over 
presenters' embarrassment ratings of themselves, and expression influencing audience 
embarrassment ratings of presenters. Empathy had no effect on embarrassment 
ratings. Study 4 demonstrated that EP had reliable interpersonal effects in a social 
environment, and participants were provided with some useful feedback about 
internal and external judgements of embarrassment. Furthermore, Study 4 
investigated the suggestion (raised in Chapter 5), that EP may influence practical 
perfOlmance. Indeed, EP proved to play an important role in interpersonal 
perceptions of embarrassment, but still left unanswered was the question of whether 
EP would effect the moment-by-moment regulation of behaviour. 
The role of emotional perception in the focus of attention to emotionally 
meaningful stimuli 
Studies 5 and 6, described in Chapter 8, used experimental methodologies 
within the attentional bias framework to investigate how EP may direct and maintain 
attention to emotionally meaningful stimuli. Study 5 employed the dot probe 
methodology with photographs from the Ekman series of faces to consider whether 
attentional biases for emotional faces, which has been reported to be influenced by 
anxiety, is also mediated by EP. The results showed a threat bias for participants with 
low scores on EP, but only those who also had increased levels of anxiety. 
Individuals with low EP tend to be less skilled at surveying the emotional landscape 
and may be less interested in emotional stimuli. As a result, they may have difficulty 
determining whether threat is real or imagined, so are likely to focus on an angry face 
in case it is important. Increasing levels of anxiety may sensitise the individual to 
threat, providing a threat-vigilant style with an increased perception of danger in the 
environment. Thus for different reasons, low EP and increasing levels of anxiety 
lead to an accentuation of the normal threat bias (discussed in Chapter 8). Several 
limitations of using the dot probe task were identified (see Chapter 8), including the 
problem of controlling for visual features when using real faces. 
Study 6 used the face in the crowd paradigm with schematic faces taken from 
Fox et al. (2000) to further examine the contribution of EP to attentional processing. 
There was a threat bias for individuals with low EP and individuals with increasing 
levels of anxiety. It appeared to be somewhat counter-intuitive that individuals with 
low EP did better at the face in the crowd task. However, it was suggested that 
individuals with low EP are less affected by the emotional content of the stimuli. 
They can treat the task as a traditional visual search exercise and can therefore 
respond more quickly to an angry face in a neutral crowd. On the other hand, 
individuals with high EP are more affected by emotional stimuli, so take longer to do 
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the visual search task. Additionally, there was some tentative evidence from the data 
to suggest that happy stimuli may be processed in a similar way to angry stimuli, 
which would seem to suggest a general sensitivity to emotional material. It was 
suggested that this may be the case for low EP individuals, who have an overall 
difficulty processing emotional stimuli, which is likely a result of lack of interest in 
the material in the first place. In contrast, anxiety effects were still explained by the 
threat hypothesis, as happy faces may also appear to be potentially threatening, 
palticularly for highly anxious individuals who may fear social ridicule and being 
laughed at (discussed in Chapter 8). Given the tentative evidence from Study 6 
suggesting happy faces may be processed in a similar way to angry faces, it was 
concluded that similarities in processing between emotionally meaningful stimuli 
should be investigated. 
The effect of emotional perception in attentional processing: General sensitivity 
to emotional material 
Studies 7 and 8, reported in Chapter 9, further examined the role of EP in 
attentional processing, while attempting to cast light on the threat/emotionality debate. 
Study 7 used a modified version of the face in the crowd task with schematic faces in 
order to tease apart the relative contribution of the threat and emotionality hypotheses. 
Detection of both angry and happy faces was facilitated by a combination of low EP 
and increased levels of anxiety. Initially, this appears to be in line with the 
emotionality hypothesis, where angry and happy faces would be expected to grab 
attention to the same extent. However, it seems that the effect may be more 
pronounced for EP than anxiety. Individuals with higher anxiety scores have 
demonstrated a tendency to shift attention away from happy faces relative to neutral 
(Study 5), whereas individuals with low EP have shown no bias away from happy 
faces, just that they grab attention less than angry faces but more than neutral ones. 
Thus both may be vigilant for angry and happy faces, albeit for different reasons. An 
account was proposed where EP effects could be accounted for by an emotional 
explanation and anxiety effects accounted for by a threat explanation (discussed in 
Chapter 9). 
Study 8 used the same face in the crowd technique as employed in Study 6, but 
substituted the happy faces for schematic sad faces in order to evaluate the new 
account proposed. According to this account, a sad face is emotional, therefore 
should grab the attention of low EP individuals, but is not threatening, so highly 
anxious individuals should not find it attention grabbing. Support for the account was 
demonstrated as low EP individuals showed a bias toward both angry and sad faces, 
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whereas individuals with increasing levels of anxiety only demonstrated an attentional 
bias for angry faces but not sad faces (discussed in Chapter 9). 
Answering the questions 
This section refers to the questions asked in Chapter 2 to evaluate how far we 
have come in answering them and make suggestions for future research. 
1. What is emotional perception? 
EP is the ability to perceive emotion in others, which has been identified as one 
of the core elements in many conceptualisations of EI (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998; 
Martinez-Pons, 1997; Mayer & Geher, 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Indeed, once 
the influences of personality and cognitive ability are accounted for, one of the only 
aspects of EI which remains as an identifiable construct is EP. It seems natural to 
theorise that other aspects of EI all depend on EP. The mediation, use and 
modification of emotions in oneself and others depends in the first instance on the 
individual's ability to actually perceive these emotions. 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that EP shared a small but significant correlation 
with verbal IQ as expected, plus EP scores changed across time. These results 
suggest that EP is more likely to be an ability, than a stable trait like personality. This 
lends support to the claim (Mayer et aI., 1999) that EI components (or at least EP) are 
part of an information-processing framework. 
2. How important is it? 
This thesis has demonstrated that EP has an important role to play in three main 
theoretical areas. First, it has been shown to influence performance and longitudinal 
effects (studies 2 and 3). Second, it was demonstrated that EP has an important role 
to play in the social environment (Study 4), and finally, EP has been shown to 
influence actual moment-by-moment regulation of behaviour in the focus of attention 
(studies 5-8). Research on the effects of EP is in its infancy, and yet it has already 
proved to have an important conttibution to three major theoretical areas. The scope 
for further investigation of these effects and the possible influences of this important 
construct are considered below. 
3. Can emotional perception be measured effectively? 
Although defining the broad nature of EP is straightforward, measuring it has 
proved problematic. Attention was drawn to these measurement difficulties in 
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Chapter 2, particularly the lack of accurate self-report measures to assess EP and the 
weak internal consistency coefficients associated with objective measures. 
Despite these difficulties, in addition to objective measures, the Affective 
Perception Test (APT) does seem to measure EP effectively. Study 1 demonstrated 
that the scale was reliable and valid, and further supporting evidence was found in 
studies 2 and 3. Not only did the scale demonstrate good reliability, construct and 
discriminant validity, it also proved to be useful in predicting academic achievement. 
4. Is emotional perception independent from personality and cognitive ability? 
In order to determine whether EI components are independent abilities, it 
needs to be demonstrated that they have some independent status over and above 
personality and cognitive ability. Aspects of these potential confounds most likely to 
be associated with EI components were described in Chapter 3. 
Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence for the independent status of EP over 
personality and cognitive ability. Of all the other EI components, EP demonstrated 
the lowest correlations with both personality dimensions and cognitive ability. These 
results support the contention that EP represents a semi-independent ability within the 
EI construct. 
5. Is emotional perception related to theoretically relevant variables including 
other emotional intelligence components? 
Researchers have classified EI as a type of ability within the traditional 
intelligence framework (e.g., Mayer et aI., 1999). One of the criteria for an ability is 
that there should be positive correlations between measures (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998). 
This criterion was supported by data from studies 2 and 3 where EP correlated 
positively with the EI scales of emotional clarity, emotional awareness and emotional 
expression. Although in line with previous research which has conceptualised EI as 
being a set of related abilities (e.g., Davies et aI., 1998; Martinez-Pons, 1997; Mayer 
& Geher, 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), the correlations were small to moderate 
demonstrating that EP still retained independent status over other EI variables. 
Similarly, EP showed small to moderate correlations with theoretically relevant 
variables of well-being and coping, but again retained some independent status. 
6. Does emotional perception evidence predictive validity? 
Predictive validity is an important aspect of intelligence which has been 
ignored by many of the current conceptualisations of EI. Additionally, if a measure 
demonstrates predictive validity it is of some practical use. 
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Studies 2 and 3 described evidence for the predictive validity of EP when 
assessing academic achievement. APT scores predicted seminar presentation grades 
and nursing grades more strongly than other EI components, personality, verbal IQ, 
well-being and coping variables. EP seems to be more closely related to performance 
related assessment where skills such as closely monitoring other people's reactions in 
order to make a good seminar presentation are fundamental. This was supported by 
the results of Study 4, where EP influenced practical performance, this time during 
class presentations. More traditional methods of assessment such as essay writing and 
examinations require a different set of skills. As discussed in Chapter 5, EP 
influences practical aspects of performance, rather than intellectual capacity assessed 
by traditional methods. 
7. Does emotional perception have behavioural effects? 
It has been suggested (Petrides & Fumham, 2000), that the status of the EI 
construct should be explored using experimental methodologies rather than relying 
purely on self-report data. Using only questionnaire-based methods makes it 
impossible to address the issue of whether EP influences actual behaviour. One 
important aspect of the thesis, therefore, was to employ more objective methods, in 
addition to questionnaire measures. Such methods were quasi-experimental (Study 
4), employed to consider the effects of EP in a social setting, and experimental 
methodologies employed in the series of attentional bias studies. 
EP demonstrated behavioural effects in the social environment where it 
predicted presenters' self-ratings of embarrassment. These results showed that EP 
plays an important role in interpersonal perception. Theoretical and practical 
implications were discussed in Chapter 6. 
EP also had an important role to play in the moment-by-moment regulation of 
behaviour, as demonstrated by the series of four attentional bias studies reported in 
Chapters 8 and 9. These studies lead to the proposal and subsequent support for an 
account predicting the effects of EP in the focus of attention to emotionally 
meaningful stimuli. 
8. What else needs to be done? 
In reference to part one of the thesis, which considered the influence of EP on 
performance and whether it had longitudinal effects, first, and perhaps the most 
important work which needs to be conducted, is the assessment of the EI-performance 
relationship. As discussed in Chapter 5, this relationship can only be explored 
thoroughly when researchers specify clearly how they are defining performance and 
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which aspects of EI they are measuring. Second, as noted in Chapter 5, the 
longitudinal studies did not consider change over time in detail, which would have 
detracted from the main focus of the thesis. Future research, however, should 
consider this issue and perhaps introduce training initiatives between testing phases. 
Third, the relationship between EP and other theoretical constructs (such as self-
actualisation, introduced in Chapter 1) should be considered. Given the broad range 
of variables which are potentially related to EP, measures chosen for the test battery 
employed in studies 2 and 3, were thought to be important in terms of establishing 
validity evidence for the APT, and determining whether EP represented an 
independent construct within EI. When investigating the relationship between EP and 
theoretically related constructs, the problems with the reliability of the coping 
measure, discussed in Chapter 4, indicate that not only do we need to identify the key 
variables which EP may be related to, but carefully select reliable and valid measures. 
In terms of part two of the thesis, which considered the role of EP in the social 
environment, there are many other situations other than during group presentations 
(Study 4) in which EP may influence social interactions. One area worth considering 
is the influence of EP in interpersonal relationships, with both couples and family 
members. Indeed, there is some evidence (see Chapter 1) that EI factors, including 
perception, are involved in the maintenance of happy long-term relationships. It 
would also be interesting to further investigate the suggestion (raised in Chapter 6), 
that EP may account for the discrepancy between people's own perceptions and 
others' perceptions of them. For various reasons (discussed in Chapter 6), the data 
presented in Study 4 could only speculate on this issue, but EP may hold the answer 
to the debate over this discrepancy. It makes sense that individuals with high EP will 
have a smaller discrepancy between perceptions of themselves and other people's 
perceptions of them, as they are better equipped to assess emotional signals. Future 
research will concentrate on resolving the problems with the data in Study 4, and 
collect further data in order to investigate this suggestion. 
In reference to part three of the thesis, which looked at the effects of EP on the 
moment-by-moment regulation of behaviour, there are a number of ways in which to 
continue the investigation of EP using the attentional bias framework (employed in 
studies 5-8), and other cognitive areas, such as memory and language. Although the 
application of EP to other cognitive areas is of importance, this discussion is limited 
to the attentional bias framework where there is still a great deal of work to be done. 
First, although the selies of studies have demonstrated that EP influences attentional 
processes at stimulus durations of 500 msec, they did not consider what subsequently 
occurs. According to the anxiety literature, there are three main possibilities 
(discussed in Chapter 7). According to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, 
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individuals with high anxiety show an initial threat bias, then divert attention away in 
order to reduce discomfort. In a similar fashion, albeit for a different reason, 
individuals with low EP may show an initial bias for emotional stimuli, then divert 
attention away because they are less interested in the material. In contrast, individuals 
with high EP take longer to respond to emotional stimuli, but may actually be fixated 
on the material as they find it more interesting. Also, they may take longer to 
disengage from such material. Future research will investigate these hypotheses using 
more appropriate methodologies such as monitoring eye-gaze and the cue-validity 
paradigm (described in Chapter 7). 
Second, the mediating effects of EP on attentional processes may not be 
exclusive to faces. Future research will attempt to replicate these findings using 
different types of emotional stimuli, such as the body postures used in Study 1 (see 
Appendix B.1). 
Third, although these suggestions are logical steps forward and are important, 
an alternative interpretation of the four studies leads to a different line of research. In 
most studies, individuals with low EP are quicker to respond to emotional material 
than individuals with high EP. The explanation offered was that low EP individuals 
are less interested in affective material so respond more quickly. In contrast, 
individuals with high EP maintain attention on emotional material which is of 
significance to them (discussed in Chapter 8). This explanation lead to a suggestion, 
raised in Chapter 9, that what has been termed EP may incorporate an element of 
emotional sensitivity. Although speCUlative at this stage, presumably, individuals 
with high levels of emotional sensitivity will be more interested in emotional stimuli, 
thus taking longer to respond to them. In contrast, individuals with low levels of 
sensitivity will not be so interested in emotional stimuli and will respond quickly 
without lingering on the material. Adopting this approach, anxiety can be classified 
as a special case of emotional sensitivity where too much interest in emotional 
material (specifically threat) becomes a problem leading to an accentuation of the 
normal threat bias. Future research will further investigate the association between 
EP and emotional sensitivity. 
Conclusion 
The important construct of EP has emerged as being a core element within the 
EI framework. Indeed, perhaps the only independent component which is truly 
emotional in that it is not simply an aspect of personality or cognitive ability. The 
regulation, use and modification of emotions in oneself and others naturally depends 
in the first instance on the individual's ability to actually perceive these emotions. 
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10. Conclusions 
This thesis has demonstrated that EP has an important role to play in academic 
performance, social interaction and the focus of attention. The investigation of EP is 
in its early stages, but the first issue to be resolved is whether we should incorporate 
emotional sensitivity into the EP construct. 
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Appendix A 
Statistical Appendices 
This appendix contains scree plots from studies 1, 2 and 3, the results of the t-
tests from studies 2 and 3, descriptive statistics from Study 4, and full analysis of 
variance (ANOV A) tables for the four experimental studies (5-8) in the thesis. For 
Study 5 independent groups ANOVA's were performed on the data. For studies 6, 7 
and 8, mixed design ANOVA's were performed on the data. 
For independent groups ANOVA's, levene's test was employed to assess 
equality of vmiances. When the test was significant, equal variances were not 
assumed. When the test was non-significant, equal variances were assumed. For the 
mixed ANOVA's, mauchley's test of sphericity was used. When significant, the 
lower bound epsilon adjustment was used, when non-significant sphericity was 
assumed. At the start of each ANOVA table, it is reported whether levene's test or 
mauchleys were significant. 
Conventions 
All the statistical tables which follow were produced using the SPSS analysis 
package. For studies 2 and 3, in order, the columns of each table refer to the name of 
the factor, the Mean, the t value, the degrees of freedom of the factor (df), and the 
Probability level (Sig). For studies 5, 6, 7 and 8, in order, the columns of each table 
refer to the name of the factor (Source), sums of Squares (Sum of squares), the 
degrees of freedom of the factor (df), the Mean Square Error (Mean Square), the F 
value, and the Probability level. 
A number of conventions have been adopted in naming the factors. Sheer space 
on the page does not allow all labels to be expanded upon. These are described 
below; 
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TA Trait anxiety (for studies 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
DEP Depression (Study 8) 
Same Refers to the type of crowd (all angry, all happy/sad, all neutral) for 
studies 6 and 8. Note that happy faces are substituted for sad faces in 
Study 8. 
Diff Refers to the type of target (angry in neutral crowd, happy/sad in neutral 
crowd or neutral in angry/hap:0'/sad crowdl for studies 6 and 8. 
Ang Refers to the number of angry faces (1 angry, 2 angry, 3 angry) within a 
neutral background for Study 7. 
Hap Refers to the number of happy faces (1 happy, 2 happy, 3 happy) within 
a_neutrall:>ack~ro~nd 0r Sludy}. __ . ___ ._. __ ._._ 
First the appendix for Study 1 is presented which is identified as AI. Second, 
the appendix for the longitudinal studies is presented which is identified by A2-3 and 
is split up by Chapters. During phase 1 nurses completed a 60-item personality scale, 
but used a reduced 30-item measure in phase 2. In order to compare across both 
phases, a new score was calculated for phase 1 using only the 30-items later used in 
phase 2. This explains the discrepancy between descriptive statistics for phase 1 of the 
nursing study and scores presented in the appendix. Third, the appendix for the quasi-
experimental study is presented which is identified by A4. Forth, each experimental 
study (5-8) has a separate appendix devoted to it. These appendices are identified as 
An where n refers to the number of the study in the main body of the thesis. Tests for 
equality of variance are described first, these are followed by full ANOV A tables. 
Where a number of different analyses were performed on a set of data the appendix is 
split up into sections. 
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Chapter 4 (studies 2 and 3) 
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1. Independent samples t-tests between nurses (Study 2) and managers (Study 3) for 
phase 1. 
Factor Mean df sig 
nurses managers 
Emotional intelligence 
Attention 52.831 48.448 7.506 321 .000 
Clarity 41.326 37.627 6.977 321 .000 
Expression 76.955 73.682 2.681 321 .008 
EP 79.443 74.248 4.213 321 .000 
Personality 
Neuroticism 17.295 17.648 .675 321 .500 
Extraversion 21.142 22.572 3.381 321 .001 
Openness 20.523 19.943 1.529 321 .128 
Agreeableness 21.219 20.521 .800 321 .425 
Conscientiousness 22.019 22.122 .222 321 .825 
Cognitive ability 
Verbal IQ 13.657 13.524 .409 321 .683 
Well-being 
A-C 4.062 3.788 2.960 321 .003 
D-E 4.362 4.373 .126 321 .900 
Coping 
Situation 13.516 13.000 1.630 321 .104 
Accomodation 12.955 11.986 3.318 321 .001 
Devaluation 12.241 11.193 2.949 321 .003 
Avoidance 11.618 10.537 2.897 321 .004 
Reduction 13.595 12.951 2.095 321 .037 
Cope total 63.927 59.669 3.682 321 .000 
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2. Independent samples t-tests between nurses (Study 2) and managers (Study 3) for 
phase 2. 
Factor Mean df sig 
nurses managers 
Emotional intelligence 
Attention 47.750 47.473 .289 180 .773 
Clarity 37.486 36.054 2.052 180 .042 
Expression 71.453 69.391 2.519 180 .009 
EP 74.277 66.013 4.958 180 .000 
Personality 
Neuroticism 17.250 17.648 .634 180 .527 
Extraversion 21.851 20.567 2.646 180 .009 
Openness 20.898 19.364 3.339 180 .001 
Agreeableness 21.833 20.135 3.825 180 .000 
Conscientiousness 22.805 21.243 3.232 180 .001 
Cognitive ability 
VerbalIQ 14.990 13.473 4.115 180 .000 
Well-being 
A-C 3.998 3.673 2.673 180 .008 
D-E 4.290 4.078 1.892 180 .060 
Coping 
Situation 12.750 12.905 .407 180 .684 
Accomodation 12.657 12.486 .479 180 .633 
Devaluation 11.675 11.473 .431 180 .667 
Avoidance 10.879 11.229 .726 180 .469 
Reduction 13.277 12.243 2.720 180 .007 
Cope total 61.240 60.337 .611 180 .542 
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Chapter 5 (studies 2 and 3) 
l. Repeated measures t-tests for nurses (Study 2) over phases 1 and 2. 
Factor Mean (nurses) df sig 
tl t2 
Emotional intelligence 
Attention 52.831 47.750 7.903 107 .000 
Clarity 41.326 37.486 7.686 107 .000 
Expression 76.955 71.453 5.138 107 .000 
EP 79.443 74.277 4.982 107 .000 
Personality 
Neuroticism 17.295 17.250 .500 107 .645 
Extraversion 21.142 21.851 1.491 107 .139 
Openness 20.523 20.898 3.520 107 .001 
Agreeableness 21.219 21.833 2.737 107 .007 
Conscientiousness 22.019 22.805 3.407 107 .001 
Cognitive ability 
VerbalIQ 13.657 14.990 7.023 107 .000 
Well-being 
A-C 4.062 3.998 2.788 107 .006 
D-E 4.362 4.290 2.448 107 .016 
Coping 
Situation 13.516 12.750 4.696 107 .000 
Accomodation 12.955 12.657 .665 107 .508 
Devaluation 12.241 11.675 1.685 107 .095 
Avoidance 11.618 10.879 1.635 107 .105 
Reduction 13.595 13.277 .320 107 .749 
Cope total 63 .927 61.240 3.901 107 .000 
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2. Repeated measures t-tests for managers (Study 3) over phases 1 and 2. 
Factor Mean (managers) df sig 
tl t2 
Emotional intelligence 
Attention 48.448 47.473 2.509 73 .014 
Clarity 37.627 36.054 2.545 73 .013 
Expression 73.682 69.391 3.392 73 .001 
EP 74.248 66.013 5.823 73 .000 
Personality 
Neuroticism 17.648 17.648 .956 73 .342 
Extraversion 22.572 20.567 3.416 73 .001 
Openness 19.943 19.364 1.052 73 .296 
Agreeableness 20.521 20.135 4.617 73 .000 
Conscientiousness 22.122 21.243 2.321 73 .023 
Cognitive ability 
VerbalIQ 13.524 13.473 .044 73 .965 
Well-being 
A-C 3.788 3.673 .035 73 .972 I; 
D-E 4.373 4.078 1.415 73 .161 
Coping 
Situation 13.000 12.905 .455 73 .650 
Accomodation 11.986 12.486 1.166 73 .248 
Devaluation 11.193 11.473 .036 73 .971 
Avoidance 10.537 11.229 1.460 73 .149 
Reduction 12.951 12.243 1.650 73 .103 
Cope total 59.669 60.337 .145 73 .885 
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Study 4 
1. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for all variables across the eight groups. 
Group N EP of presenters Expression of presenters Empathy of presenters Presenters Audience embarrassment 
embarrassment ratings of ratings of presenters 
themselves 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 14 70.214 10.908 73.857 12.056 158.429 15.692 9.071 4.222 7.090 1.866 
2 18 71.000 9.387 73. 167 12.401 153.889 16.102 9.444 4.256 7.818 1.174 
3 12 72.418 12.743 70.000 13.490 157.667 15.785 8.917 4.852 5.899 1.102 
4 12 72.750 ' 10.894 73 .167 12.997 158.917 19.866 9.917 3.906 7.525 2.355 
5 14 70.642 9.223 75.000 10.593 155.429 16.543 10.214 3.945 8.425 2.101 
6 13 70.307 10.290 74.769 13.717 155.000 15.656 10.539 4.854 8.009 3.129 
7 10 72.200 9.452 73.600 10.648 157.300 19.987 9.700 4.498 7.992 1.196 
8 16 74.125 10.085 73.125 14.000 157.375 14.216 .375 4.649 8.876 2.175 
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Study 5 
1. Independent groups ANOV A for angry bias. 
Levenes test was non-significant [F(3,49) = 0.187, n.s.] so equal variances were 
assummed. 
Source Sum of squares df 
EP 
TA 
EP*TA 
Error 
1172.275 
2597.469 
16252.803 
169853.088 
1 
1 
49 
Mean Square F Si~. 
1172.275 
2597.469 
16252.803 
3466.390 
.338 .564 
.749 .391 
4.689 .035 
2. Independent groups ANOV A for happy bias. 
Levenes test was non-significant [F(3,49) = 0.720, n.s.] so equal variances were 
assummed. 
Source Sum of squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
EP 27.155 27.155 .006 .939 
TA 21980.614 21980.614 4.821 .033 
EP*TA 1550.613 1550.613 .340 .560 
Error 223392.920 49 4559.039 
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Study 6 
1. 2x2x3 mixed ANOV A for the same displays. 
Mauchly's test of sphericity was significant [W(2) = 0.519, p<0.05] so the lower 
bound epsilon was employed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Si~. 
Same 1673309.878 1673309.878 25.023 .000 
Same*EP 57580.768 57580.768 .861 .358 
Same*TA 90327.840 90327.840 1.351 .251 
Same*EP*TA 17434.061 17434.061 .261 .612 
Error 3076003.086 46 66869.632 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
EP 95085.210 95085.210 .265 .609 
TA 335632.080 335632.080 .936 .338 
Error 16500208.450 46 358700.184 
2. 2x2x2 mixed ANOV A for the different display - Angry in neutrallHappy in 
neutral. 
Mauchly's test of sphericity was non-significant [W(2) = 1.000, n.s.] so sphericity 
was assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source 
Diff 
Diff*EP 
Diff*TA 
Diff*EP*TA 
Error 
Sum of squares df Mean Square F Si~. 
547927.276 
123300.606 
279557.886 
3560.913 
556453.804 
547927.276 
123300.606 
279557.886 
3560.913 
46 12096.822 
45.295 .000 
23.110 .000 
10.193 .003 
.294 .590 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source 
EP 
TA 
Error 
Sum of squares df Mean Square F 
90450.955 90450.955 .805 
18853.912 18853.912 .168 
5169727.490 46 112385.380 
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3. 2x2x2 mixed ANOV A for the different display - Neutral in angrylNeutral in 
happy. 
Mauchly's test of spheticity was non-significant [W(2) = 0.89, n.s.] so spheticity was 
assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
Diff 45814.802 45814.802 2.084 .156 
Diff*EP 3.105 3.105 .000 .999 
Diff*TA 115.138 115.138 .005 .943 
Diff*EP*TA 5164.743 5164.743 .235 .630 
Error 1011431.717 46 21987.646 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
EP 37788.055 37788.055 .276 .602 
TA 2401.307 2401.307 .018 .895 
Error 6308592.079 46 137143.306 
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Study 7 
1. 2x2x3 mixed ANOV A for the angry displays. 
Mauchly's test of sphericity was non-significant [W(2) = 0.914, n.s.] so sphericity 
was assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
Ang 2302644.390 2 1151322.200 23.112 .000 
Ang*EP 164874.017 2 82437.008 1.655 .196 
Ang*TA 311562.156 2 155781.078 3.127 .048 
Ang*EP*TA 706579.949 2 353289.975 7.092 .001 
Error 4881914.560 98 49815.455 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
EP 1114541.840 1114541.840 2.100 .154 
TA 193939.343 193939.343 .365 .548 
Error 26003327.310 49 530680.149 
2. 2x2x3 mixed ANOV A for the happy displays. 
Mauchly's test of sphelicity was non-significant [W(2) = 0.940, n.s.] so sphericity 
was assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
Hap 5124065.650 2 2562032.820 50.80 .000 
Hap *EP 31187.547 2 15593.773 .309 .735 
Hap *TA 82253.340 2 41126.670 .815 .445 
Hap *EP*TA 290172.055 2 145086.028 2.877 .061 
Error 4942455.140 98 50433.216 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
EP 589815.519 589815.519 1.868 .178 
TA 12022.674 12022.674 .038 .846 
Error 15470177.010 49 315717.899 
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Study 8 
1. 2x2x2x3 mixed ANOV A for the same displays. 
Mauchly's test of spheticity was non-significant [W(2) = 1.000, n.s.] so spheticity 
was assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sik. 
Same 2546896.808 2 1273448.404 19.078 .000 
Same*EP 27092.865 2 13546.433 .203 .717 
Same*TA 69419.839 2 34709.919 .520 .596 
Same*DEP 57936.301 2 28968.151 .434 .649 
Same*EP*TA 78593.776 2 39296.888 .589 .557 
Same*EP*DEP 40445.004 2 20222.502 .030 .802 
Same*TA*DEP 29481.043 2 14740.521 .221 .739 
Same*EP*T A *DEP 172017.336 2 86008.668 1.289 .281 
Error 5606926.553 84 66749.126 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sik. 
EP 108213.537 108213.537 .572 .454 
TA 4161.893 4161.893 .022 .889 
DEP 589865.353 589865.353 3.118 .081 
Error 7945432.747 42 189176.970 
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2. 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOV A for the different display - Angry in neutral/Sad in 
neutral. 
Mauchly's test of sphelicity was non-significant [W(2) = 1.000, n.s.] so sphericity 
was assummed. 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
Diff 291145.654 291145.654 12.607 .001 
Diff *EP 129720.772 129720.772 5.617 .022 
Diff *TA 142602.608 142602.608 6.175 .017 
Diff *DEP 72868.858 72868.858 3.155 .123 
Diff *EP*TA 37745.174 37745.174 1.634 .208 
Diff *EP*DEP 34195.521 34195.521 1.481 .230 
Diff *T A *DEP 22369.409 22369.409 .969 .331 
Diff *EP*T A *DEP 29988.086 1 29988.086 1.299 .261 
Error 969921.053 42 23093.358 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
EP 121892.138 121892.138 3.841 .057 
TA 105077.259 105077.259 3.311 .078 
DEP 94140.932 94140.932 2.967 .092 
Error 1332849.901 42 31734.521 
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3. 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOV A for the different display - Neutral in angry/Neutral in sad 
Mauchly's test of spheticity was non-significant [W(2) = 0.98, n.s.] so spheticity was 
assummed 
Within-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Sig. 
Diff 6018.086 6018.086 .197 .660 
Diff *EP 680.514 680.514 .022 .882 
Diff *TA 2391.070 2391.070 .078 .781 
Diff*DEP 2352.264 2352.264 .077 .783 
Diff*EP*TA 1405.339 1405.339 .046 .831 
Diff *EP*DEP 43640.231 43640.231 1.427 .234 
Diff *T A *DEP 12646.182 12646.182 .414 .524 
Diff *EP*T A *DEP 35237.646 35237.646 1.152 .289 
Error 1284166.781 42 30575.400 
Between-Subjects effects 
Source Sum of sguares df Mean Sguare F Si ... 
EP 93653.467 93653.467 2.834 .102 
TA 77628.578 77628.578 2.349 .133 
DEP 119278.552 119278.552 3.610 .064 
Error 1387871.196 42 33044.552 
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Appendix B 
Materials Appendices 
The following appendices contain the materials for all the empirical work 
conducted throughout the thesis. Each empirical study (or set of studies) has its own 
appendix which is numbered accordingly, for example an appendix for Study 1 would 
be numbered B.l and so on. Where necessary, each appendix is split into sections. 
The same materials were used in studies 2 and 3 so the materials appear in the same 
appendix (B.2-3). This is also the case for studies 5, 6, 7 and 8 where many of the 
same matelials were used. The matelials for these four studies appear in the same 
appendix (B.5-8), which is split into self-report measures and materials for the 
attentional tasks. 
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Study 1 
The 17·item Affective Perception Test (APT) 
This questionnaire concerns the degree to which you feel you are able to spot the emotions other 
people are feeling. Please read each question carefully and circle only one number on the scale. 
1. I can tell when other people are affected by emotionally charged music 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
2. I can see when a friend is angry with me just by looking at them 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
3. I recognise enthusiastic laughter in other people, regardless of whether I respond to it or not 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
4. I am good at recognising emotions when they are expressed over the telephone 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
5. I know which of my friends are more or less likely than me to initiate physical contact 
during conversations 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
6. I am very aware of when other people are feeling nervous or embarrassed in public 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
7. I can tell a lot about what a person is experiencing by looking at their facial expression 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
8. I know which of my friends would make good actors or actresses 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
9. I am able to tell whether someone is anxious or not just by observing their body language 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
10. I can recognise people who are shy amongst strangers 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
11. I know when someone is trying to seduce me 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
12. I find it easy to recognise what feelings people are portraying in games like charades 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
13. In any social situation, I know who wants to be the centre of attention 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
14. Just by listening to someone's voice on a radio talk show, I can tell whether they are angry or 
not 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
15. I recognise immediately when someone wants to express intimacy to a greater or lesser degree 
than I am comfortable with 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
16. When someone smiles at me, I can tell whether it is false or if it is really meant 
strongly disagl'ee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
17. I find it difficult to tell how someone is feeling just by looking at them 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
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The 13-item Affective Communication Test (ACT) 
This questionnaire concerns the degree to which you feel you are able to express emotions. Please read 
each question carefully and circle only one number on the scale. 
1. When I hear good dance music, I can hardly keep still 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
2. My laugh is soft and subdued 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
3. I can easily express emotion over the telephone 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
4. I often touch friends during conversations 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
5. I dislike being watched by a large group of people 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
6. I usually have a neutral facial expression 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
7. People tell me that I would make a good actor or actress 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
8. I like to remain unnoticed in a crowd 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
9. I am shy among strangers 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
10. I am able to give a seductive glance if I want to 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
11. I am terrible at pantomime as in games like charades 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
12. At small parties I am the centre of attention 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
13. I show that I like someone by hugging or touching that person 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
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The Facial and Posture Perception Test 
Consists of two similar sub-tests: 
Can you tell what a person is viewing from their face? 
This booklet contains pictures of people adopting various facial expressions. In each case you 
are asked to choose which word from a list of six emotions best describes how this person 
would be feeling. There are twelve pictures in all, and the booklet will take only a few 
minutes to complete. 
The emotions are anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise and disgust. 
Do not spend too long thinking about each picture. Select one emotion for each picture. If 
you are not sure, pick the emotion which is closest in your opinion. 
Each face was rated using the following scale; 
Anger 
Disgust 
Fear 
Happiness 
Sadness 
Surprise 
References to exact images were as follows: happiness (NRl-6 & WF2-11), sadness (EM4-24 
& MOl-30), anger (WF3-1 & C2-12), surprise (NRl-14 & GSI-16), fear (PF2-30 & JJ5-13), 
and disgust (JBl-16 & CI-4). 
Happiness Happiness 
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Can you tell what a person is feeling from the way they are standing? 
This booklet contains illustrations of a mannekin in various poses seen from the front and the 
side. In each case you are asked to choose which word from a list of five emotions best 
describes how this person adopting this posture would be feeling. There are ten illustrations 
in all, and the booklet will take no longer than a couple of minutes to complete. 
The emotions are anger, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. Please note that unlike the 
previous section, the emotion disgust is not an option. 
Do not spend too long thinking about each pose, your first impressions are important. Select 
one and only one emotion for each posture. If you are not sure, pick the emotion which is 
closest in your opinion. 
Each posture was rated using the following scale; 
Anger 
Fear 
Happiness 
Sadness 
Surprise 
The five postures displayed below were shown once each from the side and once each from 
the front. In order to save space in the appendix, the postures here are only shown from the 
side. 
Angry Fear 
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Studies 2-3 
Questionnaire pack for nurses (Study 2) and managers (Study 3) phase 1 
It is noted that nurses used the original 60-item NEO-FFI personality inventory in phase 1 and 
were given the actual booklets to complete. Presented here is the shortened 30-item version 
used in phase 2 for nurses and both phases for managers. For the purposes of clarity in the 
appendix, the names of the measures appear at the top of each questionnaire. These names 
were not present when administering the questionnaire packs. 
Questionnaire Pack 
This questionnaire pack contains a total of eight different questionnaires concerning 
aspects of the way you think, feel and act. 
All of the questionnaires are quite short, so shouldn't take too long to complete. A brief 
description of each questionnaire and specific instructions for completing it are given at the 
start of each one. 
If you have any difficulties whilst completing the questionnaire pack, raise your hand 
and ask a question. 
All the information collected will be kept confidential and anonymous, and you will not 
be identifiable except through the use of a key which only the experimenter will have access 
to. This cover sheet will be discarded before any data are entered into a computer. 
You will also receive feedback on these questionnaires which I hope you will find 
interesting. This will be made available in your student tray. 
Please complete the following information before working your way through the 
questionnaire packs: 
Student number:-
Name:-
Date of birth:- ........ day ........ month ........ year 
Gender:- o Male o Female 
Informed consent 
I fully understand the nature of this study, and appreciate that I can withdraw my participation 
at any time. I give permission for the data I have provided to be cross-referenced with my 
academic records for the purposes of this research only. I understand that complete 
confidentiality will be observed at all times, and I will not be identifiable from any records 
held on a computer or otherwise. Signature: 
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Questionnaire 1 (Emotional Awareness) 
This questionnaire is concerned with the degree to which you think about and are aware of your 
emotions. Please read the following items carefully and then circle around a number for each item 
on the table to show your answer. Please reply to all the items. 
Items Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree nor Agree 
Disagree 
1. People would be better off if they felt 
less and thought more 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I don't think it's worth paying 
attention to your emotions or moods 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I don't usually care much about what 
I'm feeling 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Feelings give direction to life 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I believe in acting from the heart 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The best way for me to handle my 
feelings is to experience them to the 1 2 3 4 5 
fullest 
7. One should never be guided by 
emotions 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I never give in to my emotions 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I pay a lot of attention to how I feel 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I don't pay much attention to my 
feelings 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I often think about my feelings 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Feelings are a weakness humans have 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. It is usually a waste of time to think 
about your emotions 1 2 3 4 5 
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Questionnaire 2 (Emotional Clarity) 
This questionnaire is concerned with the degree to which you understand and identify your 
emotions. Please read the following items carefully and then circle around a number for each item 
on the table to show your answer. Please reply to all the items. 
Items Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
Disagree Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
1. Sometimes I can't tell what my feelings 1 2 3 4 
are 
2. I am rarely confused about how I feel 1 2 3 4 
3. I can never tell how I feel 1 2 3 4 
4. My belief and opinions always seem to 1 2 3 4 
change depending on how I feel 
5. I am often aware of my feelings on a 1 2 3 4 
matter 
6. I am usually confused about how I feel 1 2 3 4 
7. I feel at ease about my emotions 1 2 3 4 
8. I can't make sense out of my feelings 1 2 3 4 
9. I am usually very clear about my 1 2 3 4 
feelings 
10. I usually know my feelings about a 1 2 3 4 
matter 
11. I almost always know exactly how I am 1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Jeeling . 
-
.- .-
-
- _ ...... _ ... _-
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Questionnaire 3 (Emotional Expression) 
This questionnaire is concerned with the degree to which you feel you are able to express 
various different emotions. Please read each question carefully and then circle around a number for 
each item on the table to show your answer. Note that unlike the first two sections, this questionnaire 
uses a 7-point scale. Please reply to all the items. 
Items 
1. I often tell people I love them 
2. I show that I like someone by hugging or 
touching that person 
3. I often touch friends during conversations 
4. Watching television or reading a book can make 
me laugh out loud 
5. I laugh a lot 
6. When I am angry people around me usually 
know 
7. People can tell from my facial expressions how 
I am feeling 
8. Whenever people do nice things for me, I feel 
"put on the spot" and have trouble expressing my 
gratitude 
9. When I really like someone they know it 
10. I often laugh so hard that my eyes water or my 
sides ache 
11. When I am alone, I can make myself laugh by 
remembering something from the past 
12. My laugh is soft and subdued 
13. If a friend is surprising me with a gift, I 
wouldn't know how to react 
14. I apologise when I have done something 
wrong 
15. If someone makes me angry in a public place, 
I will "cause a scene" 
16. I always express disappointment when things 
don't go as I'd like them to 
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Questionnaire 4 (EP) 
This questionnaire concerns the degree to which you feel you are able to spot the emotions other 
people are feeling. Please read each question carefully and then circle around a number for each 
item on the table to show your answer. Note that this questionnaire also uses a 7-point scale. Please 
reply to all the items. 
I _ ... ""' ......... s ",tron IV Uisa2ree s ). .. 1'1 .... v.I1!JY .n..1! .. ""'" 
l. I can see when a friend is angry with me just by 
looking at them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I recognise enthusiastic laughter in other 
people, regardless of whether I respond to it or not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am good at recognising emotions when they 
are expressed over the telephone I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I know which of my friends are more or less 
likely than me to initiate physical contact during I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
conversations 
5. I am very aware of when other people are 
feeling nervous or embarrassed in public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I can tell a lot about what a person is 
experiencing by looking at their facial expression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I know which of my friends would make good 
actors or actresses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am able to tell whether someone is anxious or 
not just by observing their body language 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I can recognise people who are shy amongst 
strangers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I know when someone is trying to seduce me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1l. In any social situation, I know who wants to be 
the centre of attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Just by listening to someone's voice on a radio 
talk show, I can tell whether they are angry or not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I recognise immediately when someone wants 
to express intimacy to a greater or lesser degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
than I am comfortable with 
14. When someone smiles at me, I can tell 
whether it is false or if it is really meant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Questionnaire 5 (Verbal IQ) 
This test assesses your knowledge of the meaning of words. Please read the following items 
carefully and then circle around a word for each item on the table to show your answer. Please reply 
to all the items. 
Items Response Choices 
1. Easy means the opposite of .. " problem simple difficult always cannot 
2. Seed is to plant as egg is to .... tree bird pollen oats potato 
3. Right means the opposite of .... action good careless wrong motive 
4. Old means the same as .... decaying tired aged youth mended 
5. Army is to navy as soldier is to .... airman sea service sailor uniform 
6. Portion means the same as .... some whole part any cake 
7. Up means the opposite of.. .. short small low down young 
8. III means the same as .... health fever dirty mumps sick 
9. Legs are to running as teeth are to .... chattering walking eating biting arms 
10. Never means the opposite of. ... rarely always now will forget 
11. Sky is to ground as ceiling is to .... roof down floor rug high 
12. Odd means the same as .... strange even one man number 
13. When is to where as time is to .... how why space length relativity 
14. Multiplication is the opposite of. ... subtraction addition mathematics figures division 
15. Prevent means the same as .... avoid cure allow deter help 
16. Permanent means the opposite of. ... part-time ever changing temporary stable 
17. Fact is to fiction as historian is to .... history book novelist teacher story 
18. Dangerous means the opposite of.. .. brave cowardly situation safe bravado 
19. Flat means the same as .... straight level uneven oblique inclined 
I 20. Doubt means the opposite of .... wonder certainty correct dubious indefinite 
, 
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Questionnaire 6 (Personality) 
This questionnaire concerns opinions you have about yourself. Please read the following items 
carefully and then circle around a number for each item on the table to show your answer. Please 
respond to all the items. 
Items Strongly Disagree Neither Agree 
Disagree Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
1. Too often, when things go wrong, I get 
discouraged and feel like giving up 1 2 3 4 
2. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person 
1 2 3 4 
3. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art 
and nature 1 2 3 4 
4. Some people think of me as cold and 
calculating 1 2 3 4 
5. I have a clear set of goals and work 
towards them in an orderly fashion 1 2 3 4 
6. Sometimes I feel completely worthless 
1 2 3 4 
7. I really enjoy talking to people 
1 2 3 4 
8. I believe letting students hear 
controversial speakers can only confuse and 1 2 3 4 
mislead them 
9. I'm hard-headed and tough-minded in my 
attitudes 1 2 3 4 
10. I am a productive person who always 
gets the job done 1 2 3 4 
11. I often feel tense and jittery 
1 2 3 4 
12. I like to be where the action is 
1 2 3 4 
13. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or 
looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or 1 2 3 4 
wave of excitement 
14. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet 
1 2 3 4 
15. I never seem to be able to get organised 
1 2 3 4 
-
~-
-
_ ....... _ ..... -
continued ........ . 
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5 
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5 
5 
, 
B.2-3 
16. I often feel helpless and want someone 
I else to solve my problems 1 2 3 4 5 
I 
17. I am a very active person 
i 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity I 
1 2 3 4 5 
I 
19. I would rather co-operate with others 
i than compete with them 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I keep my belongings clean and neat 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I am seldom sad or depressed 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I laugh easily 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I seldom notice the moods or feelings 
I that different environments produce 1 2 3 4 5 
24. Most people I know like me 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. When I make a commitment, I can 
always be counted on to follow through 1 2 3 4 5 
26. When I'm under a great deal of stress, 
sometimes I feel like I'm going to pieces 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I like to have a lot of people around me 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. I have little interest in speculating on the ! 
nature of the universe or the human 1 2 3 4 5 
condition J 
29. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate ! 
people to get what I want 1 2 3 4 5 ! 
I 
30. I'm pretty good about pacing myself so ! 
as to get things done on time 1 2 3 4 5 
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Questionnaire 7 (Well-being) 
Thinking of the past few weeks, how often has your life made you feel the following .... ? 
Cirel 
- -- -- - --- - -- - ----- --- --"--- ------ --- ---- -_.----
fl h' he tabl 
Items Never Occasionally SOME of MUCH of MOST of ALL of the 
the time the time the time time 
1. Tense 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. Uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. Worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. Calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 
, 
5. Contented 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 
6. Relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 
7. Depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 
8. Gloomy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
, 
9. Miserable 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 
10. Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 
11. Enthusiastic I 2 3 4 5 6 ! 
12. Optimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 , 
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Questionnaire 8 (Coping) 
This questionnaire asks about the methods you may use to cope with stressful experiences. 
Please read the following items carefully and then circle around a number for each item on the table 
to show your answer. Please respond to all the items. 
Items Do not use Use Use Use 
at all seldomly sometimes frequently 
1. I try to change the situation to get what I 1 2 3 4 
want 
2. I make an effort to change my 1 2 3 4 
expectations 
3. I try to convince myself that the problem 1 2 3 4 
is not very important after all 
4. I try to turn my attention away from the 1 2 3 4 
problem 
5. I try to let off steam 1 2 3 4 
6. I focus my efforts on changing the 1 2 3 4 
situation 
7. I try to convince myself that the way 1 2 3 4 
things are, is in fact, acceptable 
8. I tell myself the problem is unimportant 1 2 3 4 
9. I try to just forget the whole thing 1 2 3 4 
10. I try to relieve my tension somehow 1 2 3 4 
11. I work on changing the situation to get 1 2 3 4 
what I want 
12. I try to adjust my expectations to meet 1 2 3 4 
the situation 
13. I tell myself the problem wasn't so 1 2 3 4 
serious after all 
14. I try to keep my mind off the problem 1 2 3 4 
15. I try to just get it off my chest 1 2 3 4 
16. I try to fix what is wrong with the 1 2 3 4 
situation 
17. I try to adjust my own standards 1 2 3 4 
18. I tell myself the problem isn't such a 1 2 3 4 
big deal after all 
19. I try to avoid thinking about the 1 2 3 4 
problem 
20. I just try to relax 1 2 3 4 
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Thank-Y ou for completing this questionnaire pack. You will be contacted in the future 
regarding further research. 
If you have any further questions regarding this research, please contact: 
Tracy Gilbert 
Doctoral researcher in Psychology 
School of Social Science 
Middlesex University 
Enfield 
Tel: (020) 8411-2646 
Email: t.gilbert@mdx.ac.uk 
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Questionnaire pack for nurses and managers phase 2 
As mentioned above, the nurses completed the shortened personality questionnaire in 
phase 2. The only further change for both samples was an equivalent version of the verbal IQ 
measure presented below. 
Verbal IQ phase 2 equivalent 
This test assesses your knowledge of the meaning of words. Please read the following items 
carefully and then circle around a word for each item on the table to show your answer. Please reply 
to all the items. 
Items Response Choices 
1. Easy means the opposite of. ... problem simple difficult always cannot 
2. Seed is to plant as egg is to .... tree bird pollen oats potato 
3. Rich means the same as .... poor wealthy high new lucky 
4. Foot is to leg as hand is to .... body finger tall limb arm 
5. Old means the same as .... decaying tired aged youth mended 
6. Portion means the same as .... some whole part any cake 
7. Up means the opposite of .... short small low down young 
8. Seeing is to picture as hearing is to .... sight sculpture ear song deaf 
9. Scarce means the same as .... unobtainable lack unique rare frightened 
10. Sky is to ground as ceiling is to .... roof down floor rug high 
11. When is to where as time is to .... how why space length relativity 
12. Backwards means the same as .... upside-down reversed stop forwards gear 
14. Autumn is to Winter as October is to .... April July Spring rain January 
14. Permanent means the opposite of. ... part-time ever changing temporary stable 
15. Fact is to fiction as historian is to .... history book novelist teacher story 
16. Industrious means the same as .... busy hard-working energetic overworked 
17. Motive is to method as why is to .... wherefore reason how because where 
18. Flat means the same as .... straight level uneven oblique inclined 
happy 
19. Doubt means the opposite of .... wonder certainty correct dubious indefinite 
20. The day after tomon'ow is to the day Friday Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday 
before yesterday_ as Wednesday is to .... 
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Study 4 
Presenters self-ratings of embarrassment 
Seminar Group Name: 
Room no. & time of seminar: 
Seminar topic: 
Please complete the following scales describing how you felt when presenting to the rest of the group 
by circling the most appropriate response. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU DO THIS IN THE 
ORDER IN WHICH YOU PRESENTED. 
(Circle the most appropriate response) 
Presenter 1 - Name: 
Student no: 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embalTassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 2 - Name: 
Student no: 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 3 - Name: 
Student no: 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 4 - Name: 
Student no: 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 5 - Name: 
Student no: 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
- ... _- -
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Audience ratings of embarrassment 
Presentation topic 
Seminar group name 
Your Student No 
Please complete the following scales describing how you think each presenter felt during their 
presentation to the rest of the group. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU DO THIS IN THE ORDER 
IN WHICH THE GROUP PRESENTED AND AS THE PRESENA TION PROGRESSES. 
(Circle the most appropriate response) 
Presenter 1 Name: ______________ __ 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 2 Name: ______________ __ 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 3 Name: ______________ __ 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 4 Name: ______________ __ 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
Presenter 5 Name: _____________ __ 
unembarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 embarrassed 
poised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 awkward 
composed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 flustered 
EP was assessed using the 14-item APT (as in the questionnaire packs for studies 2 and 3 
above) 
Emotional Expression was assessed using the 16-item EEQ (as in the questionnaire 
packs for studies 2 and 3 above) 
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Empathy 
This questionnaire is concerned with measuring emotional responsiveness to others. Please read 
each question carefully and then circle around a number for each item on the table to show your 
answer. Please reply to all the items. 
I 
- .. "' .............. s Iv D' ~ •• ~.ll:.. ~.sa~ ree s IStrongly Agree 
1. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
group 
2. People make too much of the feelings and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
sensitivity of animals 
3. I often find public displays of affection annoying 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
sorry for themselves 
5. I become nervous if others around me seem to be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
nervous 
6. I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
problems 
8. Sometimes the words of a love song can move 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
me deeply 
9. I tend to loose control when I am bringing bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
news to people 
10. The people around me have a great influence on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
my moods 
1l. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
unemotional 
12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
job training centre 
13. I don't get upset just because a friend is acting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
upset 
14. I like to watch people open presents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Seeing people cry upsets me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Some songs make me happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I really get involved with the feelings of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
characters in a novel 
19. I get very angry when I see someone being ill- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
treated 
20. I am able to remain calm even though those 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
around me WOlTL 
21. When a friend starts to talk about his problems, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I try to steer the conversation to something else 
22. Another's laughter is not catching for me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
amount of crying and sniffling around me 
24. I am able to make decisions without being 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
influenced by people's feelings 
25. I cannot continue to feel OK if people around 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
me are depressed 
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26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 
people so much 
27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ! 
! 
28. Becoming involved in books or movies is a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 
little silly 
29. It upsets me to see helpless old people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 
I 
30. I become more irritated than sympathetic when 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I see someone's tears I 
- _ ....... _ ... _ .... __ ..... __ ..... __ .... __ ... _-_ ...... __ ....... -
-
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Studies 5-8 
Self-report measures 
EP (For studies 5-8) was assessed using the 14-item APT (as in the questionnaire packs for 
studies 2 and 3 above) 
Anxiety (For studies 5-8) 
Self-evaluation questionnaire (State-Anxiety) 
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate response to the right of the statement to 
indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There is no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on anyone statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present 
feelings best. 
STATEMENT NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT MODERATELY VERY MUCH 
SO SO 
1. I feel calm 1 2 3 4 
2. I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
3. I am tense 1 2 3 4 
4. I feel strained 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel upset 1 2 3 4 
7. I am presently worrying over 1 2 3 4 
possible misfortunes 
8. I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4 
9. I feel frightened 1 2 3 4 
10. I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11. I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12. I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
13. I am jittery 1 2 3 4 
14. I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4 
15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16. I feel content 1 2 3 4 
17. I am worried 1 2 3 4 
18. I feel confused 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel steady 1 2 3 4 
20. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
-- ....... -
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Self-evaluation questionnaire (Trait-Anxiety) 
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate response to the right of the statement to 
indicate how you generally feel. There is no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
anyone statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
STATEMENT ALMOST SOMETIMES OFTEN ALMOST 
NEVER ALWAYS 
21. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
22. I feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4 
23. I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 
24. I wish I could be as happy as others 1 2 3 4 
seem to be 
25. I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4 
26. I feel rested 1 2 3 4 
27. I am "calm, cool, and collected" 1 2 3 4 
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so 1 2 3 4 
that I cannot overcome them 
29. I worry too much over something that 1 2 3 4 
doesn't really matter 
30. I am happy 1 2 3 4 
31. I have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4 
32. I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4 
33. I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
34. I make decisions easily 1 2 3 4 
35. I feel inadequate 1 2 3 4 
36. I am content 1 2 3 4 
37. Some unimportant thought runs through 1 2 3 4 
my mind and bothers me 
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I 1 2 3 4 
can't put them out of my mind 
39. I am a steady person 1 2 3 4 
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I 1 2 3 4 
think over my recent concerns and interests 
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Depression (Study 8) 
Self-response questionnaire 
This questionnaire is designed to assess how you feel about life in general. All information received in 
response to this questionnaire will be treated in strict confidence. Please circle one statement per line 
and respond to all the statements. 
CIRCLE YOUR CHOICE, ONE PER LINE 
l. I still enjoy the things I 
used to enjoy Definitely as Not quite so Only a little Hardly at all 
much much 
2. I can laugh and see the 
funny side of things As much as I Not quite so Definitely not Not at all 
always could much now so much now 
3. I feel cheerful 
Not at all Not often Sometimes Most of the 
time 
4. I feel as if I am slowed 
down Nearly all the Very often Sometimes Not at all 
time 
5. I have lost interest in my I don't take so I may not take I take just as 
appearance Definitely much care as I quite as much much care as 
should care ever 
6. I look forward with 
enjoyment to things As much as Rather less Definitely less Hardly at all 
ever I did than I used to than I used to 
7. I can enjoy a good book, 
radio or TV programme Often Sometimes Not often Very seldom 
Stimuli for the attentional tasks 
Photographs for Study 5 
References to exact images were as follows: anger (EM5-l4, JBl-23, MF2-7, M02-
11, WF3-l & Al-14), happiness (EM4-7, JBl-9, MFl-6, MOl-4, WF2-l2 & Al-6), 
and neutral (EM2-4, JBl-3, MFl-2, MOl-5, WF2-5 & Al-2). 
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Angry face set 
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Happy face set 
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Neutral face set 
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Schematic faces 
Angry (studies 6, 7 and 8) Happy (studies 6 and 7) 
Neutral (studies 6, 7 and 8) Sad (Study 8) 
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